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Till fire joins wind  
it cannot take a step.  
 
Do men know  
it's like that  
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Introduction 
Words are beneficial tools which have enabled the human species to survive and 
flourish. Concepts are equally beneficial, for they are expressed through words. 
People use the concept of danger, for example, when they talk about danger. Talking 
about danger is beneficial because it meets the need to warn others and to teach them 
how to avoid threats to survival. The concept of mushroom can be used both to talk 
about and to find mushrooms, as opposed to other plants or prey.  
 Concepts, then, serve a function in social life. They meet specific needs. 
Furthermore, the needs they function to meet affect their extension. For example, 
having a concept of dangerous mushroom meets the need to warn others of inedible 
as opposed to edible mushrooms and to teach them about same. Yet, one might 
object that all mushrooms are potentially dangerous. If one were to inhale them or to 
eat several barrels at once, otherwise innocuous mushrooms could prove harmful. 
We should not, though, allow these remote possibilities to affect the extension of the 
concept of dangerous mushroom. If we began to refer to all mushrooms as 
dangerous, we would no longer be able to use the concept in a fruitful way; its 
capacity to function in useful warnings and lessons would be lost. Given the function 
of the concept, it is far better to reserve it for mushrooms that are dangerous when 
eaten the typical human way.  
 Notice that with this thesis I do not adopt any radical stance about the social 
construction of truth or objective reality. Human interests do not create the 
mushroom nor its chemical makeup. Thus, „dangerous mushroom‟ refers to the 
outside world. Nonetheless, the extension of the concept is irreducibly relative to 
human interests and needs. If different foods made humans sick, the concept of 
dangerous mushroom would have a different extension. Likewise, if humans could 
eat anything at all, there would be no more need for the concept of dangerous 
mushroom at all. Human interests determine how our concepts carve up the world; 
they do not determine the world itself.
1
 
 In this thesis I argue that knowledge is another useful concept which meets 
human needs. It is useful to be able to recognize a certain sort of relationship 
                                                 
1
 This point is not incompatible with the existence of natural kinds. It could be human interests that 
determine which natural kinds we conceptually recognize and which natural kinds we ignore. 
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between a person and a proposition, specifically the sort of relationship that should 
inspire trust. Human societies help themselves by drawing attention to that special 
kind of trustworthiness; they call it „knowledge‟. Having a concept of knowledge 
helps people navigate others‟ assertions and their own beliefs, dividing the 
trustworthy from the untrustworthy. As they make that division, their goal is to trust 
only the true. Their strategy for reaching that goal involves trusting only the 
authoritative. The concept of knowledge then comprises both goal and strategy: a 
person who knows that p is thus a person who should be trusted, because her belief 
that p is true and because she has the authority to believe that p. 
 I do not support this thesis by means of conceptual analysis. Conceptual analysis 
of knowledge begins with an intuitive grasp of the extension of the concept of 
knowledge and then dissects those intuitions, attempting to extract a list of 
individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions that can accurately predict the 
analyst‟s intuitive response to any hypothetical example.2 While the bulk of Anglo-
American epistemology has relied on conceptual analysis, its practitioners still await 
a detailed explanation and defense of their method. To date no such account has met 
with general acceptance, or even popularity.
3
 Neither shall I attempt to remedy this 
deficit. My thesis suggests, rather, that we may use a new kind of method to go about 
conceptualizing knowledge: conceptual synthesis. The role model for my 
presentation and application of conceptual synthesis is Edward Craig‟s work in 
Knowledge and the State of Nature: An Essay in Conceptual Synthesis.
4
  
 True to its name, a conceptual synthesis must begin by finding and assembling 
conditions, rather than analytically extracting them from a given concept. After 
elaborating on the motivation behind his methodological advances (1.a), I clarify 
Craig‟s own use of the method in Chapter One, by breaking his process down into 
four distinct steps. First, he puts forth a hypothesis as to which function the concept 
of knowledge might serve. Second, he explicates the conditions that any concept 
serving that function would require. Third, he synthesizes the explicated conditions 
into one concept and finally, he compares the synthesized concept to our intuitive 
                                                 
2
 Grundmann 2008, pp. 10 – 11.  
3
 The dubiousness of basing the method on intuitions has drawn particularly severe critique and no 
satisfying response. (Williamson, 2007, p. 215) For specific criticisms, see Bishop & Trout 2004; 
Buckwalter & Stich forthcoming; Weinburg, Nichols, & Stich 2001; Stich 1990. For an attempted 
response, see Sosa 2005. 
4
 Craig 1990. 
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grasp of the concept of knowledge. Thus conceptual synthesis ends where conceptual 
analysis begins. Rather than grounding the entire proceeding, intuitions serve as a 
final test of the hypothesis. If the comparison reveals no unacceptable discrepancy, 
then the synthesized concept may be identified with the concept of knowledge. These 
four steps, hypothesis, explication, synthesis and comparison, comprise the practical 
explication (1.b). After explaining this aspect of the method, I present the results 
which Craig achieves by using it. Craig hypothesizes that the concept of knowledge 
might meet the need for inquirers to label good informants (1.c) and accordingly 
synthesizes a concept of the good informant (1.d).  
 As Craig acknowledges, his original hypothesis does not prove successful; the 
final comparison reveals significant discrepancies between the concept of the good 
informant and the concept of knowledge. To remedy the mismatch, he introduces a 
strategy which has provoked widely varying responses. Following Bernard Williams, 
I refer to this aspect of the method as a genealogy and devote Chapter Two to its 
clarification. A genealogy is a story that explains a process of change. First I explain 
the form it takes in Craig‟s work; Craig tells a story about the process of 
objectivization (2.a). His good informant hypothesis describes the needs of a fairly 
isolated individual, yet all real individuals are embedded in their society. With the 
story of objectivization, Craig describes how concepts gradually change as people 
adapt to social demands. This story should bridge the gap between the overly 
subjective concept of the good informant and the objective concept of knowledge, 
thus saving Craig‟s hypothesis. I go on to present the various forms in which his 
genealogy has been received (2.b), delineating four kinds of genealogies in and 
inspired by Craig‟s and Williams‟s work: rhetorical, imaginary, conjectural, and 
factual. I also present a fifth approach, exemplified by Klemens Kappel, who omits 
the genealogy altogether and concentrates on the practical explication alone (2.c). 
This fifth approach need not entail a total rejection of objectivization; it rather recasts 
objectivization as a modification of the original hypothesis rather than the 
synthesized concept. That is, the original hypothesis could be reformulated to take 
social circumstances into account from the first step on. My own work falls under the 
fifth approach.  
 While Chapters One and Two mostly restrict themselves to the presentation of 
Craig‟s conceptual synthesis and its reception, the remainder of the thesis consists of 
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my own application of the method. I suggest a new hypothesis (3.a): the concept of 
knowledge may function to meet the need for epistemic authority. The alternative 
hypothesis modifies Craig‟s in that it begins by recognizing the social demands on 
any public concept, obviating the need for a genealogical story of objectivization. 
Yet the alternative hypothesis should also include Craig‟s original good informant 
hypothesis, rather than replace it (3.b). These two features of the hypothesis forebode 
trouble (3.c): how may the social and individual demands coexist without cancelling 
each other out?  
 To explicate conditions from the hypothesis, I draw inspiration from the work of 
John Hawthorne and Jason Stanley, hypothesizing that the need for epistemic 
authority may be derived from the demands of rational practical reasoning (4.a). 
Subjects need to identify when it is appropriate to believe a proposition, so that they 
may rationally use that proposition as a premise in their practical reasoning. The 
concept of epistemic authority could function to label those subjects upon whose 
authority it is appropriate to believe. From this hypothesis, I explicate the condition 
that the concept of knowledge must be sensitive to features that affect an inquirer‟s 
practical environment, features such as stakes and the end of inquiry (4.b). From this 
condition I draw the conclusion that, in order to serve my hypothesized function, the 
concept‟s extension must be sensitive to the practical environment of the attributor 
(4.c).  Thus, despite the similarities to Hawthorne and Stanley‟s subject-sensitive 
invariantism, my synthesis must allow for sensitivity to an attributor‟s context. The 
demand for contextualism I practically explicate, however, is for functional 
contextualism, which is neutral towards the question of whether contextual shift is 
semantic or pragmatic. Thus, I bypass the traditional debate over contextualism and 
concentrate rather on developing a clearer picture of the behavior of the concept of 
knowledge, regardless of whether that behavior is due to semantic or pragmatic 
features. Finally, I return to the problem anticipated in Chapter Three, showing two 
conflicts between the public demands of the hypothesis and the private demands of 
the explicated contextualist condition (3.g). Altogether, I explicate three conditions 
which any concept that met the need for epistemic authority would have to satisfy 
(3.h), one to meet the need for contextualist sensitivity and two to meet the need for 
public stability.  
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 Using those three desiderata, I evaluate various conceptions of knowledge in 
Chapter Four to judge whether they provide a synthesis that would be able to serve 
my hypothesized function. First I consider two forms of invariantism, high standards 
(5.a) and moderate (5.b), and two forms of contextualism, salience-sensitive (5.c) 
and pragmatic (5.d). None of these conceptions manages to synthesize all three 
conditions into one coherent concept. I then turn to a more successful approach, 
convention contextualism (5.e), which does satisfy all three desiderata and so does 
provide a synthesis of the concept of knowledge that would be able to serve my 
hypothesized function. As my final synthesis of the concept of knowledge (5.f) 
describes how knowledge functions as a label of authority in practical reasoning, 
sensitive to conventional contexts, I abbreviate the final synthesis KAP–CC. 
 In Chapter Six, I compare the KAP–CC synthesis to generally shared intuitions 
about the concept of knowledge, considering several possible discrepancies between 
how they describe disagreement (6.a), behavior evaluation (6.b), belief (6.c), and 
useless information (6.d). Finally, I suggest several ways in which further research 
could widen and deepen my results through normative stipulation and empirical data, 
including factual and conjectural genealogies (6.e). 
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1. The Concept of the Good Informant 
In the following two chapters, I shall introduce Craig‟s methodological innovations. 
As described in the introduction, conceptual analysis proceeds by analyzing the 
intuitive extension of the concept. Craig begins instead by asking, what need might 
having that concept meet? With a hypothesized need before him, he goes on to ask, 
which conditions would a concept that met that need require? Thus, he does go on to 
offer an analysis, but the object of the analysis is a need rather than an intuitive 
concept. He analyzes the need to explicate the conditions of its satisfaction. He then 
puts those conditions together into a synthesis and compares the result to our 
intuitive concept. If the comparison shows a striking similarity, the hypothesis is 
likely to be true. 
We can best understand Craig‟s conceptual synthesis as divisible into two distinct 
parts that I shall present in turn: a practical explication and a genealogy. This chapter 
is devoted to the practical explication and the results Craig draws from its 
application. 
a. The function of the concept of knowledge 
i. Why do people attribute knowledge? 
Before presenting the details of his method, we should consider why Craig developed 
it and why he found it appropriate in particular for understanding the concept of 
knowledge. Craig‟s motivation is based in an observation and a question. 
There seems to be no known language in which sentences using „know‟ do not find a 
comfortable and colloquial equivalent. The implication is that it answers to some 
very general needs of human life and thought, and it would surely be interesting to 
know which and how.
5
 
Craig observes that every linguistic community has some close translation for the 
word “knowledge” and its cognates. This observation inspires the question, why does 
everyone talk about knowledge? What need do all these people have in common that 
the concept of knowledge functions to meet? Thus, the widespread use of the word 
knowledge motivates the first step of the conceptual synthesis, the proposal of a 
hypothesis as to what function the concept of knowledge might serve. 
                                                 
5
 Craig 1990, p. 2.  
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 It is of course to be taken for granted that it will still be possible to use the 
concept of knowledge in ways secondary to the hypothesized function. The 
imperative “Stop!” primarily meets the need of getting someone to stop doing 
something, but it can also be used to scare someone, to make a joke, or in make-
believe. I will assume that these needs are secondary to the first, for if the concept 
didn‟t usually function to serve the primary need, then the secondary needs couldn‟t 
be met either. If we find such a primary function for knowledge, then we should be 
able to plausibly characterize its other functions as secondary to that.
6
 
 One might argue that the primary function of the concept of knowledge is simply 
to talk about people who have knowledge. Knowledge is out there; the concept of 
knowledge functions simply to describe it.
7
 Craig rejects this answer, reasoning that 
knowledge is not a natural kind.
8
 That is, the phenomenon of knowledge is grounded 
in the human need for the concept and not the other way around. Yet even if 
knowledge were a natural kind, this answer would not preclude the applicability of 
conceptual synthesis to knowledge. After all, whether phenomena of knowledge 
naturally exist or not, the definition of knowledge is controversial, and that 
controversy is rooted in disagreement over the very standards that its definition must 
meet. We may approach that controversy by asking, why do we need the concept of 
knowledge? Perhaps the question could be rephrased as, why do we need to talk 
about this natural kind? Nonetheless, there is no immediate reason to assume that the 
answers will be any less important to quelling the controversy that surrounds the 
standards for a definition of knowledge.
9
 
ii. Value  
If the concept of knowledge serves a widespread social function, it has social value. 
Nonetheless, it is not immediately obvious that Craig‟s work may be classified as a 
                                                 
6
 (Kappel, 2010, pp. 71 - 72) 
7
 Hilary Kornblith offers this response to Craig in Kornblith forthcoming.  
8
 Craig 1990, p. 3. 
9
 For example, Kornblith assumes that the concept of knowledge need not be immune to outlandish 
counterexamples. (Kornblith 2002, p. 69.) With a conceptual synthesis, he could defend that 
assumption, arguing that we do not need the concept to be so immune. As is stands, the assumption is 
not adequately founded and his claim that biology should determine the relevant standards seems 
capricious.  
  
16 
 
study of the value of knowledge.
10
 Craig‟s method concerns the function of 
applications of the concept of knowledge, not knowledge itself.  
We are asking not so much, when is the ascription of a certain concept correct, but 
rather, why it is applied?
11
 
Applications of the concept of knowledge generally take the form of knowledge 
attributions: one subject attributes knowledge to another subject.  
 By bringing the function of attributions to the fore, Craig analyzes the value of 
having a concept of a certain phenomenon, rather than the value of the phenomenon 
itself. The two kinds of values are not identical. For example, having a concept of 
badness might be useful in so far as it functions to help humans avoid bad things. 
The concept of badness is valuable, but we need not conclude that bad things are 
valuable. Thus, the answer to Craig‟s question need not necessarily reveal anything 
about the value of knowledge per se. 
 It would of course defy most epistemologists‟ intuitions if knowledge per se 
turned out to be noxious or neutral. In fact, Craig‟s work does not lead us to such a 
conclusion. He does argue that the value of the concept of knowledge is based upon 
the recognition of something valuable. Nonetheless, it is important to keep in mind in 
what follows that we are concentrating on the function played by knowledge 
attributions, rather than knowledge per se. 
b. Practical explication 
A conceptual synthesis begins with a hypothesized need and goes on to synthesize a 
concept which would meet that need. As Craig puts it, we should take, 
some prima facie plausible hypothesis about what the concept of knowledge does for 
us, what its role in our life might be, and then ask what a concept having that role 
would be like, what conditions would govern its application.
12
 
If the concept that would meet our hypothesized needs has conditions that add up to 
resemble our intuitive concept of knowledge closely enough, then it seems we may 
identify the two. That is, we construct a new concept so that it meets a certain set of 
standards, and if it has enough features in common with the intuitive concept, then 
we may describe the intuitive concept‟s intension as consisting of the new concept‟s 
                                                 
10
 Contrast Kusch 2009, p. 65.  
11
 Craig 1990, p. 14.  
12
 Ibid., p. 2.  
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conditions. Craig finds precedence for such a method of analysis in Rudolf Carnap‟s 
theoretical explication.
13
 He accordingly refers to his method as a “practical 
explication”, and I follow suit. However, my use of the phrase differs somewhat 
from Craig‟s, as I am particularly interested in contrasting the steps described here 
with the genealogical step that I describe in Chapter Two. Craig simply refers to his 
entire project, including the genealogy, as a practical explication. 
i. Practical explication in four steps 
I have broken the practical explication down into four steps: 
 
Step One: Hypothesis  
Hypothesize a need that the concept of knowledge might meet.  
 
 Step Two: Explication  
Analyze the need to determine precisely what would be required in order to meet it. 
If the hypothesis was well chosen, then the need will require a concept. Explicate the 
conditions such a concept would require in order to meet the need. 
 
Step Three: Synthesis  
Synthesize those conditions into a concept, which, did it exist, would meet the 
hypothesized need. 
 
Step Four: Comparison 
Compare the synthesized concept to knowledge-related intuitions. If the synthesized 
concept does not contradict the intuitions generated by the concept of knowledge, 
then that constitutes a strong case for the hypothesis. It would then seem that the 
concept of knowledge actually does function to meet the hypothesized need. At that 
point, the burden of proof would be on the opponent.
14
 
                                                 
13
 Ibid., p. 8.  
14
 Ibid., p. 4. 
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ii. Two constraints on the hypothesis 
A hypothesis about what the concept of knowledge does for us takes its first form as 
a hypothesis about our needs. That is, the first step of Craig‟s method is to ask what 
kind of need might generate a knowledge-like concept in response.  
 Craig doesn‟t find it necessary to provide any arguments for choosing one initial 
hypothesis over another. Instead he prefers the “proof of the pudding,”15 meaning 
that we should evaluate the hypothesis by its results. If the results are good, then the 
hypothesis is good.  That is, if the hypothesized need does in fact demand conditions 
that resemble our intuitive concept of knowledge, then that constitutes sufficient a 
posteriori defense that the concept of knowledge does in fact function to meet those 
needs. 
 Nonetheless, there are two constraints on the hypothesis from the very 
beginning.  
(1) Generality requirement 
The first arises out of the following observation: every society that has a language 
has a word for the concept of knowledge. Craig takes this to suggest that the concept 
of knowledge might meet “some very general needs of human life and thought.”16 
So, the hypothesized need must be very widely spread. Precisely, it must be common 
enough to be shared by “any society that has a well-developed language, sufficiently 
well developed for us to be able to say that it exercises a concept … approximately 
identifiable with our concept of knowledge…” 17  Thus, the needs must be “so 
general, indeed, that one cannot imagine their changing whilst anything we can still 
recognise as social life persists.”18 
 If the hypothesized need were more exclusive, peculiar only to certain societies 
or to certain individuals within any given society, then a practical explication would 
fail to yield unified results. That is, the analyst would have to construct several 
concepts, each meeting different needs, in order to hope to describe the different 
ways in which the concept of knowledge is used. This is a valid alternative, but it is 
worthwhile to find out if it is our only alternative. That is, we should check whether 
                                                 
15
 Ibid., p. 3.   
16
 Ibid., p. 2.  
17
 Ibid., p. 4.  
18
 Ibid., p. 10. 
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there might be a widespread need, which one common concept of knowledge 
functions to meet. 
(2) Simplicity preference 
The drive to find one unified concept lies in the simplicity preference. Craig relies on 
the principle that the best explanations are the simplest explanations. Complex 
hypotheses should be invoked only if simple ones prove insufficient.
19
 Thus if the 
results satisfy, then the hypothesis is complete and ought not to be specified or 
augmented any further. 
 The same goes for the results. A more complicated synthesis of the concept of 
knowledge should only be given if a simpler one is insufficient for meeting the 
hypothesized needs. 
c. The need 
i. Survival and information 
Now that we have a grasp on how a practical explication works, we may turn to the 
results Craig draws from it. In accordance with the generality requirement and the 
simplicity preference, Craig begins with very simple and general truisms about 
human life.  
 People need to survive. In order to survive, they must perform survival-
conducive actions. In order to perform survival-conducive actions, they must have 
accurate information about their environment. A human must be cognitively aware of 
danger in order to best protect himself from it, just as he must be cognitively aware 
of food in order to best locate it. 
Human beings need true beliefs about their environment, beliefs that can serve to 
guide their actions to a successful outcome. That being so, they need sources of 
information that will lead them to believe truths.
20
  
These truths serve as premises in humans‟ practical reasoning. Humans stay alive by 
avoiding foolish or false reasons for action. 
 As revealed in the citation above, the need for good information generates the 
need for good sources of information. Often, humans rely on themselves.  
                                                 
19
 Ibid., pp. 4, 68, 92 
20
 Ibid., p. 11 
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[Human beings] have „on-board‟ sources, eyes and ears, powers of reasoning, which 
give them a primary stock of beliefs.
21
 
Craig does not hypothesize that the use of „on-board‟ sources generates a widespread 
need for a knowledge-like concept. I return to this point in section iii below. 
ii. Informants 
The source of information must often be another person, for any number of reasons. 
Say that a woman is looking one way, while a man is looking another way; she can 
double the amount of information at her disposal by asking him what he sees. Of 
course, spatial differences are not the only causes of informational asymmetry; 
novices need to rely on experts; the short-sighted need to rely on the far-sighted; 
scientists need to rely on their colleagues, etc. One person cannot figure everything 
out for herself; the division of epistemic labor is crucial to survival. As a result, just 
about every member in every society has needed, needs and will need to find out 
whom to ask and whom to trust about certain questions. That is, people need to be 
able to evaluate each other as to whether or not they are good informants. Craig‟s 
hypothesis, then, is that people need a concept of a good informant. 
 Craig moves quickly from the need for good sources of information to the need 
to evaluate sources of information. 
On any issue, some informants will be better than others, more likely to supply a true 
belief. (Fred, who is up a tree, is more likely to tell me the truth as to the 
whereabouts of the tiger than Mabel, who is in the cave.) So any community may be 
presumed to have an interest in evaluating sources of information; and in connection 
with that interest certain concepts will be in use. The hypothesis I wish to try out is 
that the concept of knowledge is one of them.
22
  
In the cited passage, he relies on the following progression of needs: 
(1) The need for information generates a need for good informants.  
(2) The need for good informants generates a need to think and talk about 
evaluating informants.  
This transition from (1) to (2) is not entirely obvious. In fact, it relies on a 
controversial premise about the nature of testimonial interaction, as the next section 
shall reveal.  
                                                 
21
 Ibid. 
22
 Ibid. 
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iii. Doubt demands explicit trustworthiness 
Craig argues that we should expect to find a need for a knowledge-like concept in 
social, testimonial situations rather than situations in which humans use their „on-
board‟ sources. That is, the widespread need to attribute knowledge is not based on 
the need to make first-person attributions, i.e. to attribute an evaluative concept to 
one‟s self by saying, “I am a good informant as to whether p.” According to Craig, 
people are more likely to need a way to say something like, “He is a good informant 
as to whether p.” 
To find oneself in possession of a belief on the question whether p pre-empts 
inquiry; to take a self-conscious look at one‟s own apparatus with the doubt in mind 
that it may have delivered a falsehood calls for a considerable degree of 
sophistication. Our investigation ought to start from the position in which we as yet 
have no belief about p, want a true belief about it one way or the other, and seek to 
get it from someone else.
23
 
He reasons in this passage that because humans are not so likely to doubt their own 
beliefs, the need to evaluate one‟s own trustworthiness might not meet the generality 
requirement. He does, though, assume that the need to evaluate others meets the 
generality requirement. Craig‟s hypothesis is thus based on the assumption that 
humans are very likely to doubt the assertions of others. Otherwise, the need for a 
third-person evaluation would be as unable to meet the generality requirement as the 
need for a first-person evaluation.  
 Just as humans only need a concept of edible mushroom if there are some 
inedible mushrooms around, humans only need a way to separate the trustworthy 
from the rest if they tend to encounter a good deal of untrustworthy assertions. 
Thanks to the widespread nature of interpersonal doubt, the need for such an explicit 
evaluation passes the generality requirement. It is the presence of doubt that bridges 
the gap between the need for good information and the need for a concept of the 
good informant. People need a concept that describes those situations in which their 
doubt may be dispelled.  
 We need not conceive of this doubt as an active suspicion. Even a much weaker 
form of doubt, say an inarticulate hesitation before committing to a positive belief, 
could still result in a need for a concept that entails permission to believe. 
Nonetheless, this may seem to gloss over some controversial points in the 
                                                 
23
 (Ibid.) 
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epistemology of testimony about whether and how one may, in normal 
circumstances, take another‟s assertion to be true.24 Yet Craig defends the third-
person form of the hypothesis by touting its simplicity; he claims that first-person 
considerations would make the synthesis unnecessarily complex.
25
 Given the 
complexity involved in arguing that other people are harder to trust than one‟s self, I 
find it unlikely that a restriction to the third-person scenario truly follows from the 
simplicity preference. Thus, I shall modify his hypothesis to include the needs that 
arise in first-person scenarios as well. However, for the rest of this chapter, I refrain 
from offering any critique and simply present Craig‟s own results, which rely 
exclusively on the third-person hypothesis.  
d. The conditions 
The next steps involve explicating the conditions required to meet the need for good 
informants and synthesizing them into one concept. The inquirer needs to recognize 
trustworthy subjects. What conditions would a concept have that could meet that 
need? Craig assumes that the need demands a concept of the good informant. The 
question then becomes, what features make a subject a good informant? What is the 
inquirer looking for? 
i. Prototypical case 
The first interesting point is a negative one: the concept of the good informant need 
not be definable with a list of necessary and sufficient conditions. In this respect 
Craig radically departs from conceptual analysis. For such analysts, as Michael 
DePaul writes, “the primary criterion for the adequacy of a philosophical analysis is 
immunity to intuitive counterexample.” 26  When practically explicating a new 
concept, though, the only criterion one may presuppose is that the concept must meet 
the hypothesized need.  
 Inquirers may need a concept with a certain set of conditions, x, y, and z. Still, it 
might turn out that, in one unusual situation, x, y, and z are all satisfied, and yet the 
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inquirer would still doubt. There might also be unusual situations in which one of the 
conditions is not satisfied, yet the inquirer has some other good reason to trust. 
In freakish circumstances, a purpose may be achievable in unusual ways – factors 
which would usually frustrate it may, if other features of the situation are 
exceptional, do no damage, factors which are usually vital may, abnormally, be 
dispensable.
27
 
Craig argues that neither of these unusual situations would have the power to change 
the concept.  
 I can find at least two motivations for his rejection of the “primary criterion” of 
conceptual analysis. First, Craig draws attention to how the concept is likely 
acquired. 
It is precisely by being everyday practice that everyday practice manages to impress 
itself upon speakers and so stay what it is.
28
 
As an inquirer repeatedly searches for and comes across good informants, certain 
characteristics common to each of these experiences impress themselves upon her. 
Indeed, any concept that serves a practical purpose for entire communities likely 
must be acquired in just this manner, for it must be acquirable by every child, not 
only those with specialized educations. If this is indeed Craig‟s point, then he would 
have an ally in Timothy Williamson who supports an analysis of „knowledge‟ as a 
vague term with the following argument: 
We understand [many philosophically significant terms] not by learning precise 
definitions but by extrapolating from examples which leave their application to 
ranges of borderline cases unclear.
29
  
Language acquisition is a hodgepodge affair and the blurry edges of the concept of 
knowledge might be expected to reflect that. 
 Craig also argues that a less determined concept would be better able to play the 
hypothesized function, as it is better fitted to an inquirer‟s strategic concerns. 
To try to make a practice of detecting freakish cases would mean incurring high 
costs in time and energy; and successful detection would scarcely ever offer any 
benefit which could not be had by finding a standard informant, or investigating for 
oneself. In practice, therefore, it must be the standard or prototypical case at which 
the inquirer‟s strategy is directed, so that one might almost say that for practical 
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purposes what the concept amounts to is the essential description of the prototypical 
case.
30
 
Remember, according to the hypothesis the concept of the good informant exists in 
order to help inquirers who are looking for an answer to the question “Who can tell 
me whether p?” The concept of the good informant will thus take on those features 
for which the inquirer is alert when she is trying to find someone who can tell her 
whether p. Her best strategy is to be alert for the features that are usually there. If in 
some bizarre but possible world she might get what she wants without all of those 
features, or she might have all the features, but still cannot get what she wants, that 
should not affect her strategy. 
 This explication from the hypothesized need makes a biconditional definition of 
the concept of knowledge inappropriate. That is, we will not be able to plug the 
explicated conditions into the right side of the following formula: “S knows that p if 
and only if x, y, and z.” The strictness of the phrase “if and only if” does not properly 
reflect the vague concept with typical conditions that the hypothesized need requires. 
Nonetheless, in what follows I will continue to present the results of the synthesis in 
just such a formula. I do so only to promote the clarity of my claims. The point 
should not be forgotten that the “if and only if” is not meant to indicate strict 
necessity and sufficiency. Rather, the conditions on the right side of the formula will 
typically be individually necessary and typically be jointly sufficient. Thus, one 
bizarre counterexample will not be a satisfying refutation of my final definition. 
 Bizarre counterexamples may be helpful insofar as they suggest a serious flaw. 
While thought experiments might present extremely unlikely situations, they can still 
inspire very clear and strong intuitions. It is likely that these intuitions do have some 
relation to the function of the concept of knowledge.
31
 Still, opponents need to show 
that relation; that is, they need to show how the counterexample demonstrates the 
overall inability of the synthesis to fully account for the function of the concept of 
knowledge. Therein lays the strength of such an objection. If the counterexample 
does not reveal any such inability, then it is only a freak curiosity and may be 
disregarded. 
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ii. The goal: True, intelligible assertion 
A demand for the concept of the good informant arises out of the inquirer‟s need to 
answer the question, “Who can tell me whether p?” Therefore, according to Craig, 
the conditions of the concept are going to be those conditions that would satisfy the 
inquirer. What does the inquirer want? 
 She wants an informant that offers true information as to whether p. That 
offering usually takes the form of a belief that the informant sincerely asserts. It is 
possible that the informant offer the information in some other way. Maybe the 
assertion is true, but only because the informant is lying about his false belief. In that 
case, so long as the inquirer sees that the informant is lying, she can still get her true 
information. Maybe the informant has a hesitant constitution and so doesn‟t quite 
believe the information. In that case, so long as the inquirer sees that the informant 
should be more certain, she can still get her true information.  
 Nonetheless, due to the rarity of such scenarios and the amount of background 
knowledge they demand of the inquirer, the inquirer‟s strategy will still be to find 
informants who will offer information in the form of a true belief that they sincerely 
assert. Therefore, Craig insists that we may still explicate the condition that the 
informant must have a true belief as to whether p. Thus, if an informant is to be 
good, then the following condition must hold: 
 
Disjunctive belief condition 
S1 is a good informant for S2 that p only if either p and the informant believes 
that p, or not-p and the informant believes that not-p.
32
 
 
Since in the prototypical case the good informant that p would believe that p, Craig 
synthesizes the belief condition into his concept. Christoph Kelp, however, remains 
unconvinced that the good informant concept really would demand a belief 
condition.
33
 I will return to this objection later, offering two further arguments for the 
explication of a belief condition.
34
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 In any case, Craig holds that the good informant concept also has an intelligible 
assertion condition. That is, in order to be a good informant, the informant must 
sincerely assert his belief to the inquirer, and the inquirer must be able to understand 
him.
35
 We have thus explicated the following conditions for the concept of the good 
informant: 
 
The truth condition  
S1 is a good informant for S2 that p only if p.  
 
The intelligible assertion condition 
S1 is a good informant for S2 that p only if S2 hears and understands S1 assert 
that p. 
 
Notice that I have simplified Craig‟s version. Rather than keep the disjunctive form, 
which describes what S1 needs to be a good informant as to whether p, I have only 
described what S1 needs to be a good informant that p. With this reformulation, we 
lose the element of uncertainty that characterizes the inquirer‟s position. However, I 
think that this element is adequately accounted for by the following indicator 
property condition; so I will leave the truth and intelligible assertion conditions as 
they are, for simplicity‟s sake. 
iii. The strategy: Indicator properties 
If an inquirer is just looking around for subjects with true beliefs as to whether p, she 
is not going to get very far. How can she separate the subjects with true beliefs from 
the subjects with false beliefs? She needs some sort of indication that the subject has 
a true belief. That is, an inquirer will not directly search for an informant with a true 
belief, but rather for an informant with some property indicative of a true belief about 
whether p. To meet that need, Craig holds that we must explicate not only a 
condition that reflects the inquirer‟s goal, but also a condition that reflects her 
strategy. Without a strategy, what use is a goal? Craig‟s final synthesis includes both. 
In this aspect, his work coincides with that of Matthew Weiner, who holds that the 
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concept of knowledge is, like a Swiss Army Knife, “an economical way to carry its 
components around.”36   
 Craig calls the indicator property simply property X. It needn‟t be specified any 
further, for it is not any one particular sort of indicator property the inquirer is after; 
any sort will do. Therefore, we need not complicate our analysis with stipulations 
about the informant‟s belief having been caused by this or that, or about the 
informant having a good reason. Although both those sorts of properties could 
function as indicator properties, neither can claim to be the only desirable indicator 
property. The only thing that matters is that the inquirer can somehow tell that the 
informant has got a true belief. To do so, the inquirer must detect any property that 
correlates reliably with being right about p. 
 The question then arises, how reliably must the property so correlate? We may 
phrase the question of reliability in the terminology of possible worlds. What range 
of possible worlds must the inquirer take into account when deciding whether the 
informant is likely to be right as to whether p? Craig argues that, here too, the best 
answer is an indeterminate one. The range of possible worlds in which a good 
informant must be right as to whether p is entirely relative to the inquirer.
37
  
 Many variables can affect the level of reliability that the inquirer demands. If it 
is very urgent that the inquirer form a belief, she might accept any informant with a 
property that indicates better than even chances of being right.
38
 If, on the other hand, 
her stakes are extremely high and the consequences will be devastating if she forms a 
false belief as to whether p, then she will only accept an informant with an indicator 
property that correlates extremely reliably with being right about p.
39
  
 The two clauses on the indicator property are that it (a) correlates with being 
right about whether p reliably enough for the inquirer and (b) is detectable by the 
inquirer. We may therefore formulate the indicator property condition as follows: 
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The indicator property condition 
S1 is a good informant for S2 that p only if S2 detects that S1 has a property X which 
correlates with being right about p reliably enough for S2‟s concerns. 
iv. The minimal synthesis 
Craig stops with these conditions. The concept he has explicated to meet the need of 
getting true information synthesizes the following conditions: a true belief, an 
intelligible assertion, and a detectable indicator property. 
 The concept of the good informant has turned out fairly minimal and vague. 
Craig argues that it needn‟t include anything more specific. As the inquirer looks for 
someone who can tell her whether p, she‟s just looking for someone who truly asserts 
that p and who has some detectable property that correlates reliably with being right 
about whether p. 
 So the synthesized concept could be characterized as follows, in which the 
inquirer is S2 and the informant is S1: 
 
The Concept of the Good Informant 
S1 is a good informant for S2 that p if and only if (iff) p, S2 believes that p, S2 
hears and understands S1 assert that p, and S2 can detect that S1 has a property X 
which correlates with being right about p reliably enough for S2‟s concerns. 
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2. Genealogies 
a. Objectivization 
The concept of the good informant is not equivalent to the concept of knowledge; we 
cannot take the former as our practical explication of the latter. The two different 
concepts generate very different intuitions in far too wide and important a range of 
scenarios. For example, imagine that Jessica wants to find out what time it is. She 
asks Kashim, but Kashim only speaks Urdu and Jessica only speaks English. Since 
Jessica cannot understand Kashim‟s assertions, Kashim is not a good informant for 
her as to the time. However, we have no corresponding intuition that Kashim does 
not know what time it is. Neither do we intuitively accept that, relative to Jessica, 
Kashim does not know what time it is, for we would not agree that Jessica could 
truly say such a thing. Indeed, we do not have the intuition that one man‟s knowledge 
is relative to any single inquirer. The concept of knowledge is more independent 
from its user‟s individual situation than the concept of the good informant. 
i. Four subjective conditions 
Craig recognizes that the concept of the good informant is not equivalent to the 
concept of knowledge. That is, the following definition would be false: 
S1 knows relative to S2 that p iff p, S2 hears and understands S1 assert that p, and 
S2 can detect that S1 has a property X which correlates with being right about p 
reliably enough for S2‟s concerns.  
Intuitively, that definition would be far too restrictive. We do not reserve knowledge 
attributions for subjects who happen to give us information. Craig traces the 
discrepancy back to four conditions that must be synthesized as part of the concept of 
a good informant, but have no place in the concept of knowledge. These conditions 
arise in response to the inquirer‟s subjectively varying needs; I will accordingly refer 
to them as subjective conditions. If I am to recognize a subject as a good informant, I 
demand that the following conditions be satisfied: 
1) He should be accessible to me here and now. 
2) He should be recognizable by me as someone likely to be right about p.  
3) He should be as likely to be right about p as my concerns require.  
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4) Channels of communication between him and me should be open.
40
 
Intuitions and linguistic behavior both agree that a subject can know something even 
if he doesn‟t meet these four subjective conditions. The concept of knowledge cannot 
be reduced to the concept of the good informant.  
However, despite the serious discrepancies revealed in the fourth step, Craig does 
not simply start over with a new hypothesis. Rather, he makes several modifications 
to the concept of the good informant. The modifications result in a new concept, 
which does a better job of matching the intuitive concept of knowledge. Naturally, 
Craig must avoid saving his hypothesis with ad hoc modifications. He must explain 
why people would have as strong a functional reason to use the modified concept of 
the good informant as they would have to use the original concept. He offers such an 
explanation with the story of the process of objectivization. 
ii. Social and diachronic needs 
The concept of the good informant refers only to subjects who satisfy the inquirer‟s 
own immediate needs. This limited scope is the direct result of Craig‟s hypothesis. In 
his prototypical case, an inquirer may need, for example, an answer to the question, 
“Who can tell me whether that‟s edible?” because she is hungry and needs to have 
the information right now. A good informant, accordingly had better be able to tell 
her right now, or else he cannot meet her needs. As a hypothesis, this sort of need is 
helpfully vivid, but also extremely restricted. Since the concept of knowledge has a 
much broader extension, we must conclude that it meets a broader, more general 
need. 
Therefore, to bridge the gap between his results and our intuitions about 
knowledge, Craig extends his hypothesis, considering further needs. He points out 
that an inquirer also has diachronic and social needs, that is, needs which concern her 
position in the future and needs which are affected by her participation in a 
community of interdependent subjects. These needs will impact her use of the 
concept of the good informant. She may need, for example, to find someone who can 
tell whether that‟s edible, because she will often be hungry and so might want such 
information in the future. If a subject would be able to tell whether that‟s edible, then 
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he qualifies as meeting the inquirer‟s diachronic need even if he happens to be 
currently indisposed. Likewise, the inquirer needs to notice people who could 
identify food for others as well. It is not only altruism that makes it worthwhile to 
pick out people who might be able to help others. As Craig points out, “it isn‟t 
necessarily for the sake of the horse that we give it the oats instead of eating them 
ourselves.”41 A strong community needs strong members; cooperation is necessary to 
survival.
42
 Thus, if the subject would be able to help someone else who was hungry, 
he meets the inquirer‟s social need. Thanks to diachronic and social needs, the 
inquirer is interested in recognizing a subject that would be able to tell whether that‟s 
edible, if only he were awake and someone were hungry.  
Craig describes the relationship between an isolated individual‟s momentary 
private needs to a socialized individual‟s diachronic needs as a development which 
he calls the process of objectivization. The story goes as follows: isolated individuals 
needed the concept of a good informant. Then, they began to adapt the concept in 
response to social and diachronic needs. With each adaptation, the concept became 
more objective, until it was finally the fully objective concept of knowledge we have 
today.  
We could tell the story of objectivization about many other concepts as well. For 
example, we could tell the following story about the concept of chair. Once upon a 
time, one man wanted to sit down. To satisfy that desire, he did not need to notice 
anything besides close and accessible objects.
43
 Then he began to think about the 
desire he may have to sit in the future and about his family‟s desire to sit. Eventually, 
he no longer noticed only those objects accessible to him, but anything which could 
at some point be accessible to anyone. At that point, the fully objectivized concept of 
chair had been formed and even a folded up unused chair on top of a bonfire could 
still be included in its extension, so objective had the concept become.  
I mentioned above that the indicator property may be understood with the 
terminology of possible worlds. In order to clarify the modifications wrought by 
objectivization, I shall apply the same technique here. The subjective conditions 
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emphasize the actual world.
44
 Insofar as I am applying the concept of the good 
informant, I am only considering myself, here and now. Bringing different times and 
other people into consideration means that I must take possible worlds into account 
as well. The extension of the objectivized concept will certainly be wider as a result. 
That is, there are far more subjects that I may recognize would be a good informant 
for me in some possible world than there are subjects who are good informants for 
me right now in this actual world. As it happens, at the moment I am not speaking to 
anyone, much less asking someone for information. So there are, for me, no actual 
good informants right now. However, there are countless individuals who could be 
good informants for me. When I consider my future needs and the needs of others, I 
recognize the importance of that untapped potential.  
Given this relationship with possible worlds, the concept of the objectively good 
informant may be described as a counterfactual conditional:  
If certain circumstances were to concur (S2 needed to find out whether p and 
S2 was talking to S1 in a language she could understand and S2 recognized 
that S1 was reliable enough for her), then S1 would be a good informant for S2 
that p.  
If that counterfactual is true for all nearby possible worlds, then S1 may count as an 
objectively good informant, whether or not the circumstances actually concur in this 
world.
45
 So, the objective concept could end up taking the following form: 
S1 is an objectively good informant for S2 that p iff in a nearby possible world 
x, y, and z would hold. 
However, we should notice straight away that at least one condition cannot change 
with objectivization: the truth condition. There is no social diachronic need to accept 
false information as to whether p.
46
 Whether one‟s interest is for oneself or another, 
for the present or for the future, the interest is always in getting at the truth. S1 could 
never be an objectively good informant that p if p is actually false. Therefore the 
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definition above could not be correct, for the following modification is sure to be 
necessary: 
S1 is an objectively good informant for S2 that p iff p, and in a nearby 
possible world x, y, and z would hold. 
Yet truth is not the only feature people need to recognize in the actual world, 
regardless of their social and diachronic concerns. The following sections will show 
which conditions may be satisfied by a nearby possible world and which must be 
satisfied in the actual world. Two conditions will turn out necessary in the actual 
world: a belief condition and an indicator property condition. Two conditions will 
turn out to demand satisfaction only in nearby possible worlds: the intelligible 
assertion condition and the detectability condition. In fact, given the satisfaction of 
the former two conditions, the latter two will turn out so easy to satisfy that we will 
be able to drop them from the synthesis altogether without substantially changing the 
synthesized concept.  
iii. From an assertion condition to a belief condition 
The concept of the good informant is modified by the intelligible assertion condition, 
“S2 must hear and understand S1 assert that p,” resulting in the subjective conditions 
(1) and (4). How does objectivization affect the need for intelligible assertion? Craig 
points out that, in a social context, I care about whether someone will be accessible 
to others as well as myself and I hope that they will do the same. That is, cooperation 
makes it worthwhile to notice subjects who could inform others, even if they cannot 
inform me.
47
 As a member of society, I need to recognize whether a subject would be 
a good informant for other inquirers. Furthermore, in a diachronic context, I need to 
recognize whether someone will be accessible at a later time. So I need to notice 
subjects who could inform others and myself at some time, even if not now. When 
the conditions (1) and (4) are objectivized accordingly, they have the following form:  
(1) S should be potentially accessible to an inquirer. 
(4) Channels of communication between S and an inquirer should potentially be 
open at some time. 
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If we clarify that „accessibility‟ means that S is heard, and „intelligibility‟ means that 
S is understood, then we can combine the two objectivized versions to arrive at the 
following counterfactual: 
If S1 asserted p and S2 heard and understood S1, then S1 would be a good 
informant for S2. 
When we look for an informant who satisfies that counterfactual, we are looking for 
an objectively good informant. Using the results of Chapter One, such a concept 
would be defined as follows (with the modified condition emphasized): 
 
S1 is an objectively good informant for S2 that p iff p, S1 asserts that p in a 
nearby possible world, S2 hears and understands S1 assert that p in a nearby 
possible world, and S2 can detect that S1 has a property X which correlates with 
being right about p reliably enough for S2‟s concerns. 
  
This definition is clearly incomplete; it leaves us forced to accept a drastic 
discrepancy with the intuitive concept of knowledge. Imagine that, in the actual 
world, the truth and indicator property conditions hold, but S1 asserts not-p. Elias is 
usually a champion bird identifier, but thanks to a random event (perhaps an arrow in 
the eye) he mistakenly believes that the bird before him is a green finch, when it is 
actually a linnet bird. Even the most trustworthy can sometimes make mistakes. 
Given the definition above, this mistaken subject counts as an objectively good 
informant, for in a nearby possible world, the arrow would not have hit his eye. Thus, 
in a nearby possible world he would not have made a mistake, but rather correctly 
asserted that p. However, the concerns of objectivization in no way suggest that a 
mistaken inquirer should be considered an objectively good informant. People are 
interested in identifying subjects who would be good informants if only the obstacles 
of accessibility and intelligibility were overcome; they are not interested in 
identifying subjects who would be good informants if only they were accurate. 
Accuracy is one of the properties that people demand to have satisfied in the actual 
world. 
 Yet, the concerns of objectivization do suggest that the subject need not actually 
be asserting p to count as an objectively good informant. How then can we include 
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the demand for actual accuracy in the concept of the objectively good informant? 
What is it that must be accurate? I suggest that here we have clear functional support 
for a belief condition. Remember, it was not immediately obvious that a subject must 
believe that p in order to be a good informant that p.
48
 All the inquirer actually needs 
is the subject‟s true and trustworthy assertion that p. Usually, people don‟t assert true 
things in a trust-inducing manner unless they also believe it, but still, we can imagine 
some scenarios in which they might. Craig insists that he must still synthesize a 
belief condition into the concept of the good informant, arguing that the good 
informant will almost always believe what he asserts, which makes belief integral to 
the prototypical case.
 49
  There is, I maintain, an even stronger demand for the belief 
condition when we consider the need for an objectively good informant. People 
judge whether or not a subject would assert the truth about p by determining whether 
or not he actually believes that p. The belief condition prevents the concept of the 
objectively good informant from including mistaken subjects, who actually believe 
and actually assert that not-p despite the fact that in a close possible world, they 
would believe and thus assert that p.  
 When looking for an objectively good informant, we look for someone who 
satisfies the following counterfactual: 
 
If S1 asserted his actual belief that p and Sn heard and understood his 
assertion, then S1 would be a good informant for Sn that p.  
 
As long as S1 does believe that p, there will always be some nearby possible worlds 
in which S2 would hear and understand S1 assert his belief that p. Therefore, without 
changing the behavior of this condition, we may omit mention of potential assertion 
altogether and reformulate it as a simple belief condition: 
 
 The actual belief condition 
S1 is an objectively good informant that p only if S1 believes that p. 
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When we add this condition to the entire good informant concept, we get the 
following synthesis (with the modified condition emphasized): 
 
S1 is an objectively good informant for S2 that p iff p, S1 believes that p, and 
S2 can detect that S1 has a property X which correlates with being right about 
p reliably enough for S2‟s concerns. 
iv. Losing the detectability condition 
A subject can know something, despite the fact that no one can detect his indicator 
property. Craig offers the examples of a secretly studious milkman and a little girl 
who usually lies, but just now is telling the truth.
50
 No one can actually recognize 
them as good informants. What functional reason could there be that we intuitively 
agree that they know, despite the fact that their knowledge is useless to others? Craig 
then points out that in a community, a member may care about whether a subject is a 
good informant on a certain subject, even if she herself would not be able to detect 
him.
51
 She needs, for example, someone in her community to be a good informant 
about the mass of propositions necessary to disarm and dismantle a nuclear missile. 
As long as the right people can detect and understand such a subject, that desire is 
satisfied; she herself need not be able to detect him.  
 To account for this feature of social life, we need a modification that resembles 
the change wrought by substituting the subjective assertion condition for the belief 
condition. In the last section, I argued that, whether or not S2 actually hears and 
understands S1 assert that p, as long as S1 actually believes that p, S1 may count as 
knowing that p. Likewise, whether or not someone actually detects S1‟s property X, 
as long as S1 actually has some property that correlates reliably with being right 
about p, then S1 counts as knowing that p. The objective detectability condition 
therefore means inquirers will need to recognize people who satisfy the following 
counterfactual:  
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If S2 detected S1‟s actual property X which correlates with being right about p 
reliably enough for S2‟s concerns, then S2 would be a good informant for S2 that 
p. 
 
The range of possible worlds must include all logical possibilities of S2 detecting the 
property X without changing S1‟s possession of property X. Since, as long as S1 
actually has a property X, there will always be some nearby possible worlds in which 
S2 can detect it, the detectability condition can be omitted entirely without changing 
the extension of the synthesized concept. The following simplified condition results: 
 
The indicator property condition 
S2 is a good informant for S1 that p only if S1 has a property X which correlates 
with being right about p reliably enough for S2‟s concerns. 
 
By modifying the indicator property condition so that it no longer is affected by a 
subjective detectability condition, we have arrived at the following definition of the 
objectively good informant (with the modified condition emphasized): 
 
S1 is an objectively good informant for S2 that p iff p, S1 believes that p, and 
S1 has a property X which correlates with being right about p reliably 
enough for S2‟s concerns. 
v. The reliability condition 
The concept of the good informant has the following indicator property condition:  
 
S2 must be able to detect that S1 has a property X which correlates with being 
right about p reliably enough for S2‟s concerns. 
 
The indicator property condition has two elements of subjectivity: condition (2), S2 
must be able to detect the indicator property; and condition (3), S1 must be reliable 
enough for S2‟s concerns. I have just shown how condition (2) may be objectivized 
and eliminated. 
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We may call the condition (3) the reliability condition. As discussed in 1.d.iii, 
this condition demands a consideration of possible worlds even in its subjective 
version. The inquirer needs to find an informant with a property that correlates with 
being right about p in a range of nearby possible worlds. That range is set relative to 
the inquirer.  
Notice though that the subjective reliability condition does not interact with 
possible worlds in the same way as the objectivized assertion and detectability 
conditions. Those latter conditions could be satisfied by any one close nearby 
possible world. The reliability condition, on the other hand, must be satisfied by all 
close nearby possible worlds, otherwise the informant does not count as reliable 
enough. 
Craig argues that the reliability condition must drastically change in a social 
setting. Members of a society must label good informants without any clue as to who 
might need their information, or what concerns those indeterminate inquirers will 
have.
52
 Objectivized, the reliability condition therefore reads: 
3) He should be as likely to be right about p as anyone‟s potential concerns 
require. 
That is, we widen the amount of relevant possible worlds in which the informant 
must be likely to be right about p. Say that Joel believes that Annie is a redhead. 
Given our uncertainty about who might need the subject‟s information and why, we 
must consider all possible worlds in which he is giving his information. What if, for 
some reason, the president‟s decision whether to go to war depended on Annie‟s hair 
color – would Joel be a reliable enough informant for the president in that possible 
world? Would Joel be reliable enough for a shopper deciding which shoes to buy, or 
for a policewoman catching a criminal? For every possible inquirer with every 
possible concern, we must consider the possible world in which Joel is telling that 
inquirer that p. If in one single possible world in that drastically widened range Joel 
fails to be reliable enough for the inquirer using his assertion, then he also fails to be 
an objectively good informant. Unlike the assertion and detectability conditions, the 
objectivized reliability condition becomes much more difficult to fill, so we cannot 
expect it to merely fall away. 
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 There are a number of important questions here, concerning both Craig‟s 
motivation and the resulting modification. Since I answer them differently than Craig 
does, I‟ll postpone considering this condition until Chapter Three. Here I shall only 
foreshadow my further treatment: I do not agree that we need the concept of 
knowledge to have such an objective reliability condition. I shall accept a version of 
contextualism according to which the level of reliability demanded by the concept of 
knowledge is indeed affected by the attributor‟s concerns. Therefore S2, qua potential 
inquirer, will never disappear entirely from the definition of knowledge. The range of 
possible worlds in which a knower must be reliable does in fact depend in part on the 
attributor. 
vi. The objectivized synthesis 
By considering the needs implied by a diachronic social environment and explicating 
the conditions which could meet them, we arrive at the following synthesis:  
 
The Objectivized Concept of the Good Informant  
S1 is an objectively good informant for S2 that p iff p, S1 believes that p, and 
S1 has a property X which correlates with being right about p reliably enough 
for S2‟s concerns. 
 
Intelligible assertion and detectability are far less important to this synthesis then 
they were in that of the concept of the good informant. A subject may count as an 
objectively good informant as long as, in some nearby possible world, he intelligibly 
asserts that p to an inquirer and, in some nearby possible world, the inquirer can 
detect his indicator property. I argued that with this modification these conditions 
become so easy to satisfy that they are dispensable to the synthesis. I also argued that 
the belief condition gains in importance, so that its place in the synthesis is less 
disputable.  
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b. A Taxonomy of genealogies 
Craig claims that the concept of the good informant is the origin of the concept of 
knowledge,
53
 and that this origin has left marks.
54
 Yet he fails to expound on further 
on exactly how we should understand these expressions „origin‟ and „mark‟. We 
must clarify the status of the concept of the good informant and its relationship to the 
new objectivized synthesis. Several attempts to do so have claimed that the concept 
of the good informant is the first step in the genealogy of knowledge. These attempts 
have employed varying and in part contradictory presuppositions about how and why 
to construct such a genealogy. However the differences have not been made explicit; 
apparent agreement has veiled incompatibility. Thus in the following section, I offer 
a taxonomy of genealogies, dividing the varieties into four categories: rhetorical, 
imaginary, conjectural and factual.
55
 
i. Rhetorical genealogy: Craig 
In order to understand genealogies, first we must consider an aspect of Craig‟s theory 
which I have not yet mentioned: his use of the state of nature. His reference to a state 
of nature places Craig‟s work in a larger tradition of political and ethical philosophy, 
practiced by philosophers such as Hume, Hobbes, and Nietzsche. However, despite 
its prominence in the title, nowhere in his book does Craig explain exactly how we 
should understand the status of the state of nature. In a later essay
56
, he discusses the 
matter at more length. The state of nature is a tool to be used in a genealogy; its 
constitution thus depends on the sort of genealogy in which it is used. According to 
Craig, a genealogy can be factual, imaginary, or conjectural.
57
 He seems to think of 
his own as imaginary; however I prefer to save that term for a rather different 
approach, discussed below. Therefore, I propose that Craig employs a fourth kind of 
genealogy: rhetorical.  
Craig characterizes his own use of the state of nature as,   
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not an argumentative strategy, but a literary device, that of presenting a 
generalisation about the human condition as a sketchy description of the early life of 
the race.
58
 
Craig writes as if knowledge had its origins in a state of nature, where a concept of a 
good informant sprang up, and as if objectivization had occurred throughout time, 
gradually modifying that concept into the concept of knowledge we have today. He 
could have just as well written without that literary device and omitted the state of 
nature altogether, without altering his hypothesis or his results. The question then 
remains what we should make of the process of objectivization. If the genealogy is 
rhetorical and not meant to be taken literally, then what is objectivization supposed 
to evoke? If the process of objectivization is not a literal process in time, then how 
should we understand the modifications? Craig does not address this question, so I 
offer my own suggestion below (2.c.iii). 
On this reading, the state of nature is, as Craig puts it, a “non-load bearing frill 
rendered harmless by the basic character of the particular facts in question.”59 It 
involves no actual historical claims, but is rather meant to illustrate very general 
features of humanity. The features should be general enough to be plausibly 
attributed to prehistorical societies, but most importantly, they must still be 
attributable to contemporary societies. In addition to his own work, Craig describes 
Hobbes‟ use of the state of nature as also falling under this ahistorical model.60  
Why rely on this particular rhetorical device? By describing his hypothesized 
needs as present in a state of nature, Craig ensures generality, naturalism and 
simplicity. The state of nature is able to help us with these three points for two 
reasons. One, it is abstract. Two, insofar as it is not abstract but rather reminiscent of 
a prehistoric tribe, it is very different from our own society.  
By bringing our attention to the epistemic needs of a prehistoric tribe, Craig 
ensures that the hypothesized needs will meet the generality requirement. Remember, 
he began with the observation that any society with a language has a word for 
„knowledge‟.  Therefore the needs to which the concept of knowledge functions in 
response must be shared by any society with a language. We prevent ourselves from 
narrowing the applicability of our practical explication by asking straightaway 
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whether our hypothesized needs could also be attributed to a society very different 
from our own.  
Second, the state of nature is helpful because it ensures naturalism.
61
 Of course, 
prehistoric tribes probably had lively cultures. However, when discussing the needs 
of a “state-of-nature society” we omit any mention of idiosyncratic cultural 
influences and focus only on general practical needs. As a result, the concept we 
explicate as a natural response to those needs will be a natural response to the 
humans‟ interaction with their environment. We thereby avoid any inadvertent 
reversion to Platonic presuppositions.  
In a related way, the state of nature can help to ensure simplicity. With an 
abstract model of a society as our starting point, we avoid considering any elements 
extraneous to the basic natural needs that can get the explication going. 
In Craig‟s work, the “non-load bearing frill” is a rhetorical device, used for the 
advantages outlined above. Thus, I have characterized his use of the state of nature, 
and the temporal terms in which he presents the process of objectivization, as a 
rhetorical genealogy. The other three forms of genealogy are more substantial. I 
discuss below how Williams and Fricker use an imaginary genealogy, while Kusch 
and Kelp use a conjectural genealogy. Both Williams and Kusch stress the additional 
importance of a factual genealogy.  
ii. Imaginary genealogy: Williams 
The term „genealogy‟ was introduced in relation to Craig‟s work by Bernard 
Williams in his book Truth and Truthfulness.
62
 Williams goes on to offer a 
genealogy of his own, not of knowledge, but rather, of the practice of truthfulness. 
Williams‟ genealogy has nonetheless repeatedly been linked to Craig‟s,63 so it is 
worth presenting here in some detail.  
 Williams conceives of imaginary genealogies as fictional stories. The state of 
nature and the supposed development out of it are made-up; they are not meant to 
represent any real society or historical progression. He defends the use of an 
imaginary genealogy as a way to describe a concept or practice as functional without 
reducing it to its functional role.  
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Why not just give a functional account without the story? Do the diachronic fictions 
of genealogy add anything expect colour? They do. In relation to institutions, 
practices, expectations, and values that actually exist, of justice, promise-keeping, 
truthfulness, and so on, functional accounts are simply false. …it is just not true that 
the dispositions of truthfulness that we have, or that anyone else has had, can be 
adequately explained in functional terms. …their value always and necessarily goes 
beyond their function. Nevertheless, at a more abstract level, function plays a role in 
explaining them.
64
 
Williams uses an imaginary genealogy of truthfulness to avoid reducing the value of 
truthfulness to its merely functional value.  
 Like Craig, Williams begins with a state of nature in which people need to pool 
information.
65
 He describes how the inhabitants of this state cannot do so if they 
cannot trust one another to tell the truth. As a result, they begin to value accuracy and 
sincerity.
66
 That is, the individuals begin to be accurate and sincere to ensure that 
they will all get the true information they need to survive.  
 This little story tells how the need to pool information caused the tendency to 
value accuracy and sincerity. The causal element (“As a result…”) constitutes the 
fictional aspect of Williams‟ genealogy. The factual moral we may draw from the 
story is that truthfulness does offer the benefits of true information and thereby 
survival. We judge the moral as true because we can judge the inhabitant‟s decision 
as rational.
67
 “Of course they needed to start being truthful to one another in order to 
reap the benefits of true information and survival!” we may think, upon reading the 
story. 
 Williams goes on to point out that these benefits cannot suffice to account for 
the value of truthfulness.
68
 For the practice of truthfulness to actually result in the 
benefits described, people must practice it precisely at those moments in which they 
themselves are not benefitting. Yet, if truthfulness had only instrumental extrinsic 
value, there would be no reason for them to sacrifice their own personal gain for the 
sake of being truthful. That is, if truthfulness were only valuable insofar as it brought 
individual benefits, then people would lie and be lazy (and hence inaccurate) 
whenever it suited them, which would likely be often. As a result, people would not 
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be able to pool information anymore. If truthfulness only had instrumental value, 
then in fact it would not have any value at all. 
 However, people are in general truthful. That is, many, if not most, people 
continue to be truthful even in situations in which it does not directly benefit them. 
The cause of this behavior is that people value truthfulness intrinsically.
69
 They take 
accuracy and sincerity as being good per se, regardless of whether it benefits them 
personally. Thanks to this tendency to value truthfulness intrinsically, truthfulness 
does in fact have instrumental value as well. The wide-spread tendency people have 
to intrinsically value truthfulness creates communities in which people can pool 
information and thereby survive. Williams stresses that truthfulness can only have 
this extrinsic value so long as it is also intrinsically valued.
70
  
 Thus, Williams makes two points: first, he claims that we must be truthful, or 
else we will lose the benefits of pooling information. Second, he claims that the 
social bolsters of the intrinsic value of truthfulness are not merely a façade, 
disguising the actual extrinsic value of truthfulness as a means to the benefits of 
getting true information. Rather, the social bolsters of the intrinsic value of 
truthfulness enable truthfulness to provide those extrinsic benefits. It is difficult to 
make both of these points without seeming to assert a contradiction. If he used real 
examples to support the first claim, he might seem to be denying the second claim. 
Therefore, he supports the first claim by telling an explicitly fictional story in which 
people decide that they need to be truthful in order to reap some desirable goods. We 
grasp the story‟s moral by recognizing the rationality of their decision. Williams can 
then base his argument that truthfulness is a socially functional practice which should 
be established on the moral of that story without falsely implying that real 
individuals actually should or could use truthfulness as a functional means to an end.  
 In sum, Williams uses an imaginary genealogy to offer a non-reductive 
description of the relationship between a practice‟s extrinsically valuable functional 
aspect and its historical manifestation as an intrinsic value. 
 Factual genealogies also play a large role in Williams‟ work. He points out that 
the fiction can only explain so much.
 71
 His imaginary genealogy does not show us 
how societies actually encourage people to value truthfulness. To understand how 
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accuracy and sincerity have been socially established as intrinsic values, we need real 
history.   
iii. Imaginary genealogy: Fricker 
Miranda Fricker takes Williams‟ development of imaginary genealogies and applies 
it to Craig‟s epistemological work.72 Like Williams, she constructs an imaginary 
genealogy that begins with a simplified state of nature in which people need to get 
information from one another and ends with the idiosyncratic epistemic practices of 
actual societies. However, Fricker does not use Williams‟ defense of imaginary 
genealogies. That is, she does not argue that the genealogy is a useful tool for 
explaining a phenomenon‟s functional value without reducing its value to its 
function. Indeed, she argues that Williams should have written the intrinsic value of 
truthfulness into the state of nature.
73
  
 While such a criticism does not make sense given Williams‟ own motivation for 
his imaginary genealogy, Fricker‟s criticism does make sense from her own 
perspective. She uses imaginary genealogies towards a different end than Williams 
does and thus operates different standards for how the state of nature should be 
constructed. Namely, Fricker uses the state of nature and the imaginary genealogy to 
distinguish a phenomenon‟s necessary features from its contingent features. 
A good genealogical explanation of the concept of knowledge helps us understand 
how, and in what respects, our actual epistemic practices are the contingent social 
manifestations of our most basic epistemic predicament. So it helps us understand to 
what extent features of our actual practice are necessary, and to what extent they are 
contingent. This will in turn explain how some kinds of criticism of our practice are 
worth making, and how some are senseless. (In particular, it explains why some 
kinds of political criticism of the norms surrounding rational authority are worth 
making, and why others can never be genuinely political: where the norm in question 
is necessary, political criticism is at best futile.)
74
 
As the quoted passage demonstrates, Fricker‟s political goals motivate her use of the 
genealogy. Necessary features are important to distinguish from contingent features, 
because productive political critique must restrict itself to the latter.  
Fricker portrays Craig‟s work as an imaginary genealogy so that she may 
emphasize that people necessarily look for indicator properties that correlate reliably 
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with being right about a given proposition. Without that feature, no social epistemic 
practice could thrive and survival would be unlikely. On the other hand, which 
indicator properties a society actually acknowledges and whether they are actually 
reliable are contingent questions.
75
  
Fricker uses this Craig-based imaginary genealogy to argue that societies 
necessarily acknowledge certain indicator properties based on prejudice and fear of 
outsiders, rather than the properties‟ actual reliability.76 In other words, epistemic 
injustice is present in the state of nature, as is a complementary demand for the virtue 
of epistemic justice. Thus, it would be unreasonable to attempt to root out epistemic 
injustice; for it is a necessary result of social life. One must, rather, attempt to train 
one‟s sensibility to notice and lessen its effects.77 I shall not explore these claims 
further; I mention them only to clarify the motivation behind Fricker‟s use of the 
imaginary genealogy as a tool to distinguish necessary from contingent features. 
iv. Conjectural genealogy: Kusch 
In his pair of essays on Craig, Martin Kusch claims that the concept of the good 
informant is an ancestor of the concept of knowledge, which he refers to as 
protoknowledge.
78
 While he agrees that knowledge developed out of protoknowledge 
through a process of objectivization, he also modifies and expands upon Craig‟s 
work. In so doing, he draws on Williams‟ genealogy of truthfulness. I shall discuss 
three crucial points in which Kusch‟s treatment of Craig resembles Williams‟ work. 
 Williams describes the difference between the extrinsic value of truthfulness as a 
means to true beliefs and the intrinsic value of truthfulness for its own sake. Kusch 
generalizes from Williams‟ work to make the broader claim that not only 
truthfulness, but the entire institution of testimony has intrinsic value.
79
 He uses this 
claim in conjunction with the testimonial nature of protoknowledge to respond to the 
swamping problem. The swamping problem demands an explanation of why 
knowledge has more value than mere true belief. Kusch presents a solution by 
distinguishing between the extrinsic value of a mere true belief and the intrinsic 
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value of a true belief produced by testimony (protoknowledge).
80
 This suggestion 
merits further attention, but it is not directly related Craig‟s genealogical story of 
objectivization. Objectivization does not account for the difference between a mere 
true belief and protoknowledge, but rather the difference between protoknowledge 
and knowledge. That is, objectivization tells a story that links a true belief in an 
isolated testimonial interaction (protoknowledge) with a true belief in a diachronic 
social environment (knowledge). As my momentary aim is concerned exclusively 
with the latter relationship between protoknowledge and knowledge, I will focus 
instead on the second two similarities with Williams. 
 Kusch‟s treatment of objectivization draws on Williams‟ work on truthfulness in 
two ways. First, Kusch praises Williams‟ use of factual genealogy, stressing the 
importance of the relationship between a society‟s set-up and its understanding of 
knowledge. 
One of the most valuable aspects of genealogy is its systematic use of the idea that 
the evolution of concepts and the development of social relations are inseparable. 
Every step in the evolution from protoknowledge to knowledge is explicated in 
terms of changed needs of the group or changed forms of interaction.
81
 
Second, Kusch agrees with Williams that a genealogy is a fiction.
82
 So, the 
development from protoknowledge into knowledge is not meant to be taken literally. 
Protoknowledge might not have existed at all.  
 However, Kusch‟s use of fiction is not compatible with Williams‟ use of fiction. 
Recall that Williams justified his use of a fiction with the claim that a reductively 
utilitarian conception of truthfulness could never be actually held by the members of 
any society. Were an actual group of people to view truthfulness as instrumentally 
useful, then truthfulness would never gain any footing at all. The fiction of the state 
of nature is not meant to be applicable to any single, early society. Rather, the fiction 
of the state of nature is meant to illuminate the functional value of the practice of 
truthfulness shared by every single actual society. Williams argues that state-of-
nature truthfulness, „prototruthfulness‟ if you will, is not an ancestor of real historical 
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truthfulness but rather a “necessary, structural feature” of real historical 
truthfulness.
83
  
 Kusch‟s position is incompatible with a Williams-style imaginary genealogy, for 
he argues that protoknowledge is not a feature of knowledge at all. He claims rather 
that protoknowledge developed into knowledge. Furthermore, he claims that the 
conceptual development was a response to social development. That is, as 
demonstrated by the quoted passage above, Kusch applies a historical orientation to 
protoknowledge as well as to knowledge. Accordingly, his genealogy demands that it 
be possible for there to have been, at one point in real history, a society that used the 
concept of protoknowledge. He conjectures that protoknowledge did at one point 
exist, likening the relationship between protoknowledge and knowledge to the 
relationship between homo erectus and homo sapiens.
84
 Clearly, on this model the 
concept of the good informant is not in any sense a feature of the concept of 
knowledge, but rather its predecessor. As we saw, Kusch does make use of Williams‟ 
description of intrinsic value. However, in that discussion, the relationship described 
is between protoknowledge and mere true belief, not protoknowledge and 
knowledge. Therefore, I suggest that Kusch‟s work on protoknowledge should be 
classified as a conjectural genealogy, rather than an imaginary genealogy. He offers 
a conjecture as to how the actual concept of knowledge might plausibly have 
originated. If the conjecture is false, then the genealogy is mistaken. In that respect, a 
conjectural genealogy differs from an imaginary genealogy, in which the described 
„origin‟ may very well be false without endangering its relevance. 
 Kusch argues further that the genealogical story has relevance today in an 
observable “pattern of use”; people regularly treat the concept of „knowledge‟ in 
ways analogous to how they would treat a concept of the good informant.
85
 While we 
obviously cannot claim that all knowledge attributions fall under that very subjective 
concept, he suggests that knowledge need not be unified under one definition or one 
function. Rather, we should draw on Wittgenstein‟s model of a family resemblance.86 
Wittgenstein claims that certain concepts, such as „game,‟ can never be adequately 
captured by one definition. Rather, individual examples fall under the concept thanks 
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to various similarities with other examples. Staring contests resemble poker in that 
both have a winner and a loser; poker resembles solitaire in that both use playing 
cards. There is no one-size-fits-all account that could lay down individually 
necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for the concept of game.  
 According to Kusch, the concept of knowledge is also such a concept. Until 
now, epistemologists have only avoided recognizing that fact by arbitrarily 
legislating the ways in which people actually use the concept. With no adequate 
justification, they divide that data into three groups: the „core‟ use, which interests 
them and for which they construct their semantic theory; a pragmatic use; and mere 
errors.
87
 Despite his rejection of strict analytic definitions, Craig too falls under 
Kusch‟s critique, since he wrote that the concept of the good informant is the „core‟ 
of the concept of knowledge.
88
 If knowledge is a family resemblance concept, then it 
has no core. Sometimes a certain set of conditions will govern our knowledge 
attributions, while other times those same conditions will play no part. Specifically, 
Kusch argues that some knowledge attributions function to meet the needs 
hypothesized in Craig‟s practical explication, whereas others do not.89  
 The hypothesis that the concept of the good informant appears as a pattern of use 
may be supported by a conjectural genealogy.
90
 Nonetheless, it does not require it. 
After all, one may characterize a limited pattern of use of the word „knowledge‟ as 
serving a certain function, without also arguing that the concept of knowledge 
originated in order to play that function. The pattern-of-use hypothesis may not be 
supported by an imaginary genealogy, at least, not along the model of Williams or 
Fricker. Both of their imaginary genealogies describe the elements of the state of 
nature as special features of the target practice. These features demand to be 
explicated in an imaginary genealogy in order to illuminate that specialness: for 
Williams, their functional value; for Fricker, their necessity. If protoknowledge 
developed into a distinct „pattern of use,‟ then an imaginary genealogy would show 
the special role that the protoknowledge feature plays in the overall pattern of use. 
However, on Kusch‟s reading, the pattern of use that interests him is identifiable with 
protoknowledge. There is no room for an imaginary development because there are 
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no further features to add. If an imaginary genealogy were to support the pattern-of-
use hypothesis, it would require a different motivation and a different structure than 
Williams‟ or Fricker‟s.  
In sum, we may understand the concept of the good informant in five ways.  
(1) As a merely rhetorical device, handy for making some points, but entirely 
dispensable. Craig characterizes himself along these lines.  
(2) As the functional feature of the actual concept of knowledge. This 
interpretation would be along the lines of Williams‟ imaginary genealogy.  
(3) As a necessary feature of the actual concept of knowledge. Fricker offers this 
interpretation. 
(4) As a coherent concept in its own right, which may have been used at some 
point early in human civilization and which may have developed into the actual 
concept of knowledge. Kusch‟s conjectural genealogy suggests this reading. 
(5) As a pattern of use of the actual concept of knowledge, connected to other 
patterns by family resemblance. This aspect of Kusch‟s work is compatible with the 
rhetorical and conjectural genealogies, but not with the imaginary genealogy. 
Finally, there is the factual genealogy, the study of how the concept of 
knowledge has actually been used throughout history. Williams, Fricker and Kusch 
all accept the importance of such work and engage in it to a certain extent. I see no 
troubles of compatibility to prevent it being a complement to any of the above 
approaches. 
v. Conjectural genealogy: Kelp 
Christoph Kelp follows Kusch‟s use of a conjectural genealogy; that is, he offers a 
hypothesis about the conceptual needs of our early ancestors and then shows how 
changing social needs would bring about changes in the concept.
91
 Kelp however, 
rejects Craig‟s hypothesis.  While Kelp acknowledges that our ancestors must have 
needed to evaluate informants, he points out that they must have had other 
conceptual needs as well. Namely, they also must have needed to “evaluate various 
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inquiries agents undertake.” 92  Accordingly, Kelp‟s alternative hypothesis runs as 
follows: 
...the concept of knowledge answers this need: it flags when agents may 
(permissibly) terminate inquiry into a given question.
93
 
He imagines a group sending out a member to inquire, and asks what properties they 
would want him to have upon terminating his inquiry. From this hypothesis, Kelp 
explicates a belief condition, a truth condition, and the following epistemic 
condition: 
The inquirer‟s belief on whether P stems from a source that is sufficiently 
trustworthy on the question whether P.
94
 
He goes on to modify the mismatches between the concept of permissible inquiry 
termination and the concept of knowledge by accepting both Craig‟s story of 
objectivization and Kusch‟s interpretation of it as a historical development in 
response to ever more complex societies. 
 Kelp finds that his account has a crucial advantage over Craig‟s. The concept of 
the good informant arises as a need for true assertions. Although, on my account, the 
objectivized version substitutes a belief condition for an assertion condition, this 
would likely not satisfy Kelp. I imagine he might object to this substitution on the 
following grounds: why should we narrow the range of possible worlds to only those 
in which the informant believes that p? There is no reason for an inquirer to ever 
worry about an informant‟s personal beliefs. We need only narrow down the possible 
worlds to those in which the informant‟s indicator property does not change. As long 
as the informant would, in all of those possible worlds, always assert that p, then he 
should also count as an objectively good informant. So, despite the forces of 
objectivization, the concept of the good informant will always extend to include 
subjects with two kinds of reliability: reliability as a result of the process of belief 
formation as well as reliability as a result of the process that leads from belief to 
assertion.
95
 The concept of knowledge, on the other hand, is only concerned with the 
processes of belief formation. 
                                                 
92
 Ibid., p. 11. 
93
 Ibid. 
94
 Ibid.   
95
 Ibid., p. 9. 
  
52 
 
 Craig does have a way to respond to this objection, which I have not yet 
discussed; namely, informants who do not believe what they are saying are not 
properly informants at all, but rather mere sources of information. I discuss this 
distinction further in section 6.c.   
 However, no matter what possible defenses are available to Craig, we must take 
any alternative hypothesis seriously. If an equally plausible hypothesis leads to a 
different synthesis that nonetheless matches up equally well with our intuitions about 
knowledge, then the method of conceptual synthesis offers us no tools with which to 
reasonably judge between the two. Luckily for Craig, Klemens Kappel demonstrates 
that Kelp‟s alternative hypothesis does not lead to contradictory results at all. 
c. Conceptual synthesis without a genealogy  
i. Purified practical explication: Kappel 
If a practical explication fails to achieve a satisfying comparison in step four, we 
need not necessarily turn to a genealogy to bridge the gap. We may rather modify the 
hypothesis so that the final synthesis does match up with intuitions about knowledge, 
removing the need for a genealogy entirely. Klemens Kappel takes this route.
96
 He 
argues that the concept of the good informant doesn‟t match the concept of 
knowledge simply because Craig begins with the wrong hypothesis. Thus, Kappel 
practices conceptual synthesis without resorting to any genealogical modifications. 
Since he thereby avoids the complications and confusions involved in making 
genealogical claims, he calls his approach “a purified version of what Craig actually 
does in his book.”97  
 Rather than imagine what needs our ancestors may have had, Kappel begins by 
asking what needs people in general have – our current selves included. 98  He 
hypothesizes two such needs: the need for an inquiry-stopper and the need for 
pooling information. That is, he acknowledges the plausibility of both Kelp‟s and 
Craig‟s hypotheses. However, Kappel does not motivate the need for an inquiry 
stopper by considering situations in which a group sends out a member to inquire. 
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Rather, he articulates the need in the first-person.
99
 That is, individual subjects need 
to be able to decide for themselves when inquiry may permissibly be stopped.  
We need a way to command a switch of attention away from further uneliminated 
non-p possibilities, a way to urge that we simply take the truth of p for granted in our 
practical deliberation, as well as in our inquiry into other questions. Or, as I shall 
say, we have a need for an inquiry-stopper.
100
 
People need certainty, but they need expediency as well. It would often be foolish for 
people to spend so long double- and triple-checking one fact that they miss out on 
five new facts. Thus, people need a way to say, “that is enough now! Moving on… ” 
Kappel explicates the following predicate which would express the judgment that 
would meet that need: 
p, and S is in a sufficiently good epistemic position with respect to p, such that S 
ought to take the truth of p for granted in her practical and theoretical deliberation.
101
 
In addition, Kappel accepts the plausibility of Craig‟s hypothesis as well: people 
need to pool information and they need to evaluate each other‟s trustworthiness in 
order to do so. Thus, Kappel also explicates a predicate which would express the 
judgment that would meet Craig‟s hypothesized need, i.e. the judgment that the 
informant was sufficiently trustworthy. It turns out to bear a great resemblance to the 
inquiry-stopper predicate: 
p, and S1 is in a sufficiently good epistemic position such that, given the right 
circumstances of transmission, S2 ought to take the truth of p for granted in her 
practical and theoretical deliberation.
102
 
Although the two hypotheses may seem different to begin with, the similarity 
between the two predicates show that they are actually two instances of the same, 
more general, conceptual need. Indeed, Craig acknowledges this, although he speaks 
of the latter as the first-person application of the former.
103
 As we have seen above in 
section 1.c, he assumes that only the third-person version satisfies the generality 
requirement and therefore prefers to formulate his final synthesis in third-person 
terms.   
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 Kappel takes a different approach. He combines the two predicates, offering the 
hybrid predicate as the result of (step three of) his practical explication: 
K(S1, S1-Sn, p) iff p, and S1 is in a sufficiently good epistemic position such that S1-
Sn, given right circumstances of transmission, ought to take the truth of p for granted 
in their practical and theoretical deliberation.
104
 
Rather than assert that either the first- or third-person perspective is in some sense 
primary, Kappel‟s K-predicate can describe both scenarios equally well. When an 
isolated inquirer needs an inquiry-stopper, she would use the predicate to refer to 
herself by substituting “S1 – Sn” with “S1”.  When an inquirer needs a good 
informant, she would use the predicate to refer to someone else by substituting “S1 – 
Sn” with S2. I return to the implications of this perspective change for the 
internalism/externalism debate in the following section. 
 Kappel does not go on to carry out step four; he does not argue that the “K-
Predicate” is in fact equivalent to “knowledge.” He only mentions that he personally 
does believe that the concept of knowledge serves to meet his hypothesized needs.
105
 
He claims not to need a genealogy or a story of objectivization, because the needs he 
begins with are contemporary. So, his practical explication is not meant to result in 
an ancestor of the concept of knowledge, nor a feature of the concept of knowledge, 
but in an explication of the concept of knowledge itself.  
 Kappel does not imply that knowledge attributions always function as a K-
predicate. That is, it would be entirely possible to read him as claiming no more than 
that knowledge attributions sometimes serve this function. To that extent, his work 
could be compatible with Kusch‟s pattern-of-use hypothesis according to which the 
practical explication illuminates a pattern in which knowledge attributions are used. 
As I claimed above, one may coherently adopt this scope for one‟s conceptual 
synthesis without offering any conjectural genealogy. 
 Yet even with this weaker claim, Kappel‟s hypothesis might run into trouble in 
step four, when we compare his K-predicate to the intuitive concept of knowledge. 
Notice that a subject deserves the K-predicate as long as he is in a good enough 
epistemic position for the given inquirer and the needs of her deliberation. Yet many 
inquirers may have extremely lax requirements, while other inquirers have extremely 
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stringent requirements. Imagine that Ida and Estelle both ask Nelville whether a 
given batch of cookies has peanuts. He says it doesn‟t, but he isn‟t absolutely sure. 
Now imagine that Ida wants to know because her children are deathly allergic to 
peanuts, whereas Estelle wants to know because she dislikes the taste of peanuts. 
Given the differences between Ida and Estelle, Nelville deserves the K-predicate in 
relation to Estelle, but not in relation to Ida.  
 The moral of this example is that, without a story of objectivization at his 
disposal, Kappel‟s K-predicate allows for a great deal of variability in how reliable a 
subject must be in order to count as knowing. Is this variability a discrepancy 
between the K-predicate and the concept of knowledge? That depends on whether or 
not the concept of knowledge is variable too. As we will see in Chapter Three, there 
is a school of thought which claims to have empirically found just such a variance in 
the linguistic use of the word „knowledge‟, namely, contextualism. That is, the 
validity of Kappel‟s hypothesis requires the validity of contextualism about 
knowledge. Of course, contextualism about knowledge is controversial; one cannot 
simply assume its validity without further defense. In the following chapters, I 
provide such a defense, but show how I must refine Kappel‟s formulation in order to 
do so. 
ii. A contextualist response to the internalist/externalist debate 
In what follows, I imitate Kappel‟s neutrality as to whether the concept of knowledge 
functions in the first-person or the third-person, assuming that it is flexible enough to 
do both. Where does this leave me with the question of whether an internalist or an 
externalist account of justification is correct? Internalists assume that justification 
entails an element of self-awareness; a subject cannot have a justified belief if she is 
utterly unaware of the grounds that justify it. Externalists portray justification as 
possible without that extra element. A reliably produced belief is justified, even if the 
subject is not aware of that reliable production. 
 In Craigian terms, the question becomes: must a subject be aware of her own 
indicator property in order to count as knowing? As far as Craig‟s original hypothesis 
goes, the internalist state of self-awareness is obviously not necessary. For an 
informant to count as knowing, the inquirer must be able to detect his indicator 
property. It is unimportant to the inquirer whether the informant can detect his own 
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indicator property as well.  As noted above, Craig does acknowledge that an inquirer 
can apply the concept to herself, asking, “Am I a good informant as to whether p?”106 
To answer that question in the affirmative, one must be aware of one‟s own indicator 
property. Thus, one must have the internalist justification, which includes the extra 
condition of self-awareness. However, as Craig puts it, “the fact that we are in that 
extra state [of awareness that one possesses X] doesn‟t oblige us to build it into the 
concept.”107 Since he portrays the third-person good informant concept as the „core‟ 
of the concept of knowledge, it would be in defiance of the simplicity preference to 
include conditions demanded by a first-person application in his final synthesis.
108
 
Thus, Craig‟s final synthesis is best characterized as offering an externalist account 
of justification. 
 Kappel‟s formulation does not rely on a core function. He assumes that the 
concept of knowledge functions both as a label of good informants and as a label of 
inquiry stoppers; neither role is somehow primary. Thus, his final synthesis is neutral 
as to whether the concept is applied in the third- or the first-person. That is, whether 
“S1 – Sn” is substituted by “S1” (a first-person attribution) or “S2” (a third-person 
attribution) depends on the context in which it is used. Therefore, the answer to the 
internalist/externalist debate is simply: it depends.
109
 When attributing knowledge to 
a subject, the attributor must have some hypothetical relationship in mind. If the 
attributor is considering the subject‟s hypothetical relationship with herself, then the 
subject must have internalist justification. If the attributor is considering the subject‟s 
hypothetical relationship with another, then externalist justification could suffice. 
Thus, depending on the context of the attributor, either internalism or externalism 
holds. If this synthesis is correct, it is no surprise that the internalism/externalism 
debate generates conflicting intuitions: the concept of knowledge itself offers no 
decisive verdict.
 110
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iii. Objectivization without a genealogy 
We may honor Craig‟s insights concerning objectivization without using a 
conjectural or an imaginary genealogy. Craig‟s practical explication begins with the 
hypothesis that people need to identify good informants. By explicating the relevant 
conditions, he synthesizes the concept of the good informant. He then demonstrates 
how objectivization would modify the relevant conditions. Yet, rather than portray 
objectivization as an imaginary modification of the explicated conditions, we can 
understand objectivization as a correction of the original hypothesis. In this way, we 
can incorporate the points Craig makes about objectivization without giving the 
genealogical aspect anything more than a rhetorical reading. 
Craig‟s original hypothesis only considered the needs of isolated inquirers at 
isolated points in time. While it did require that these isolated inquirers encounter 
potential informants, the meeting was artificial. It was artificial, because Craig did 
not consider how the inquirers‟ conceptual needs are affected by their membership in 
a diachronic and social context. Craig‟s state of nature is a snapshot of an inquirer 
and informant meeting in a spotlight on a dark stage.  
This oversight is best understood as a deliberate oversimplification, not a 
suggestion that the subjective concept of the good informant might really have once 
existed. We may accordingly take the considerations of objectivization as a reminder 
of how society and time affect individual conceptual needs. While it might be easier 
for us to begin by imagining the instantaneous needs of an isolated individual, we 
should not consider our hypothesis complete until we have imagined the enduring 
needs of an individual in a society. Only then do we recognize the importance of 
concerns for the future and of group action, both of which weaken the accessibility 
condition; and of the division of epistemic labor, which weakens the detectability 
condition. If objectivization is to be taken as a conjectural genealogical development, 
then we must conjecture that early human societies did not worry about the future, 
were not involved in group action, and did not divide epistemic labor. I find it 
unlikely that a society in this condition could still nurture the rudimentary testimonial 
practice necessary for the concept of the subjectively good informant. It is indeed 
reasonable to conjecture that worries about the future, group actions, and the division 
of epistemic labor have manifested in different ways for different societies at 
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different times. In more modern societies it could be that these practices are more 
common and obligatory, more stably established, and that they take place on a larger 
and more intricate scale. Nonetheless, these are variations on a theme, a theme which 
is captured by the general conditions on the objectivized good informant concept. 
Any society with a practice of testimony will need the objectivized concept of the 
good informant; that need meets the generality requirement. As long as the 
hypothesis does meet the generality requirement, we will not need to conjecture that 
the general need has changed throughout time; we need only show how meeting that 
same need has demanded different sorts of means throughout time. 
Therefore, I do not agree that we should conceive of objectivization as a 
conjectural genealogical development from the need for a good informant to the need 
for an objectively good informant. So, whereas Kusch describes the relationship 
between the subjectively good informant and the objectively good informant as 
related to “changes in patterns of interaction in the group,”111 it would be more 
accurate to say that the former focuses on one artificially isolated interaction, while 
the latter fully accounts for the relationship between group interactions and 
conceptual needs. We should begin by hypothesizing the more objective, social 
needs in the first place. By beginning with social needs, we explicate objective 
conditions.   
Due to my diagnosis of the importance of objectivization, in this thesis I 
synthesize the concept of knowledge by following the four steps of the practical 
explication and make no recourse to genealogical modifications. My defense is the 
same as Kappel‟s: I hold that, when we use my hypothesis, no genealogical 
modifications are necessary for the explicated concept to resemble the concept of 
knowledge. My hypothesis is already objectivized; it presupposes a diachronic social 
environment, so the conditions I will explicate from it will be objective enough. I 
will leave it an open question whether or not the concept of knowledge might have 
originated to play the function I describe. I claim that my account is relevant, not as 
an identification of marks of the concept‟s history, but rather as a description of how 
it actually functions today. 
 I do not claim that the meanings of knowledge attributions are insensitive to the 
particular social environments in which they are made. On the contrary, by accepting 
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a form of convention contextualism, I shall include sensitivity to the idiosyncrasies 
of social structures as a crucial condition in my conceptual synthesis. Therefore, 
while my account does not rely on any one particular claim about how changing 
social environments have changed the meaning of knowledge attributions, it implies 
that such a process must have occurred. A conceptual synthesis only needs to rely on 
a genealogy if it turns out that its hypothesis does not and cannot meet the generality 
requirement, but that rather the needs themselves have changed throughout history. 
However, since my hypothesis is a generalization of Craig‟s hypothesis, it has an 
equally good chance of satisfying the generality requirement. Thus, I argue that my 
hypothesis relies on nothing but actual evidence of the need for epistemic authority. 
 It may still turn out that it cannot describe all the ways in which the concept of 
knowledge is used; that is, it may succeed only in accounting for one very 
widespread pattern of the use of knowledge attributions. If that is the case, then I 
have no objections to that limitation and gladly accept Kusch‟s defense of the 
undiminished relevance of such analyses. However, considerations of simplicity urge 
us to consider the stronger claim, that various patterns of use all serve one more 
general function. While the concept of the subjectively good informant obviously 
could not play such a broad overarching function, the concept I synthesize would 
have a much stronger chance. I will not argue for the universality of my final 
synthesis; if I do manage to properly characterize any use of the concept of 
knowledge, this synthesis has proved worthwhile.   
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3. Hypothesis: The need for epistemic authority 
In the following chapters, I present my own conceptual synthesis of knowledge. I 
follow Craig‟s four step method as outlined in 1.b: hypothesis, explication, synthesis, 
and comparison. For the reasons given in 2.c, I employ neither a state of nature nor a 
genealogy. 
a. An objectivized hypothesis 
Craig‟s hypothesis fails, because the concept of knowledge does not meet the need 
for a good informant. Rather, the concept of knowledge meets the need for an 
objectively good informant. Craig mitigated the failure by modifying the synthesized 
concept. I suggested that we should rather modify the original hypothesis.   
 However, the need for an objectively good informant might seem to be a far less 
plausible starting point. It was easy to imagine what would satisfy an inquirer 
looking for a good informant. How do we explicate what would satisfy an inquirer 
looking for an objectively good informant? We might have trouble finding intuitively 
obvious answers, because as we have seen, the inquirer-informant relationship 
involves society only by hypothetical extension; the basic need is a private one. As I 
imagine that it will be easier to base the synthesis on a basic need, we should begin 
with a hypothesis that already acknowledges social circumstances. 
 As we have seen in section 2.a, people do not only need to be able to find good 
informants for themselves, they also need to be able to talk about good informants 
and recommend them to others. The basic goal then is for whole communities of 
inquirers to get true beliefs, now and in the future. We saw above how this goal 
demands a counterfactual condition; it must be the case that, were the subject to 
inform an inquirer, he would tell the inquirer the truth. In the actual world, this 
counterfactual assertion condition boils down to an actual true belief condition. 
Likewise, when an inquirer uses an inquiry stopper, her goal is to stop with a true 
belief. For her too, we must explicate the true belief condition in order to 
accommodate her goal scenario.  
 With the true belief condition, we accommodate the goal for both the inquiry 
stopper and the good informant function. What about the strategy? The indicator 
property takes care of the inquirer‟s strategy, by ensuring the informant‟s 
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trustworthiness. The inquirer looks for informants with indicator properties to reach 
her goal of finding informants with true beliefs. However, when determining who is 
trustworthy enough, an individual inquirer asks only whether the inquirer is 
trustworthy enough for her own circumstances. When we begin our hypothesis by 
considering social and diachronic needs as well, this attitude no longer suffices. 
People need a concept that can refer to a category of trustworthiness that is relative to 
their entire community, rather than to themselves as individuals. Thus, I hypothesize 
that knowledge meets the strategic need for a category of stable trustworthiness.
112
  
Craig introduces this stable category as the concept of the objectively good 
informant. I suggest that we phrase the hypothesis rather by saying that people need 
to determine which subjects have epistemic authority.
113
 There are several 
advantages to this substitution. In the following section, I point out five.  
First, we are already accustomed to taking entire societies into account when 
applying the concept of authority. Thus, the epistemic authority hypothesis can 
accommodate the objectivization modifications more intuitively than an extension of 
the good informant hypothesis. As we have seen, an objectively good informant does 
not actually have to be informing anyone at all. Luigi would be able to tell Mario lots 
of information about the sewage system, but right now Luigi is asleep. It strains our 
intuitions to claim that Luigi is nonetheless an objectively good informant about the 
sewage system, because that concept is clearly artificial. On the other hand, it is easy 
to imagine someone who has authority, despite the fact that he is not exercising that 
authority. While authority does involve certain kinds of relationships, we more 
readily understand those relationships as hypothetical. We can say that, in her 
religion, Barb has the authority to marry couples. Thereby we make a claim about the 
relationship between Barb and a hypothetical couple. If there was a pair before her 
hoping to marry, Barb would have the authority to marry them. Barb‟s authority is 
not affected by the abundance or lack of actual couples, nor by whether she is awake 
or asleep. Thus, when we consider the need people have for a predicate that involves 
hypothetical rather than real testimonial relationships, it is more natural to phrase the 
need as for epistemic authority, rather than for an objectively good informant.  
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The epistemic authority hypothesis also draws attention to a new condition that 
we must explicate: people need to recognize stable social groups of people with good 
epistemic statuses, such as, for example, graduates from an educational program. 
Since all human societies need some form of education in order to prosper, we may 
assume that they all need a concept like epistemic authority to label their successful 
students and make them recognizable to others. A student who studies for and then 
passes a physics exam is recognized as having attained the authority to answer 
questions about physics. The same holds for the whole range of academic 
recognitions, from diplomas to the Nobel Prize. Professions are also markers of 
stable epistemic statuses. A society recognizes that its hunters are authorities on 
which weapon should be used to kill a buffalo, while its generals are authorities on 
which weapon should be used to kill a soldier. Nothing in this status implies any 
more than what has already been described in explicating the concept of the 
objectively good informant. Nonetheless, when talking about a good epistemic social 
status, the concept of the epistemic authority figure is a more intuitive choice than 
the concept of the objectively good informant. 
The explicated demand for epistemic social statuses illuminates another intuitive 
implication of epistemic authority: its connection to honor. To recognize someone‟s 
authority usually involves honoring them. The way in which we recognize a subject‟s 
epistemic authority is, on this hypothesis, by recognizing the subject as someone who 
can answer a certain question.
114
 Once again, this condition is already implicit in the 
good informant hypothesis. The epistemic authority framework just gives us a handy 
tool for imagining how such honoring works; we are used to connecting authority to 
honor. Furthermore, this explicated condition should result in a closer match to 
knowledge, for intuitions that being recognized as a knower involves honor are 
widely spread.
115
 Of course, not every knowledge attribution implies honor, but then 
neither does every recognition of authority. Authorities on underwater basket-
weaving have a notoriously tough time garnering respect. We may also expect that 
certain kinds of authority, such as the epistemic authority to say what time it is, are 
too easy to come by, and accordingly ill-deserving of honor. Nonetheless, the level 
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of honor involved might still be negatively visible; people who are unable to read a 
clock might well have a recognizably low epistemic status in their community, and 
experience shame as a result. In any case, it seems true for both authority and 
knowledge that, the higher the investment, the greater the honor awarded.  
 Furthermore, thinking of knowledge as a response to a need for epistemic 
authority helps to highlight the normative aspects of knowledge. As Melissa Lane 
points out, 
I am rationally bound to accept certain persons as knowers on the basis of their 
socially acknowledged standing as such, and I can be held socially and epistemically 
liable if I do not.
116
 
All social systems are maintained by a network of expectations and demands; there is 
no reason for the system of epistemic evaluation to form an exception. Therefore, the 
concept we are synthesizing must include conditions about who ought to be believed 
and who ought not to be believed. Subjects with epistemic authority ought to be 
believed. An inquirer who does not believe a subject with epistemic authority is 
violating an epistemic norm. If a sexist inquirer who only trusts women meets a male 
math whiz, then she would be epistemically blameworthy not to believe his math-
related assertions.
117
 He has the requisite epistemic authority; therefore she ought to 
believe him. Having authority obviously entails normative demands on others; it is 
not intuitively as clear that being an objectively good informant would entail the 
same. Thus, the normative condition demanded by the modified hypothesis also 
favors speaking of epistemic authority rather than an objectively good informant. 
 In the following sections, I continue to elaborate on some facets of the need for 
epistemic authority, particularly as it relates to practical reasoning. However, I do not 
stipulate a precise definition of the term, preferring to leave it vague and suggestive. 
To clarify it, we would have to turn to the concept of authority in general, of which 
epistemic authority is presumably one particular kind. The more we learn about the 
need for a concept of authority in general and its function in society, the more we 
may expect to learn about the need for epistemic authority in particular and the way 
in which the concept of knowledge meets that need. As I am not in the position to 
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offer a full synthesis of the need for authority in general, there are bound to be 
aspects of our need for epistemic authority that I overlook.  However, I take these 
inevitable oversights as a strength, rather than a weakness, for they illuminate 
potentially fertile avenues of further research. 
 In sum, when we begin with the hypothesis that knowledge meets the need for a 
stable category of trustworthiness, we may more naturally speak of the need for 
epistemic authority rather than the need for an objectively good informant. I have 
suggested that the alternative hypothesis offers five advantages: it is more plausibly 
construed as relative to hypothetical relationships, it implies a social status, it implies 
honor, it implies a normative aspect, and it suggests further questions by connecting 
knowledge to the broader concept of authority. 
b. Continuity with the subjective hypotheses 
In the section above, I identify five advantages for the alternative hypothesis. 
However, I also claim that my hypothesis subsumes Craig‟s own original hypothesis, 
as well as Kelp and Kappel‟s. The needs upon which their syntheses rest are specific 
instances of the more general need for a category of stable trustworthiness. 
An inquirer may need a subject with epistemic authority, simply because subjects 
with epistemic authority are trustworthy and an inquirer needs to find out whom she 
can trust when searching for good information. In other words, people need subjects 
with epistemic authority in part because they need good informants. A good 
informant is a subject with epistemic authority, and the need for a concept of the 
good informant is one instance of the more general need for a concept of epistemic 
authority. If I am busy picking berries in a tiger-ridden wood, I will not take any 
madman‟s ravings as a reason to flee; I will only trust the warning of someone who 
seems to possess the requisite authority on the question whether or not a tiger is 
coming. Being up a tree is a fine way to establish just that authority. To that extent, 
„has legitimate epistemic authority on the question whether p‟ is simply another way 
of saying „is a good informant as to whether p‟. 
 Epistemic authority also covers the inquiry stopper function hypothesized by 
Kelp and Kappel. Inquirers may only cease inquiry as to whether p if they have 
reached the point where they have the requisite authority to believe that p. If I want 
to find out whether a ladder is sturdy, I will perform whatever tests are necessary to 
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make myself an authority on the matter of that ladder‟s sturdiness. Again, all this 
only goes to say that „has legitimate epistemic authority on the question whether p‟ 
may express the same idea as „may permissibly stop inquiry as to whether p.‟ 
 I assume that no one‟s intuitions have already risen in rebellion. A particularly 
clear example of „epistemic authority‟ being used in the two senses outlined above 
may be found in the 2005 paper Say’s Who?: Epistemic Authority Effects in Social 
Judgment,
118
 which studies the make-up of epistemic authority with the tools of 
experimental psychology. The authors introduce their topic as follows: 
As we negotiate our way through the labyrinths of interpersonal relations and task 
exigencies, we encounter a continuous flow of information in the form of 
communications, advice, exhortations, and pleas from a variety of sources. These 
pose the ubiquitous question of whom to (informationally) trust and whose 
statements to discount or regard with suspicion.
119
 
They then present our assessment of others‟ epistemic authority as necessitated by 
this state of affairs. As such, they make „having epistemic authority‟ analogous to 
„being a good informant.‟ They go on to define epistemic authority more closely by 
using the considerations that motivate Kelp and Kappel: 
In its role of a „„stopping mechanism,‟‟ a source‟s authority plays, therefore, a 
motivational role in information processing determining the amount of energy the 
individual is prepared to devote to continued epistemic activity in a domain.
120
 
Thus, they equally understand „having epistemic authority‟ as analogous to „being 
able to stop inquiry‟.    
Furthermore, they specifically stress the possibility that an inquirer may serve as 
her own epistemic authority.
121
  If a subject doesn‟t feel confident about her own 
expertise in a certain subject, then she will tend to seek advice from other people 
before making a decision as to whether p. In such situations, the inquirer looks for 
the assertion of a trustworthy informant before committing herself to belief. She may 
not believe that p on her own authority.  If on the other hand, she believes that she 
herself “knows best,” 122  then she will simply take her own belief that p as 
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 Kruglanski, et al. 2005.  
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 Ibid., p. 346. 
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 Ibid., p. 352.   
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 Ibid., pp. 370 – 376. 
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 The authors found the formulation “Who knows best?” to be the question that most clearly evoked 
the notion of epistemic authority. (Ibid., p. 357)  
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authoritative enough. Thus epistemic authority can function in the first-person as 
well as in the third-person. 
This example from non-philosophical literature should suggest that equivocating 
between the concept „epistemic authority‟ on the one hand and the concepts „good 
informant‟ and „inquiry stopper‟ on the other hand is no rash stipulation, but is rather 
supported by generally shared intuitions about what authority in the cognitive 
domain entails. The idea of epistemic authority can capture our intuitions about both 
the good informant function and the permissible inquiry stopper function. 
c. A problem anticipated 
I have introduced a new hypothesis: the concept of knowledge meets the strategic 
need for a concept of epistemic authority. I claim that this hypothesis takes all the 
concerns of objectivization into account from the get-go. However I have further 
claimed that the hypothesis covers the function of the subjectively good informant 
and the subjectively permissible inquiry stopper as well. The result is appealing in its 
comprehensiveness, but is it tenable?    
 The concept of the good informant serves a vital function thanks to its sensitivity 
to inquirers‟ personal needs. The concept of stable trustworthiness serves a vital 
function thanks to its insensitivity to same. How can the concept of epistemic 
authority include both functions? This contradiction threatens to prevent a coherent 
synthesis. The conditions explicated as necessary to one function may turn out 
anathema to the other. To support my claim that one single concept can play both 
functions, I must explicate a condition which allows for both enough sensitivity and 
enough insensitivity.  
 Just such a condition is in fact available, as I show at the end of Chapter Five. 
Before reaching this point though, I must elaborate on the kind of sensitivity we 
should explicate from the hypothesis. This will be the theme of Chapter Four. 
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4. Explication: Sensitivity to practical context 
a. Knowledge characterized by its authoritative role in practical 
reasoning (KAP) 
i. The vague reliability condition 
In the last chapter, I introduced a new hypothesis: knowledge meets the strategic 
need for epistemic authority. This hypothesis should accommodate the demands of 
objectivization. I have already explicated three new conditions from the hypothesis: a 
social status condition, an honor condition, and a normativity condition. I will return 
to the importance of these conditions in section d of this chapter. For the moment, 
however, I set them aside in order to concentrate exclusively on the function of the 
reliability condition. With the provisional exclusion of the new social conditions, we 
may simply make a couple substitutions to the objectivized concept of the good 
informant,
123
 and explicate this synthesis: 
 
Knowledge as true and potentially Authoritative belief (KA) 
S1 knows relative to S1 - Sn iff p, S1 believes that p, and S1 has a property X which 
correlates with being right about p reliably enough that S1 - Sn may appropriately use 
the belief that p on S1‟s authority.    
  
Before we go on to step four and compare KA to the concept of knowledge, we must 
determine just how reliably the property X must correlate with being right about p – 
how reliably is „reliably enough‟? What standards of reliability will meet people‟s 
need for epistemic authority? Once we explicate the relevant standards, we will be in 
the position to clarify what makes it „appropriate‟ for an inquirer to believe on an 
informant‟s authority. 
ii. Two sources of inspiration 
To explicate the reliability condition, I will borrow an idea from John Hawthorne and 
Jason Stanley‟s subject-sensitive invariantism, namely, that knowledge is the norm 
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of practical reasoning.
124
 According to Hawthorne and Stanley, one should only use 
p as a reason for acting if one knows that p. Inspired by this account, I will argue that 
S1 may appropriately have epistemic authority over S1-n regarding p only if it would 
be acceptable for S1-n to use the belief acquired on S1‟s authority as a reason for 
acting. 
Due to the testimonial needs included in my hypothesis, however, my position 
will not mimic subject-sensitive invariantism. To develop it properly, I must rather 
borrow an idea from an opposing camp: contextualism. Namely, I make use of the 
contextualist idea that the meaning of a knowledge attribution is relative to the 
person making the attribution. I go through the differences between my account and 
Hawthorne and Stanley‟s account in more detail below, in section 4.c. 
In sum, I will argue that the meaning expressed by a knowledge attribution is 
directly affected by the practical environment of the attributor. Thus, I use an 
element of subject-sensitive invariantism in order to motivate a contextualist account 
of knowledge.  Most contextualist accounts of knowledge have been motivated by 
the desire to properly interpret skeptical arguments, explaining why they are both 
compelling and unthreatening to everyday knowledge claims.
125
 My contextualist 
synthesis of knowledge, on the other hand, is focused entirely on the functional role 
the concept of knowledge plays in social life, and not at all with skepticism.  
iii. Craig’s prototypical case 
Craig describes the concept of the good informant as a response to the demands of 
practical reasoning. In order to get all the information she needs to successfully 
pursue her practical goals, the inquirer needs to detect good informants. Once she 
finds a good informant, she asks him whether p or not p. If he asserts that p, she can 
believe p on his authority and accordingly use p as a premise in her practical 
reasoning. So, Craig‟s portrayal of the prototypical case looks as follows, in which S2 
is an inquirer and S1 an informant: 
 
The prototypical case of the good informant and the inquirer 
S2 needs to find out whether p. S1 truly asserts that p. S2 detects that S1 has a property 
                                                 
124
 Hawthorne & Stanley 2008.  
125
 Willaschek 2007, p. 254.  
  
69 
 
X which correlates with being right about p reliably enough that S2 believes that p on 
S1‟s authority and accordingly uses p as a premise in her practical reasoning. 
 
Two points require clarification. First, I must clarify what I mean by using p as a 
premise in practical reasoning. To use p as a premise in one‟s practical reasoning 
means to act as if p. If p makes action A preferable, and not p makes action B 
preferable, then a subject acts as if p when she performs action A.  For example, if it 
will probably rain, Marion would prefer to bring an umbrella. If it will probably be 
dry, Marion would rather do without the hassle of lugging an umbrella around; she 
has many other things to carry and a long way to travel. A weatherman tells her that 
it will probably be dry. She detects that being a weatherman correlates fairly reliably 
with being right about such things and accordingly decides to risk the chance of rain, 
leaving the umbrella at home. Because Marion believes on the weatherman‟s 
authority, she uses the proposition “It will probably be dry” as a premise in her 
practical reasoning. By leaving the umbrella at home, she acts as if it will probably 
be dry.
126
 
 Second, I must clarify the relationship between the inquirer‟s trust and the 
inquirer‟s reasoning. In Craig‟s prototypical case, if an informant is good, then an 
inquirer may believe p on his authority and accordingly use p as a premise in her 
practical reasoning. The „accordingly‟ should indicate that she uses the belief in her 
practical reasoning because of S1‟s authority. This is a causal relationship that I 
tentatively characterize along David Lewis‟ account of a causal chain of 
counterfactual causal relations:
127
 If the inquirer had not detected the informant‟s 
indicator property, then the inquirer would not have acquired a belief that p on his 
authority. If the inquirer had not acquired a belief that p on his authority, then the 
inquirer would not have used p as a premise in her practical reasoning. For example, 
Fred climbs a tree and starts screaming, “A tiger is coming!” and the inquirer on the 
ground runs away. If the inquirer had seen Fred eating hallucinogenic mushrooms, 
then the inquirer would not have believed that a tiger was coming on his authority. If 
                                                 
126
 For further explanation and a host of clarifications, see Fantl & McGrath 2002. 
127
 For an introduction to the theory, see Menzies 2009. I assume that the problems with Lewis‟ theory 
do not substantially affect my explication. The following discussion should demonstrate that my 
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the inquirer had not believed that a tiger was coming on his authority, then she would 
not have acted as if a tiger was coming, i.e., ran away.  
 A subject is only in truth a good informant if his authority is appropriate. A 
subject‟s authority is appropriate if and only if an inquirer would be rational to use a 
belief based on his authority as a premise in her practical reasoning. A causal chain 
goes from the informant‟s authority over whether p, to the inquirer‟s belief that p, to 
the inquirer‟s action as if p. In order to evaluate the informant‟s authority we must 
ask whether the first link makes the final link rational. If the level of the reliability of 
the informant‟s indicator property makes the inquirer rational to act as if p based on 
the inquirer‟s trust in the informant, then the informant‟s authority is appropriate. If 
on the other hand, the inquirer would be irrational to use a belief acquired out of trust 
in the informant as a premise in her practical reasoning, then the informant‟s 
authority is not appropriate. Imagine Luke tells Colleen that a tree branch is strong; 
Colleen trusts him and crawls out onto the branch. If her crawling out onto the 
branch is rational, then Luke has the epistemic authority to make the assertion. That 
is, if Colleen may use “the tree branch is strong” as a premise in rational practical 
reasoning based on her trust in Luke, then Luke‟s belief that “the tree branch is 
strong” really is authoritative. 
 Thus, the appropriateness of S1‟s authority for S2 that p is derivative from the 
rationality of using p as a premise in S2‟s practical reasoning. The amount of 
reliability required for using p as a premise in rational practical reasoning dictates the 
amount of reliability S1 requires to have authority as to whether p. We may describe 
the concept of the good informant with the following biconditional: 
 
The concept of the good informant characterized by its authoritative role in 
practical reasoning  
S2‟s belief that “S1 is a good informant that p” is true iff p, S1 asserts that p, and S2 
detects that S1 has a property X which correlates with being right about p reliably 
enough that S2 believes that p on S1‟s authority and accordingly uses p as a premise 
in rational practical reasoning.     
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iv. Objectivizing everything besides the reliability condition 
The previous section clarifies the relationship between being a good informant and 
practical reasoning. However, I have rejected Craig‟s good informant hypothesis, 
arguing that we must begin with the epistemic authority hypothesis instead. 
Nonetheless, I have also argued that the epistemic authority hypothesis can subsume 
the good informant function, doing all of its work in addition to its further social 
functions. 
 I will argue that the concept of knowledge can do the work of the good 
informant concept by playing the role in practical reasoning just outlined. At the end 
of the chapter, I will acknowledge the tension between this subjective feature and the 
social conditions explicated above.
128
   
 Losing the subjective conditions (1) and (4) allows that S1 need not actually tell 
S2 that p in order to count as knowing that p; as we saw above, the social hypothesis 
demands instead that S1 believe that p. Losing the subjective condition (2) allows 
that S2 need not actually detect S1‟s indicator property. In addition, I take Kappel‟s 
inquiry stopper hypothesis into account, and his maneuver of combining the two 
functions by substituting S2 with S1 – Sn. We end up with the following synthesis: 
 
Knowledge characterized by its Authoritative role in Practical reasoning (KAP) 
S1 knows that p relative to S1 – Sn iff p, S1 believes that p, and S1 has a property X 
which correlates with being right about p reliably enough that S1 – Sn could believe 
that p on S1‟s authority and accordingly use p as a premise in rational practical 
reasoning.      
 
According to KAP, the concept of knowledge functions to label subjects who are in 
such a good epistemic position that someone could rationally rely on their beliefs 
when deciding what to do. Refusing to attribute knowledge to a subject functions as a 
sign that someone would have to find better evidence before acting as his beliefs 
suggest. So, if someone would be rational to believe the branch was strong on Luke‟s 
authority and accordingly crawl out on it, then Luke knows that the branch is strong. 
If someone would be irrational to do so, then Luke does not know that the branch is 
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strong. We can use this hypothetical relationship to judge whether or not Luke knows 
that the branch is strong even if Luke is alone and no one wants to climb the tree.  
v. KAP vs. Hawthorne: a foreshadow 
By connecting the appropriateness of S1‟s authority to the rationality of S1 - Sn‟s 
practical reasoning, I clarified how reliable a subject must be to count as knowing. 
This tactic is inspired not only by Craig, but also by the work of John Hawthorne. In 
his book Knowledge and Lotteries, he writes, 
Insofar as it is unacceptable – and not merely because the content of the belief is 
irrelevant to the issues at hand – to use a belief that p as a premise in practical 
reasoning on a certain occasion, the belief is not a piece of knowledge at that time.
129
 
Hawthorne‟s formulation is simpler than KAP. If we were to reformulate his 
principle in terms of causality, his causal chain would only have one link:   
If S did not believe that p, then S would not use p as a premise in her practical 
reasoning.  
KAP explicitly includes an additional link to begin the chain: 
In the first person case, if S did not have a property that indicated authority as to 
whether p, then S would not believe that p.  
If S did not believe that p, then S would not use p as a premise in her practical 
reasoning. 
Of course, Hawthorne would probably accept that that the concept of knowledge 
plays a function in that first link, but only in the first-person form. KAP, on the other 
hand, also allows for the following chain:  
In the third person case, if S1 did not have a property that indicated authority as to 
whether p, then S2 would not believe that p.  
If S2 did not believe that p, then S2 would not have used p as a premise in her 
practical reasoning. 
In this chain, Hawthorne could only recognize a function for the concept of 
knowledge in the second link: it serves to separate beliefs one should act on from 
beliefs one should not act on. He would be forced to deny that knowledge can 
function in the first link as a way to separate testimony one should believe (and 
accordingly act on) from testimony one should not believe (and accordingly act on). 
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Therein lays the greater explanatory power of KAP as opposed to Hawthorne‟s 
version. I return to this comparison at much greater length in sections 4.c and 6.c. 
vi. Crisp’s bizarre counterexample 
Thomas Crisp constructs a thought experiment which he claims presents a 
counterexample to such a conception of knowledge.
130
 In his thought experiment, Dr. 
Evil is monitoring your thoughts and has threatened to torture and kill you if you use 
„2+2=4‟ as a premise in your practical reasoning.131  In that case, it would not be 
practically rational to do so, yet surely you still know that „2+2=4‟. Thus, we have a 
scenario in which a piece of knowledge may not be rationally deployed in practical 
reasoning. Therefore, Crisp reasons, the reliability condition presented above cannot 
be necessary to knowledge.  
 To meet this objection, we must return to the considerations of section 1.d.i. If 
we may conceive of the concept of knowledge by way of explicating conditions from 
generally shared needs, we must include all and only those conditions which usually 
meet those needs. Bizarre possibilities do not suffice to affect the synthesis. In nearly 
all cases, a true belief acquired on appropriate authority is rational to use in practical 
reasoning. Crisp needs to demonstrate that there is a set of ordinary cases in which 
that doesn‟t hold. His bizarre example is not enough to demonstrate that the concept 
of knowledge is unaffected by its role in practical reasoning. 
b. Explicating contextual attributor sensitivity 
i. Practical environments change 
People need to recognize subjects whose epistemic position is such that someone 
would be able to act on the authority of their beliefs. So if, in a nearby possible 
world, Colleen would be rational to act on Luke‟s belief that the tree branch is 
strong, then Luke counts as knowing it, even if Luke is actually alone and no one 
wants to climb the tree. What happens, though, in situations like the peanut 
example?
132
 Nelville believes that his cookies have no peanuts in them, and he has 
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fairly good, though not absolutely decisive, evidence for the belief. Estelle would be 
rational to act on his belief by eating a cookie, because she would only risk 
experiencing a taste she dislikes. Ida would not be rational to act on his belief by 
giving one of the cookies to her child, who is fatally allergic to peanuts. So, does 
Nelville know or not? According to KAP, Nelville would know relative to Estelle, 
but would not know relative to Ida. KAP cannot provide one single answer, because 
whether a premise may be used in rational practical reasoning or not varies from 
reasoner to reasoner. Specifically, it varies relative to a reasoner‟s practical 
environment. The notion of a practical environment is taken from Hawthorne.
133
 It 
consists of any factors that affect which premises one may use in rational practical 
reasoning.  
Some factors that affect a practical environment are already traditionally 
accounted for in epistemological theories. The amount of evidence one has for a 
belief, for example, can affect whether or not it is rational to act on it. In what 
follows, I am more interested in the factors which a practical environment includes, 
but which have usually been excluded from analyses of knowledge. In the peanut 
example, Nelville‟s amount of evidence stays constant; what changes is the risk 
involved in acting on his belief. By explicating the concept of knowledge as that 
which plays the role in practical reasoning described by KAP, I assume that such 
blatantly practical considerations can affect whether or not a subject knows.  
The rest of this section introduces three such factors that affect a practical 
environment. Furthermore, in presenting examples of these factors, I also 
demonstrate how knowledge can function by virtue of its sensitivity to the relevant 
practical factor. In so doing, I already anticipate the fourth step of comparison, 
eliciting intuitions that it is indeed acceptable for knowledge to be applied just as my 
explication deems it would be. 
(1) End of inquiry  
Rational actions are directed towards some sort of end. By changing the end of 
inquiry, the sorts of premises that one may use in rational practical reasoning also 
change. 
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Example: The book and the ticket
134
 
 
Buying a Guide Book 
S2 is in a book store, looking to buy a guide book. She can only afford one and must 
choose between a guide book for a distant land and a local guide book. 
END OF INQUIRY: Decide which book to buy. 
S1 tells S2 “You won‟t be able to afford to travel to that distant land.”  
S1 is S2‟s financial advisor. S2 believes that S1 knows that she won‟t be able to afford 
to travel to that distant land. As a result, S2 makes the rational decision to buy the 
local guide book. 
 
Selling a Lottery Ticket  
S2 has bought a ticket in a big lottery for a dollar. Someone offers to buy the ticket 
off her for a penny.  
END OF INQUIRY: Decide whether or not to sell the ticket. 
S1 tells S2 “Your ticket will lose.” 
S1 doesn‟t have any inside information about this particular lottery. S2 believes that 
S1 does not know that the ticket will lose. As a result, S2 makes the rational decision 
to keep her ticket. 
 
Changing the end of inquiry changed whether it was acceptable for S2 to use the 
premise “Your ticket will lose” as a premise in rational practical reasoning. The end 
of inquiry is a factor in a practical environment.  
 Furthermore, the example reveals interesting intuitions about knowledge 
attributions. Imagine that the lottery‟s prize is big enough that, were S2‟s ticket to 
win, she would in fact be able to afford to travel to that distant land. In that case, the 
truth of S1‟s assertion in Buying a Guide Book would entail the truth of S1‟s assertion 
in Selling a Lottery Ticket. Nonetheless, it‟s generally agreed that S2 is in fact acting 
rationally and in her own best interest when she accepts S1‟s testimony in Buying a 
Guide Book and rejects it in Selling a Lottery Ticket.
135
 According to my explication, 
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the concept of knowledge would thus apply to S1 in Buying a Guide Book, but not in 
Selling a Lottery Ticket. That is, the end of inquiry would have to be able to affect 
what S1 knows about S2‟s financial situation. Since the truth of S2‟s knowledge 
attributions in these examples is intuitively acceptable, the contextualist sensitivity I 
have explicated promises to do well in the fourth step of comparison. 
(2) Stakes 
As already shown in the peanut example above, raising the stakes of being wrong 
about a certain premise can change whether or not it is acceptable to use that premise 
in rational practical reasoning. 
 
Example: “John was at work.”136 
Thelma and Louise made a small office bet as to whether their often absent colleague 
John would be at work that day. Before leaving the office, Louise sees John‟s hat 
hanging on the coatrack and hears Fred call out “Why don‟t you clear that letter with 
John quick before you send it off?”  
 
Petty Bet 
At a bar, Louise runs into Thelma. Thelma had bet five dollars that John would be 
absent. If Thelma believes that John was at work when he wasn‟t, she loses five 
dollars that she otherwise would have kept. If she loses the five dollars, she won‟t be 
able to afford another drink, which she mildly desires. 
STAKES: Low 
Louise tells Thelma that John was at work, describing what she saw and heard. 
Thelma believes Louise and as a result, makes the rational decision to give Louise 
five dollars. 
 
Criminal investigation 
Later that night, Louise is visited by the police, who are investigating a terrible 
crime. If the police believe that John was at work when he wasn‟t, they might arrest 
an innocent man, thereby endangering lives and their jobs. 
                                                                                                                                          
ticket will lose. Rather the irrational reason for buying the ticket also prevents the ticket holder from 
coherently believing that it will lose. (Levin 2008, pp. 372 – 373)  
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STAKES: High 
Louise tells the police that John was at work, describing what she saw and heard. 
The police believe Louise and as a result, make the rational decision to continue 
looking for a reliable witness as to whether John was at work. 
 
Louise‟s position in relation to her assertion that “John was at work” doesn‟t change. 
However, it is only acceptable as a premise in rational practical reasoning in a fairly 
low stakes situation. The height of stakes is a factor in a practical environment. 
(3) Relevant alternatives 
To be an authoritative informant that p, a subject must be able to rule out certain 
possibilities which entail that not p. These possibilities, or „counterpossibilities,‟137 
may be called the relevant alternatives. Fred Dretske first introduced this feature of 
knowledge claims and defined it as follows,  
A relevant alternative is an alternative that might have been realized in the existing 
circumstances if the actual state of affairs had not materialized.
138
  
S1 cannot responsibly believe that S2 knows that p unless S1 believes that S2 has ruled 
out a certain set of relevant alternatives that would entail not-p.
139
  
 
Example: “Lefty killed Otto”140 
 
Did Lefty do it? 
Altin tells Deia that “Lefty killed Otto.” Deia is doubtful; she asks, “Are you sure it 
wasn‟t Righty who killed Otto?”  
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 One way to integrate relevant alternatives into an account of knowledge is to consider knowledge 
attributions as based on contrastive questions: “Does S know that p, or is S unable to eliminate 
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relata: a subject S, a proposition p, and a set of contrastive propositions Q. While he presents the view 
as an alternative to contextualism, that is due to his identification of contextualism with the claim that 
„knowledge‟ is an indexical. I conceive of contextualism more loosely as any account which claims 
that knowledge is relative to the attributor‟s context and so would construe Blaauw‟s account as 
another form of contextualism. 
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paper concerns zebras in a zoo: must one be able to rule out that it is a cleverly disguised mule in 
order to know that it is a zebra? If so, skeptical implications abound. Since my interest is not in 
skepticism, I have chosen a somewhat more quotidian example. 
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Relevant Alternative: Righty killed Otto. 
Altin answers, “Yes, I was playing cards with Righty when it happened. He 
definitely didn‟t do it.” Accordingly, if Deia had to use the premise that Lefty killed 
Otto in her practical reasoning, she could rationally do so on Altin‟s authority. 
 
Is Otto dead? 
Altin tells Deia that “Lefty killed Otto.” Deia is doubtful; she asks, “Are you sure 
Otto really died?” 
Relevant Alternative: Lefty only injured Otto. 
Altin answers, “Yes, I spoke to the coroner myself.” Accordingly, if Deia had to use 
the premise that Lefty killed Otto in her practical reasoning, she could rationally do 
so on Altin‟s authority. 
 
If Altin is to count as knowing that “Lefty killed Otto,” he must be able to rule out 
the relevant alternatives. Which alternatives are relevant depends on the context of 
inquiry; in the first example Deia demands that he be able to rule out a different 
culprit, in the second, Deia demands that he be able to rule out a mere injury. Why 
should Deia‟s demand change like that? There are several possible answers. We can 
already see from the previous two examples that both the end of inquiry and the 
stakes of a practical environment can affect which alternatives are relevant.
141
 In 
“Selling a Lottery Ticket,” the very slim chance that S2‟s lottery ticket will win is a 
relevant alternative. S2 can‟t accept S1‟s assertion as a reason for acting unless she 
can rule out that very slim chance. In “Buying a Guide Book” the very slim chance 
that S2‟s lottery ticket will win is not a relevant alternative. S2 can accept S1‟s 
assertion as a reason for acting, despite the fact that she hasn‟t ruled it out. Likewise, 
in “Petty Bet” the possibility that John left his hat there the day before and that Fred 
just made a mistake is not a relevant alternative, but in “Criminal Investigation” its 
feasibility prevents the police from using Louise‟s testimony as a reason for 
prosecution.  
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 What else can make an alternative relevant? Is it enough that an alternative is 
salient to the speaker?
142
 Or are there more „objective‟ criteria for relevance? My 
answer to this question must await a clearer model of practical environments, which I 
offer in section 5.e.  
 The three factors outlined here leave many crucial details unaddressed. The one 
general point which should already be clear is that, if the concept of knowledge is to 
play the role described by KAP, it must be sensitive to the end of inquiry, the stakes, 
and the relevant alternatives in the potential inquirer‟s practical environment. 
ii.  “Knowledge” changes according to context  
As the examples given above demonstrate, when the factors of a practical 
environment change, then the acceptability of p as a reason to act changes. Given 
KAP, the acceptability of p as a reason to act directly affects whether knowledge 
may be truthfully attributed. The subject counts as knowing if someone could 
rationally act on his belief. The subject counts as not knowing if someone could not 
rationally act on his belief. Yet both circumstances can be simultaneously true. 
Estelle could rationally act on Nelville‟s belief; but Ida could not. Whether or not 
“Nelville knows that the cookies have no peanuts” is a true statement depends on 
whether the speaker who states it is considering Nelville‟s potential relationship with 
Estelle or his potential relationship with Ida.  
 In other words, KAP supports contextualism about knowledge. According to the 
contextualist portrayal of knowledge, there need not be one single right answer to the 
question “Does Nelville know?” Estelle can truthfully say “Nelville knows that p” 
while Ida can truthfully say “Nelville doesn‟t know that p” in reference to the same 
Nelville and the same proposition at the same time. The two sentences do not 
necessarily contradict one another because the meaning of the word „know‟ and 
thereby the actual proposition expressed can change. That is, it is possible for Estelle 
to mean “Nelville can rule out relevant alternatives 1, 2, and 3,” while Ida means 
“Nelville can rule out relevant alternatives 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5.” Since they both mean 
different things by the word „know‟, both sentences can be true without entailing a 
contradiction. Just as S can be simultaneously both „here‟ and „not here‟ depending 
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on who is talking, S can simultaneously both „know‟ and „not know‟ that p because 
the meaning of the word „know‟ can shift according to who is talking. 
 The context sensitivity of “here” is of course much more obvious than the 
alleged sensitivity of “know(s)”. Contextualists traditionally compare “know(s)” to 
more subtly context sensitive words like “tall”. One person can truthfully say “S is 
tall” while another can truthfully say “S is not tall” in reference to the same person at 
the same time. The two sentences need not contradict, because the semantic value of 
the word “tall” can be different in two different attributors‟ context. That is, it is 
possible that the first person means, “tall for a fourth grader” while the second means 
“tall for a basketball player.”  
 The concept of knowledge cannot function to meet the hypothesized need unless 
it is sensitive to an implied practical environment. As a result, I explicated a 
contextually sensitive reliability condition, as described in the formula KAP. 
According to that condition, the meaning of the word “knowledge” can change 
according to the speakers‟ context. Thus, if KAP is acceptable, the concept of 
knowledge needs just the kind of flexibility that contextualists claim it has. 
iii. Functional contextualism 
Contextualism about knowledge is generally taken to be a thesis about the semantic 
meaning of the word „know‟. One can thus be an invariantist about the semantic 
meaning of the word „know,‟ while still claiming that the pragmatic implications of 
the word „know‟ vary with context. Indeed, Unger, who first introduced the terms 
„invariantist‟ and „contextualist‟, assumed throughout that all epistemologists must 
agree to some sort of contextualist shift in communicated meaning.
143
 He portrayed 
the vital difference as whether the shift happens in the semantics or the pragmatics of 
the knowledge attribution. That is, does the proposition expressed by a knowledge 
attribution, and thereby its truth conditions, change according to context? Or is it 
rather what is implied and understood beyond the propositional content that changes 
according to context?  
For example, if I say, “Nobody will be laid off,” the semantic meaning of my 
statement is just that: “Nobody will be laid off.” If someone halfway across the world 
is laid off, my statement expresses a semantic falsehood. However, it might be very 
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well understood that I do not actually mean “Not one single person will be laid off” 
but rather “Nobody in this company will be laid off.” The limited reference class is 
not part of the semantics of my sentence, but rather a pragmatic implication. So what 
I communicate and what my interlocutor understands is not the actual proposition I 
said, but rather the one I meant. For the concept of knowledge we can understand the 
difference as follows: either the proposition expressed by „knowledge‟ changes 
according to practical environment, or what people mean when they use the word 
„knowledge‟ changes according to practical environment. If the latter is the case, 
then people who, for example, say “S knows that p” in a low stakes environment 
might be saying something false, but meaning something true, such as “S is very 
close to knowing that p.”144  
What does a functional synthesis have to say about the distinction between 
pragmatics and semantics? As Craig recognizes, not much.
145
 A semantic invariantist 
who allows for contextual pragmatic implications may still argue that the use of the 
word „knowledge‟ fills the function described by KAP. Of course, she would be left 
with the burden of demonstrating why the semantics of the word diverge from the 
function of the word, but such a demonstration might not be impossible. While a 
functional synthesis must compare the explicated concept to the empirical use of the 
word, it is not limited to semantic data. If the word can fill its function thanks to 
pragmatic implication, the thesis is still supported. Thus the contextualism defended 
here is functional contextualism, which may be either semantic or pragmatic. 
However, I still have to defend my functional analysis against those who hold 
that, according to empirical data, what is primarily communicated and understood by 
knowledge attributions varies neither semantically nor thanks to pragmatic 
implication.
146
 Since that is the distinction that interests me here, I shall restrict the 
label „invariantism‟ to those who hold that position. I shall refer to those who argue 
that the uptake of knowledge attributions can vary thanks to pragmatic implication as 
pragmatic contextualists. 
The debate over whether shifts in the meaning of knowledge attributions are 
semantic or pragmatic involves deciding whether intuitive knowledge attributions are 
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based on conversational propriety or on truth conditions.
147
 By disregarding this 
debate altogether, I free my hands for a different project. Rather than focusing on 
particular uses of the word „know‟ that could shed light on that distinction, I attempt 
to achieve a more thorough understanding of the various factors that affect what is 
communicated through knowledge attributions, regardless of how that 
communication takes place. The results of this more general account can 
subsequently contribute to the semantics/pragmatics debate, for once we have a 
better idea of what kinds of shifts to look for, we should be better able to choose 
which sentences to linguistically analyze. 
c. Not explicating invariant subject sensitivity 
In elaborating on how the concept of knowledge might function to meet the need for 
epistemic authority, I have drawn from Hawthorne and Stanley‟s exemplary work on 
the link between knowledge and practical reasoning. However, as foreshadowed, I 
made several crucial changes. Here, I present the outlines of Hawthorne and 
Stanley‟s account of knowledge and explain the three main points on which it differs 
from KAP. I also describe how the two accounts should be compared. The actual 
comparison and its verdict must wait until KAP has been more satisfyingly 
developed, in section 6.c. 
i. The Reason-Knowledge Principle 
Hawthorne and Stanley claim that knowledge functions as the norm of practical 
reasoning.
148
 They offer the following formulation: 
 
The Reason-Knowledge Principle 
Where one‟s choice is p-dependent, it is appropriate to treat the proposition 
that p as a reason for acting iff you know that p.
149
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For a choice to be “p-dependent” simply means that the question whether p is 
relevant to the action at hand. Or, in Hawthorne and Stanley‟s more technical 
explanation: 
Let us say that a choice between options x1…xn is p dependent iff the most 
preferable of x1….xn conditional on the proposition that p is not the same as the 
most preferable of x1…xn conditional on the proposition that not-p.150 
Like KAP, the Reason-Knowledge Principle entails that a change in practical 
environment will result in a change in the applicability of the concept of knowledge, 
even if the subject‟s belief and all the traditional factors, such as how much evidence 
she has, remain the same. Take “John was at work.” In Thelma‟s practical 
environment it is appropriate for Thelma to treat the proposition that “John was at 
work” as a reason for action. Therefore, according to the Reason-Knowledge 
Principle, Thelma knows that p. In the police‟s practical environment it is not 
appropriate for the police to treat the proposition that “John was at work” as a reason 
for action. Therefore, the police do not know that p. Despite having identical 
evidence, the difference in their practical environments entails that Thelma but not 
the police may know that p. This interpretation of the example is similar to the one 
KAP provides, but it is not identical.   
The Reason-Knowledge Principle has three major differences from KAP, all of 
which are interrelated. First, it is motivated by the evaluation of behavior rather than 
the evaluation of a belief or assertion. Second, it refers exclusively to first person 
scenarios, resulting in subject-sensitive invariantism rather than contextualism. 
Third, it refers to knowledge per se rather than knowledge attributions.  
ii. Contrasting hypotheses 
The Reason-Knowledge Principle is motivated by behavior appraisal scenarios. If we 
were to rephrase their work in the terms of a conceptual synthesis, we could say that 
their principle is based on the hypothesis that the concept of knowledge functions to 
meet the need to appraise behavior. People need the concept of knowledge so that 
they may exercise epistemic judgment over the behavior of others. That is, on the 
Hawthorne and Stanley account, the concept of knowledge primarily functions as a 
guideline for whether people‟s actions should be blamed or praised.  
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 Of course, Hawthorne and Stanley do not actually perform a four step 
conceptual synthesis. Rather, they begin straightaway with intuitions about the 
concept of knowledge by listing several everyday situations in which it intuitively 
seems appropriate for one subject to appraise another‟s behavior by using the 
concept of knowledge.  
… our ordinary folk appraisals of the behavior of others suggest that the concept of 
knowledge is intimately intertwined with the rationality of action.
151
 
For example, in their version of “Selling a Lottery Ticket,” they present a subject 
who does decide to sell his ticket, using “I will lose the lottery” as his reason for 
action.
152
 They go on to encourage the reader to notice the absurdity of such 
reasoning, that is, to appraise his behavior as irrational. In another example John 
decides not to buy health insurance.
153
 His mother then appraises his behavior as 
irrational, due to the fact that John doesn‟t know that he won‟t fall ill. Other 
examples include conditional orders, “Don‟t take out the cake until it‟s done” implies 
“Don‟t take out the cake until you know it‟s done,” and judgments of negligence, 
“Only a negligent doctor would use a needle that he doesn‟t know is safe.”154 Noting 
the way one intuitively appraises such behavior, they offer the Reason-Knowledge 
Principle as the foundation of these normative judgments. Namely, one tends to 
criticize subjects who use a premise that they do not know as a reason for action. 
“Folk appraisals” of the kind of behavior these subjects exemplify motivate the 
Reason-Knowledge Principle. 
 KAP on the other hand is motivated by scenarios in which inquirers must decide 
whether or not an informant‟s assertion is trustworthy and scenarios in which 
inquirers must decide whether or not they may acceptably stop inquiry. The 
rationality of an action is thus taken as an independently determined point.
155
 Of 
course, a knowledge claim can be used to evaluate behavior; however, the accuracy 
of a knowledge claim ultimately rests on the rationality of the action, not the other 
way around. Therefore, on my hypothesis, the concept of knowledge does not enable 
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us to evaluate action; rather, its sensitivity to action evaluations enables us to 
evaluate beliefs. So, while KAP could be seen as motivated by evaluation, the 
primary object of evaluation would be a belief or an assertion, not an action.  
iii. First person scenarios 
The Reason-Knowledge Principle describes the relationship between a practical 
reasoner and a proposition. It says that a subject should not use a proposition as a 
reason for action unless she herself knows it.  
 KAP is more flexible. It too can describe cases in which a subject may use a 
proposition as a reason for action because she herself knows it. However, it also 
describes how the concept of knowledge functions in cases in which a subject can 
use a proposition as a reason for action because some other, external, informant 
knows it. As we saw in the examples above, this flexibility led KAP to entail a 
contextualist account of knowledge. The police may truly say that “Louise does not 
know that John was at work,” thanks to their practical environment. Thelma may 
truly say that “Louise does know that John was at work,” thanks to her practical 
environment.  
 The Reason-Knowledge Principle does not entail contextualism. Rather, it 
entails subject-sensitive invariantism. Given the driving hypothesis, there is no 
reason to explicate sensitivity to the practical environments of hypothetical inquirers. 
Only the subject‟s (S1‟s) own practical environment is relevant to whether or not he 
knows. Hawthorne introduces this approach as follows: 
Restricting ourselves to extensional matters, the verb „know‟ picks out the same 
ordered triples of subject, time, and proposition in the mouths of any ascriber. 
However, whether a particular subject-time-proposition triple is included in the 
extension of „know‟ depends not merely upon the kinds of factors traditionally 
adverted to in accounts of knowledge – whether the subject believes the proposition, 
whether that proposition is true, whether the subject has good evidence, whether the 
subject is using a reliable method, and so on – but also upon the kinds of factors that 
in the contextualist‟s hands make for ascriber-dependence. These factors will thus 
include (some or all of) the attention, interests, and stakes of that subject at that 
time.
156
 
This approach to the relationship between knowledge attributions and practical 
considerations is called subject-sensitive invariantism. Knowledge is sensitive to the 
practical concerns of the subject, but not to those of the attributor. For example, say 
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that S1‟s stakes are high in the morning and low in the evening, but otherwise his 
relationship with p remains identical – he believes it and has some set amount of 
justification. It would then be possible for S1 not to know p in the morning, but to 
know p in the evening. If an attributor has low stakes the entire time, then her 
assertion that „S1 knows that p‟ would be false in the morning and true in the 
evening. According to subject-sensitive invariantism, the context of an attributor is 
irrelevant to the truth of her attribution.  
 Subject-sensitive invariantism would describe Louise‟s epistemic status in the 
John example as follows: As long as Louise is with Thelma, governed by the 
standards of the petty bet practical environment, then Louise does know that John 
was at work. As long as Louise is with the police, she does not know. If the police 
assume that Louise does not know based on the strict demands of their own practical 
environment, then that is simply a mistake of over-generalization; they accidentally 
apply their own standards to Louise.
157
 The police cannot make any accurate claims 
about whether or not Louise knows without being privy to Louise‟s practical 
environment, because the concept of knowledge is sensitive only to the practical 
environment of the knower herself. Thus, if Louise is with Thelma in the petty bet 
environment, then the police cannot truly say that “Louise doesn‟t know whether 
John was at work.” 
 Since the hypothesis driving the Reason-Knowledge Principle only considers the 
relationship between one subject‟s reasoning and her own belief, we may only 
explicate a first-person sensitivity from it, according to which the reliability 
condition varies exclusively with the knower’s own practical environment. Since 
KAP is based on the hypothesis that the concept of knowledge may also function in 
the relationship between one subject‟s reasoning and a different subject‟s belief, it 
goes on to explicate a reliability condition that may also vary with the attributor’s 
practical environment. Thus the Reason-Knowledge Principle entails subject-
sensitive invariantism, while KAP entails contextualism. 
iv. Knowledge per se 
Hawthorne and Stanley claim that the truth of knowledge attributions is only 
sensitive to the subject‟s practical environment. This makes their account a form of 
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invariantism, for the meaning of a knowledge attribution cannot change according to 
the attributor‟s concerns. One subject can only have one practical environment at a 
time.
158
 There is no such limit to the amount of attributors that may be talking about 
a certain subject. Furthermore, each attributor might have her own unique practical 
environment. As we saw above, that fact leads KAP to endorse the contextualist 
claim that “S knows that p” and “S doesn‟t know that p” might simultaneously be 
true in the mouths of two different attributors. Therefore, if KAP is correct, we will 
sometimes be unable to offer a final diagnosis of a given subject‟s epistemic 
position, for it is always possible that an attributor‟s practical environment will 
change.
159
 Subject-sensitive invariantism does not lead to this situation. That is, it 
does assume that, for a given subject at a given point in time, there is a conclusive 
answer to the question “Does S know that p?” At that point in time, S either knows 
or he does not know. Therefore, according to subject-sensitive invariantism, we are 
not limited to judging whether S or someone else could truthfully say “S knows,” but 
may also judge whether or not S knows per se.
160
   
v. How to compare the two kinds of sensitivity 
Most work on comparing contextualism to subject-sensitive invariantism has relied 
on examining intuitions about the appropriateness of different sentences. As 
explained in section 4.b.iii, this method of examination is not as well suited to a 
conceptual synthesis. Accordingly, we must judge the respective merits of the two 
accounts with different tools. 
 A practitioner of conceptual synthesis should ask which theory can better 
account for the function of knowledge attributions. KAP is motivated by the way 
knowledge attributions function in evaluating beliefs and attributions. Subject-
sensitive invariantism is motivated by the way knowledge attributions function in 
evaluating behavior. In order to compare the two theories, we should ask whether 
one of the theories can better account for both functions. 
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 I will argue in section 6.b that the answer to that question suggests the 
superiority of KAP to subject-sensitive invariantism. That is, KAP can account for 
the role knowledge plays in behavior appraisal, while a subject-sensitive invariant 
synthesis cannot account for the role knowledge plays in third-person belief 
appraisal.  
d. Two objections to the private nature of KAP 
By hypothesizing that the concept of knowledge plays a role in practical reasoning, I 
have explicated a contextually variant reliability condition. However, in so doing, I 
have ignored the social circumstances in which any system of epistemic evaluation 
must be embedded. The time has come to confront the tension between the social 
need for a stable category and the personal need for sensitivity to practical 
environments. If my claim is correct and the concept of knowledge can fill both 
needs, then we need some explanation of how this is possible. I have explicated two 
seemingly contradictory conditions and must now explore whether they may be 
synthesized into one concept. The following two objections demonstrate the 
difficulty of such a synthesis. 
i. The authority objection 
(1) Craig: recommendations/flags 
Craig emphasizes that people do not only notice informants who are good for them; 
they also help each other find good informants. He points out that the concept of 
knowledge has adapted to this social practice; it is not indexed to the private needs of 
one person, but rather suited for use in recommendations. Thus, one role for 
knowledge attributions lies in cases of recommendation. When an inquirer attributes 
knowledge to an informant, she not only trusts him as to whether p, she also declares 
that he is someone who should be trusted as to whether p, thereby flagging him and 
recommending him to anyone else who might need to find out whether p. 
To put it briefly and roughly, the concept of knowledge is used to flag approved 
sources of information.
161
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KAP does not suffice to explain how a knowledge attribution can function as a flag 
of epistemic authority. KAP shows that the truth of a knowledge attribution may be 
solely dependent on whether S1 would have authority over S2. If Estelle could act on 
Nelville‟s authority that p, then Estelle can truthfully say that “Nelville knows that 
p.” However, a flag is by definition meant to be used by others. If the spoken 
knowledge attribution is to be able to function as a flag, the truth of the knowledge 
attribution must also depend on whether S1 has authority over the person hearing the 
attribution, not only the person making it. That is, we must consider some S3, who is 
hearing or who may overhear the attribution. If S1 is to have appropriate epistemic 
authority over S3, S3 must be able to use p as premise in rational practical reasoning.  
If the concept of knowledge is to function properly in recommendations, we need to 
be able to say that Estelle would be wrong to tell Ida that “Nelville knows that the 
cookies have no peanuts.”  Yet KAP claims that a knowledge attribution can depend 
exclusively on Estelle‟s personal needs; we have as yet explicated no condition about 
what happens when an S2 meets an S3.  
If a knowledge attribution is to function in recommendations, then it must be a 
flag of public epistemic authority. Yet, contextualists typically conceive of practical 
environments as a private affair.
162
 The fact that S1‟s assertion is good enough to use 
in S2‟s practical environment offers no guarantee that it will be good enough to use in 
anyone else‟s practical environment, such as that of S3. Therefore, it seems that we 
cannot describe the concept of knowledge as relative to an attributor‟s practical 
environment if we also claim that it plays a functional role in recommendations. 
(2) Epistemic authority confers an honorable social status with normative 
implications 
In Chapter Three I suggested that we substitute talk of „objectively good informants‟ 
with talk of „epistemic authority‟. I supported this substitution by pointing to 
intuitive connections between the concept of authority and the social conditions that 
we will have to explicate, if the synthesized concept is to match up well with 
knowledge. These conditions go beyond Craig‟s need for recommendations; I argued 
that people also need the concept of epistemic authority to imply a social status, 
honor, and a normative aspect. All three of these points seem to directly conflict with 
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the contextual sensitivity explicated above. KAP entails that a subject‟s knowledge 
can come and go relative to which hypothetical relationship one has in mind.
163
 If 
Olivia‟s practical environment implies extremely low standards, she may be able to 
truthfully apply knowledge to Arlo, despite the fact that hardly anyone else would be 
able to act on Arlo‟s authority. Given this fickle variability, a fixed social status for 
knowers seems out of the question. There would be equally little reason to honor 
someone for such a transient feature. If “knows” can be as worthless a predicate as it 
is in Olivia‟s mouth, people would not intuitively connect it with value. Finally, the 
contextual sensitivity threatens the normative implications as well. Olivia can 
truthfully say that Arlo knows, despite the fact that others would be irrational to 
believe him. The normative condition that people ought to believe a knower conflicts 
with a contextually variant reliability condition. 
ii. The intelligibility objection 
Craig argues that an undetermined group of potential inquirers must be able to trust 
on the authority of a knowledge attribution. However, there is another requirement 
which must be filled before the question of authority can even be broached, an 
intelligibility requirement. If inquirers cannot even understand the spoken attribution, 
then they will not be able to trust on its basis either.  
(1) Disquotation 
Contextualist accounts make intelligibility seem mysterious. If the meaning of a 
word is always shifting according to the context of the speaker, how can an inquirer 
understand what is being communicated by a knowledge attribution? Of course, 
many intelligible words mean different things in different contexts, such as „I‟, „tall‟, 
or „nearby‟. However, some object that our linguistic intuitions do not treat 
„knowledge‟ as they do those other words. In particular, those other words are not 
disquotable, whereas knowledge attributions are disquotable.
164
 If a word is 
disquotable, then I can report someone‟s use of it without using quotation marks, i.e. 
without explicitly drawing attention to the (possibly different) context she was in 
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when she said it. Words that change their meaning with context are not disquotable, 
whereas words with invariant meanings are. „Nearby‟ is not disquotable. Janice 
might tell me on the phone, “Jack is nearby.” It would be absurd for me, standing 
elsewhere, to disquote her report by claiming “Janice believes that Jack is nearby.” 
Such a statement would be false. Rather, if I repeat her statement, I would have to 
use the word „nearby‟ in quotes in order to indicate that it was true for her, the 
original speaker, not for me: “Janice believes that Jack is „nearby‟ – that is, near the 
tree, where she is.” 
 If „knowledge‟ varied contextually, then it too would not be disquotable. 
Imagine that Estelle sincerely asserts that “Nelville knows that p.” Imagine further, 
that Ida overhears that sincere assertion. If the truth values of knowledge attributions 
vary contextually, then Ida‟s assertion that “Estelle believes that Nelville knows that 
p” is not true, because Ida‟s practical environment is different than Estelle‟s practical 
environment. Thus, “knows” in Estelle‟s mouth means something different than 
“knows” in Ida‟s mouth. Ida could only ensure accuracy by saying something like, 
“Estelle believes that Nelville „knows‟ that p, that is, knows according to the 
standards of knowledge implied by her practical environment.” Only with a 
modifying clause may Ida disquote the word “know.” Therefore, if contextualism is 
correct, people would have to report knowledge attributions in the same way they 
report nearness attributions, explicitly stating the situation in which they were made. 
 However, according to Hawthorne, people do regularly disquote knowledge 
attributions without adding such modifying clauses. That is, in most cases, S3 will 
simply claim that “S2 believes that S1 knows that p” without making any reference to 
the practical environment S2 was in when she made her attribution.  
 Of course, this objection depends on the way we actually use knowledge 
attributions, which brings us prematurely to the fourth comparative step. 
Nonetheless, the point does affect the ability of a concept to play the hypothesized 
function, making it appropriate to consider now during the third explicative step. If a 
concept is to function in a social system of epistemic evaluation, it must be 
intelligible. If we, in fact, disquote knowledge attributions without adding modifying 
clauses, then the concept of knowledge, given my explication, would be 
unintelligible. So, we have the following conflict: (a), according to the explication, 
the meaning of „knowledge‟ varies according to the original attributor‟s context, 
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while (b), according to empirical fact, speakers usually report knowledge attributions 
without referring to the attributor‟s context (i.e. without quotes). It seems that in 
order to save the explication, I would have to hold that our usual, disquoting reports 
of knowledge attributions are usually false. Yet, if we systematically misuse or 
misunderstand the word „knowledge‟ in these situations, then the concept cannot be 
properly functioning as a term in a social system of epistemic evaluation. Therefore, 
I must somehow explain how knowledge can vary contextually without opposing our 
disquotation related intuitions. 
(2) Bach: Eavesdropping 
Kent Bach provides a vivid example of the intersubjective intelligibility of 
knowledge attributions that does not explicitly rely on disquotability, though it 
exploits the same tension. He imagines a case in which someone eavesdrops on a 
knowledge attribution, and thus presumably would be utterly clueless as to what kind 
of practical environment the speaker meant to imply.  
What does contextualism predict if you encounter a [knowledge] attribution out of 
context? It seems to predict that you won‟t be in a position to grasp which 
proposition the sentence expresses. Suppose you eavesdrop on the middle of a 
conversation and hear one person say to the other, “Nixon knew that Liddy was 
planning the Watergate break-in.” Since it is not evident to you which [knowledge] 
relation „knew‟ expresses, you can have only a vague idea of what is being said. 
Lacking any specific information about the context in which the [knowledge] 
attribution was made, you should feel a bit uncertain as to what was said. But you 
won‟t.165  
With the eavesdropping case, Bach demonstrates that knowledge attributions do not 
require explicit clarification.  An eavesdropper can understand what a speaker is 
implying with his knowledge attribution, even if the speaker isn‟t talking to her at all. 
(3) Memory 
My presentation of the intelligibility and authority objections has thus far focused on 
the difficulties of intersubjective communication. However, difficulties can also arise 
for one person at two different points in time. In other words, if a person makes a 
knowledge attribution, spoken or unspoken, and then later remembers it, how is it 
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possible for that attribution to be authoritative and intelligible?
166
 A functional 
analysis must allow for a knowledge attribution to temporally endure. 
e. Three desiderata  
I have argued that the concept of knowledge serves a function in practical reasoning: 
by finding people who know, an inquirer finds people with the epistemic authority 
necessary to provide her with premises she can rationally use in her practical 
reasoning. I have argued further that the concept of knowledge serves a function by 
flagging that epistemic authority for the public.  
Therefore, if this functional synthesis is to succeed, we must find some way to 
synthesize the following three conditions into one coherent concept:  
(1) Sensitivity to practical environment 
In order for “knowledge” to function as a flag of epistemic authority, its meaning 
must vary with the features of the practical environment in which it is attributed.  
(2) Intersubjective authority 
In order for “knowledge” to function as a flag of epistemic authority, it must imply 
epistemic authority to listeners. 
(3) Intersubjective intelligibility 
In order for “knowledge” to function as a flag of epistemic authority, it must be 
intelligible to listeners.   
  
In the next chapter I evaluate several accounts, to see how they fare at satisfying 
these three desiderata. If one account can simultaneously satisfy all three, then it is 
indeed possible for these seemingly contradictory conditions to be synthesized 
together into one coherent concept.   
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5. In Search of a Synthesis 
The objections raised at the end of Chapter Four threaten to disprove the hypothesis 
by making a coherent synthesis impossible. If no single coherent concept could 
possibly meet the need for epistemic authority, then the concept of knowledge must 
have some other function. Thus, while Craig moves seamlessly from explication to 
synthesis, this step poses a significant problem for my own account.  
 In the following chapter, I shall examine several conceptions of knowledge, to 
judge whether they might provide a model that can indeed satisfy all three desiderata. 
First I outline two invariantist conceptions of knowledge: Craig‟s high standards 
account and Bach‟s moderate account. Neither provides a synthesis that would meet 
the need for sensitivity. Next I outline two portrayals of contextualism: salience-
sensitive contextualism and pragmatic contextualism. Neither explains how 
knowledge attributions can be intersubjectively authoritative and intelligible. Finally, 
I introduce the relatively novel solution of convention contextualism: construe 
contextual variation as sensitive only to publically recognized contexts. I argue that 
this option can satisfy all three desiderata, thereby demonstrating that my explicated 
conditions can indeed come together in a single coherent synthesis. 
a. High standards invariantism 
In his final objectivized synthesis, Craig leaves no room for contextual sensitivity.
167
 
He argues that, to accommodate a community of users, the concept of knowledge 
must be reliable enough to be authoritative for any individual, no matter how 
stringent the demands of her practical environment. I have already presented his 
motivation for this stance,
168
 so here a brief summary will suffice. A knowledge 
attribution made in one practical environment must be able to flag a good informant 
for a second inquirer in a different practical environment. That is, one must be able to 
report that “S1 knows that p” across contexts, without risking an unintentional 
falsehood. We are not always sure what sort of practical environment our 
interlocutors are in, or to whom they will report our attribution. Thus the failure to 
function in trans-contextual reports would lead to the failure to function in any kind 
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of intersubjective reports. Basically, if its reliability were indexed to the speaker‟s 
personal concerns, the concept of knowledge would not be able to serve any sort of 
public function in spoken attributions.  
 Craig argues that the only way a knowledge attribution can serve its public 
function is by adapting to the demands of the most stringent practical environment. 
This adaptation puts Craig‟s objectivized concept in accordance with high standards 
invariantism.
169
 That is, “S1 knows that p” must consistently imply such a high 
likelihood of p being true that anyone in any situation could use p as a premise in 
rational practical reasoning. 
[Objectivization] is going to edge us towards the idea of someone who is a good 
informant as to whether p whatever the particular circumstances of the inquirer, 
whatever rewards and penalties hang over him and whatever his attitude to them. 
That means someone with a very high degree of reliability, someone who is very 
likely to be right – for he must be acceptable even to a very demanding inquirer. So 
of the worlds that we cannot quite definitely exclude, we shall want to include in our 
assessment of him even those that we regard as very improbable. Moreover, we shall 
be motivated to take a pretty careful look at those which we „can quite definitely 
exclude‟ – is that really as many as we think? These thoughts take us further down 
the road of objectivisation. Knowledge, so the hypothesis goes, lies at the end of 
it.
170
 
Unsurprisingly, this high standards invariantism does well on the authority and 
intelligibility desiderata. High standards invariantism ensures that a knowledge 
attribution can only mean one thing, and would therefore always be intelligible, 
regardless of the listener‟s amount of background information. High standards 
invariantism holds that a knowledge attribution expresses absolute epistemic 
authority in any practical environment. If knowledge were to imply such infallible 
authority, there would be no context in which a subject would not be able to use the 
attribution as the mark of an epistemically authoritative informant.
171
  
 Nonetheless, Craig‟s high standards invariant account conflicts with the 
hypothesis that the concept of knowledge plays a function related to practical 
reasoning. On his account, the concept of knowledge could not be used to 
recommend good informants without risking falsehood. While using “knowledge” to 
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recommend good informants could never be misunderstood, using the denial of  
“knowledge” to advise against bad informants could very often be misunderstood.  
There would be a plethora of situations in which S2 could truly tell S3, “S1 does not 
know that p,” despite the fact that S3 would in fact be able to use p as a premise in 
rational practical reasoning. If high strung Hannah tells sensible Sue not to trust 
Albie the Average Informant, then on Craig‟s account, Hannah is telling the truth, 
yet Sue would be irrational to believe her.
172
 Only when the standards of a 
knowledge attribution are, for both recommender and inquirer, in all respects as strict 
as the most demanding practical environment would ever require, would the concept 
of knowledge reflect the relevant standards of epistemic authority. In all ordinary 
situations, people would be acting entirely rationally to use p as a reason for action, 
despite believing that p on the authority of a subject who did not know that p.
173
 
Hence, the concept of knowledge would not serve a function in practical reasoning - 
not the function implied by Craig‟s prototypical scenario, and not the function 
implied by the recommendation scenario either. The concept of knowledge would be 
identifiable with neither the concept of the good informant nor the concept of the 
objectively good informant. 
 In order to serve the hypothesized function, the concept of knowledge must be 
sensitive enough to practical reasoning so as not to be irrelevant to ordinary 
concerns, yet insensitive enough so as not to be insufficient for extraordinary 
concerns. By adapting his synthesis exclusively to the latter condition, Craig 
manages to satisfy the authority condition at the cost of the sensitivity condition. Yet, 
as I have presented the explication, our synthesized concept demands both. 
 
Verdict 
High standards invariantism can account for the authority and intelligibility of the 
concept of knowledge, but only at the cost of sensitivity.  
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b. Moderate invariantism 
i. Misleading intuitions: Bach’s error theory 
As discussed above, functional contextualism can be satisfied by either pragmatic or 
semantic sensitivity to practical environment. However, Kent Bach has argued that 
the concept of knowledge exhibits neither sort of sensitivity; rather, it is semantically 
and pragmatically invariant.
 174
  According to his analysis, a knowledge attribution 
always implies the same amount of authority, but that amount is set reachably low. 
Thus, he defends a form of moderate invariantism. 
 The examples I presented above in section 4.b showed situations in which the 
concept of knowledge does exhibit sensitivity to practical environments. It is 
generally accepted that these examples are intuitively acceptable; we tend to approve 
of the way in which knowledge is used in the given cases.
175
 Since Bach can resort to 
neither semantic nor pragmatic concerns to explain these intuitions, he must offer 
some kind of error theory.
 176
 That is, he must argue that we make a mistake when we 
intuitively accept the contextual sensitivity of knowledge attributions demonstrated 
in the given examples.  
 He begins with a point of general agreement: “knowing that p requires that one‟s 
experience/evidence/justification rule out counterpossibilities (alternatives to p, 
threats to the basis for one‟s belief that p).”177 In other words, knowledge requires the 
ruling out of relevant alternatives.
178
 Now we are left with the question of which 
counterpossibilities must be ruled out in order for the belief to count as knowledge. If 
we insist that any conceivable counterpossibility must be ruled out, we are left with 
radical skepticism. Bach rejects skepticism and thereby argues that one need rule out 
only relevant possibilities. While he does not present any specific criteria for judging 
whether an alternative is relevant, he does maintain that relevance can be determined 
by evidential concerns alone. He thereby rejects both contextualism and subject-
sensitive invariantism, for he denies that the proper definition of relevance involves 
anyone‟s practical environment. 
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 The next step is to explain why we intuitively take a practical environment as 
affecting the relevance of a counterpossibility; if that is just a mistake, why is it so 
widespread? Bach begins his answer to that question by pointing out that “somehow, 
at least to some extent, our belief-forming processes are tuned into plausible sources 
of error.”179 As long as a subject is healthy, unafflicted by paranoia, hypochondria or 
some other disorder, then irrelevant counterpossibilities do not regularly occur to her. 
Accordingly, the fact that a counterpossibility to some proposition occurs to a subject 
at all is usually itself a piece of evidence that the counterpossibility is epistemically 
relevant. The reverse also holds; the fact that a counterpossibility to some proposition 
does not occur to a subject usually constitutes evidence that the counterpossibility is 
not epistemically relevant. Bach offers the airport example, in which Mary is 
wondering if her flight will stop in Chicago. If it occurs to Mary that her flight 
itinerary might have a misprint, then the very fact that this counterpossibility occurs 
to her is usually a valuable piece of evidence, suggesting that she must in fact 
attempt to find some more reliable source if she wants to really know whether her 
flight will stop in Chicago. The general reliability of our belief-forming processes 
means that we can take our own regard or disregard of a counterpossibility as 
valuable evidence of that counterpossibility‟s relevance.  
 Bach stresses, though, that such evidence is highly defeasible. A great deal of 
factors can cause a subject to overlook a relevant counterpossibility or attend to an 
irrelevant counterpossibility. Mental illness is one such factor: if Mary is a paranoid 
schizophrenic, then the fact that the possibility of a misprint on her flight itinerary 
occurs to her is not evidence for the relevance of that possibility. Bach argues that 
high stakes can be another of those merely misleading factors. If Mary‟s life depends 
on whether her flight stops in Chicago, the possibility of a misprint is more likely to 
occur to her, despite the fact that it is actually irrelevant. High stakes can cause 
epistemically irrelevant counterpossibilities to occur to a subject.  
 With this set-up, Bach has the tools to explain why our intuitions are likely to 
mislead us when we evaluate examples that involve high stakes. Since the occurrence 
of a live counterpossibility to p is usually evidence that the subject doesn‟t know that 
p, Mary mistakenly accepts it as evidence in the high stakes airport case, and 
mistakenly concludes that she does not know that the flight will stop in Chicago. We 
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who read the example then make the same mistake and intuitively agree with Mary‟s 
conclusions that she does not know. We accidentally rely on evidence which is 
usually reliable, but in this particular case is misleading.  
 Thus, a knowledge attribution does not always retain authority on the moderate 
invariantist account. In situations such as Mary‟s, practical standards can be so high 
that knowledge does not imply as much justification as the practical reasoner 
requires. A knowledge attribution only carries enough epistemic authority for 
average situations. In particularly demanding practical environments, Smith might 
know that p, and yet his relationship to p might still not be good enough for Mary, 
with her life and death stakes, to believe that p on his authority. As Bach puts it, 
“Sometimes it is reasonable to go beyond the call of epistemic duty.”180 
ii. Belief removal 
We cannot expect any invariantist account to fare well on the sensitivity desideratum. 
Nonetheless, Bach might argue that his account can indeed accommodate the 
intuition that a subject should only use p as a reason for action, as long as it is on the 
authority of someone‟s knowledge that p. His tactic to accommodate this intuition 
involves the phenomenon of belief removal. He points out that high stakes generally 
cause the subject to stop believing p herself.
181
 That is, they raise her doxastic 
threshold, making her demand more evidence before she will commit to a belief. 
Since Mary no longer believes that her flight stops in Chicago, it is true that she no 
longer knows it either, since belief is necessary for knowledge. Therefore, the 
intuition that she should not use “the flight stops in Chicago” as a reason for action is 
correct and further, does not conflict with KAP‟s claim that knowing that p ensures 
that one may rationally use p as a reason for action. Mary cannot use p as a reason 
for action, but neither does she know that p.  
 Jessica Brown (2005) argues that Bach‟s view is nonetheless an unsuccessful 
accommodation of our practical reasoning related intuitions in high stakes cases. It 
relies on a “brute contingent psychological fact,”182 namely that the subject in the 
high stakes scenario does stop believing that p. If the subject dogmatically continues 
to believe that p, then, according to Bach, she knows that p. If Mary, despite her 
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astronomical stakes, continues to believe that the flight will stop in Chicago and 
refuses to consider the alternative of a misprint, then Bach must admit that she knows 
that p. Yet, she still cannot use p as a premise in rational practical reasoning. Thus, 
Bach‟s belief-removal maneuver cannot change the inability of his account to 
accommodate intuitions about the connection between knowledge and practical 
reasoning.
183
 
 With or without belief-removal, Bach cannot accommodate intuitions about the 
appropriateness of third-person knowledge attributions. According to Bach, Mary‟s 
inability in a high stakes situation to believe that p does not affect Smith’s knowledge 
that p. Since Mary does not believe that the airplane will stop in Chicago, her claim 
that “I do not know that the airplane will stop in Chicago” is true. Nonetheless, her 
claim that “Smith does not know that the airplane will stop in Chicago” is false. 
Since KAP is based on the hypothesis that the concept of knowledge functions as a 
flag of third-person epistemic authority, moderate invariantism fails by KAP‟s 
standards of sensitivity, despite the belief removal maneuver. 
iii. Objection to the arbitrariness of semantic error theories 
We have seen that moderate invariantism fully accounts for neither sensitivity nor 
authority. That is not the only objection worth offering to moderate invariantism. 
Bach stresses that his account is a semantic theory, not a substantial epistemological 
theory of knowledge. He therefore doesn‟t feel obliged to offer a precise answer as to 
just what may count as a relevant alternative. However, we have seen that his 
account does attribute certain systematic errors to speakers. If his account is merely 
meant to reflect semantic use without postulating an epistemological theory, then 
what criterion can he have for criticizing the judgments of subjects in high stakes 
practical environments, calling them errors?
184
   
One may argue that semantic accounts should strive for attributing the fewest 
errors to speakers and general intuitions; similarly, the best account would 
accommodate the most intuitions. However, it is not a matter of common consent 
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that speakers do make only a minimal amount of errors when attributing knowledge. 
Wayne Davis, for example, argues that people regularly misuse the word 
„knowledge‟.185 By adhering to the standard of attributing the fewest errors, semantic 
theorists betray substantial epistemological convictions. Those convictions must be 
defended and it is difficult to discern what tools Bach would have to do so. 
KAP does not run into this problem. On the strength of my functional hypothesis, 
I offer a standard by which to determine the relevance of a counterpossibility: 
namely, if it affects the acceptability of that premise in rational practical reasoning, 
then it is relevant and must be ruled out before knowledge can correctly be claimed. 
That standard is not arbitrary, but rather motivated by the hypothesis that societies 
need the concept of knowledge to function in practical reasoning. 
 
Verdict 
As with all invariant accounts, intelligibility is no mystery. Yet moderate 
invariantism can fully account for neither the sensitivity nor the authority of 
knowledge attributions. Furthermore, the error theory which moderate 
invariantism must provide is inadequately motivated. 
c. Salience-sensitive contextualism 
i. The Rule of Attention 
Some versions of contextualism allow for a very great deal of fluctuation in what is 
implied by a knowledge attribution. „Salience-sensitive contextualism‟ refers to those 
particularly volatile accounts which maintain that salience to an individual subject is 
enough to make an alternative relevant.  
 Remember, relevant alternatives are possibilities that a subject must be able to 
rule out if he is to count as knowing that p. For example, it may be that I cannot 
know that the light is on if I cannot rule out the alternative that you have turned it off. 
David Lewis offers several rules which may be used to determine whether or not an 
alternative is relevant, i.e. whether it must be ruled out. One of his rules is the Rule 
of Attention, according to which whatever alternatives a certain speaker is paying 
attention to are automatically relevant. 
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What is and what is not being ignored is a feature of the particular conversational 
context. No matter how far-fetched a certain possibility may be, no matter how 
properly we might have ignored it in some other context, if in this context we are not 
in fact ignoring it but attending to it, then for us now it is a relevant alternative. It is 
in the contextually determined domain.
186
 
That is, a speaker‟s context is in part determined by the salience of possibilities to 
that speaker. The meaning of her knowledge attribution changes relative to whatever 
she happens to be thinking about. One moment „knows‟ might mean “able to rule out 
alternatives 1, 2, and 3” while moments later, it might mean “able to rule out 
alternatives 1, 2, 3, 4, ... 25” thanks only to a host of random paranoid fantasies 
suddenly occurring to the speaker. This leaves the concept of knowledge with a very 
high level of sensitivity, but makes intersubjective authority and intelligibility 
extremely puzzling.
187
 
 We may better understand the appeal of the Rule of Attention when we consider 
its historical motivation. Lewis‟s account is not based on any hypothesis about the 
function of knowledge attributions, but rather an attempt to offer a satisfying 
diagnosis of the power of skeptical arguments.
188
 When confronted with the 
possibility that everything we believe is based on mere illusion, and our inability to 
eliminate that possibility, people usually react by accepting the skeptical conclusion 
that we do not in fact know anything at all.
189
 Salience-sensitive contextualists can 
explain that phenomenon by arguing that the salience of a possibility makes the 
possibility relevant to the thinker, so that, thanks to the change in context, the 
skeptical conclusion is actually true relative to her standards. Only once the skeptical 
possibilities have been forgotten, do the everyday claims to knowledge become true 
again.  
My synthesis is not motivated by the desire to interpret the allure of skepticism. 
In fact, I have narrowed my focus to only those situations in which knowledge plays 
a role in practical reasoning; skeptical arguments have very little sway there. With 
functional rather than skeptical concerns at the forefront, the Rule of Attention does 
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more harm than good, as it is difficult to imagine how such a wildly fluctuating 
concept could command the authority and intelligibility required to properly 
function.   
ii. DeRose’s rejection of the intelligibility objection 
Keith DeRose follows Lewis in many respects, including an acceptance of the Rule 
of Attention and the rapid fluctuation such a rule entails. DeRose maintains that a 
speaker‟s own standards at a given point in time fully determine the meaning of the 
word „knowledge‟ in her mouth, no matter how unreasonable those standards may 
be.
190
 However, DeRose goes on to offer a contextualist response to the intelligibility 
problem: namely, he denies that it is a problem. Remember, the objection was based 
in part on a supposedly empirical fact: people regularly do in fact disquote 
knowledge attributions without modifying clauses. DeRose denies that linguistic data 
show any such thing; when „knowledge‟ is disquoted, it is not across contexts. He 
thus accepts that “knowledge” is not necessarily intelligible across contexts.191 When 
the hearer and the speaker‟s practical environments differ enough, then the hearer 
cannot and would not disquote the speaker‟s attribution.  
 However, DeRose goes on to admit that “knowledge” is sometimes disquoted.192 
If one overheard a conversation in which Frank said, “Mary knows that the library 
closes at 5” then one would not hesitate to disquote and say, “Frank believes that 
Mary knows that the library closes at 5.”  He diffuses the objection by comparing the 
word “knowledge” to the word “tall,” pointing out that “tall” is just as often 
disquotable.
 193
 If one eavesdropped on a conversation in which Frank said, “Mary is 
tall,” one would not hesitate to disquote and say, “Frank believes that Mary is tall.” 
Yet it is uncontroversial that “tall” is context sensitive. Rather than go on to offer a 
positive explanation as to how and why this common practice avoids massive 
confusion, DeRose contents himself with a challenge: anyone who finds the 
intelligibility problem a threat to contextualism about “knowledge” must also 
demonstrate why it is not a threat to contextualism about “tall.” 
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 However, DeRose neglects to address an important difference between the 
words “tall” and “knows.” A knowledge attribution, on the functional account, must 
operate as a flag of authority. Whether or not someone performs a certain action can 
depend on whether or not a knowledge attribution is true or false. Of course, while 
tallness is not involved in any general norm of action, the truth of a tallness 
attribution can still occasionally affect someone‟s actions. However, I presume that 
those are precisely the instances in which “tall” is no longer dequotable across 
contexts.  That is, if Lucius will only pick Reeves for the basketball team on the 
authority of Theo‟s assertion that “Reeves is tall” then Lucius will need to acquire 
enough background information to ensure that he and Theo share the same practical 
environment. The problem is that, according to KAP, a knowledge attribution must 
almost always be authoritative enough to imply that one could act on its basis. In that 
case, an inquirer would almost always need to ensure that she shared a practical 
environment with the speaker of the knowledge attribution before she could 
acceptably disquote the attribution.  
 “Know(s)” must almost always imply epistemic authority, whereas “tall” can 
often lack the level of authority needed to motivate action. However, given DeRose‟s 
claim that knowledge is sensitive to the salience of alternatives to an individual, his 
account entails that the meaning of a knowledge attribution is likely to change 
radically across contexts. We would then expect that people would be more cautious 
in disquoting „know(s)‟ than they would be when disquoting „tall‟. Thanks to the 
epistemic authority condition, there is a reason to think that the intelligibility 
problem is threatening to contextualism about “knowledge” despite the fact that it 
poses no threat to contextualism about “tall.”  
 
Verdict 
Salience contextualism allows for a great deal of sensitivity, but pays the price by 
failing to satisfy the intelligibility and authority desiderata. DeRose rejects the 
intelligibility objection, claiming that if it were a problem for “knowledge,” then it 
would be a problem for “tall” too. However the additional demands of the authority 
desideratum suggest that the intelligibility objection does have more force for 
“knowledge” than it does for “tall”. 
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d. Pragmatic contextualism 
i. Semantic relativity 
Although passages in his book suggest it, Craig does not explicitly endorse high 
standards invariantism. Rather, he allows that the meaning of a knowledge attribution 
might be able to undergo variation in actual use. To explain the possibility of this 
occurrence, he refers us to Unger‟s account of semantic relativity.194   
According to Unger, what is communicated by a knowledge attribution varies 
according to context. That communication might be affected by a variation in the 
semantic content of the word “knowledge” or it might be affected by a variation in 
what is pragmatically implied by the speaker. That is, “knowledge” might have an 
invariantist semantics and contextualist pragmatics, or it might have contextualist 
semantics and invariantist pragmatics. Unger argues, and Craig accepts, that the data 
will never be able to conclusively demonstrate which allotment of contextual 
variation is correct. Therefore, the proper position is semantic relativity: perhaps a 
knowledge attribution operates contextualist semantics, and perhaps not.  
I explained in 4.b that a functional synthesis will be satisfied by either pragmatic 
or semantic contextualism. Therefore, I refrain from arguing for one or the other. 
Here I introduce pragmatic contextualism only in order to demonstrate that it is no 
less vulnerable to the authority and intelligibility objections than semantic 
contextualism.  
ii. Loose use 
Wayne A. Davis is a pragmatic contextualist. He claims that the concept of 
knowledge has one fixed semantic meaning, but that what is pragmatically implied 
by a knowledge attribution may vary contextually thanks to the phenomenon of 
“loose use.”195  
...when we use a term loosely in a sentence, we imply that the proposition it 
expresses is a good enough approximation to the truth so that the difference does not 
matter for current purposes.
196
 
Davis offers the following example as a paradigmatic case of loose use. 
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The Coffee Case 
A. When the scoop comes up empty in the coffee jar, I yell to my wife, „„The coffee 
is all gone.‟‟ B. When my son comes down for breakfast a few minutes later, he 
announces that he needs a few coffee grounds for his science project, and then asks 
„„Is the coffee really all gone?‟‟ I say with no embarrassment, „„No, there may be 
enough for you.‟‟197 
In context A, Davis uses “all gone” loosely, only implying that the coffee is close 
enough to “all gone” to satisfy the purpose of brewing another cup. In context B, he 
has to use the term “all gone” more strictly. Strictly speaking, “all gone” means “not 
one little bit left,” and so, strictly speaking, the coffee is not all gone and his 
statement to his wife is a falsehood. Yet he can speak loosely to his wife without 
actually communicating a falsehood, because he is sure that she will understand him 
loosely as well. She understands the proposition he meant rather than the proposition 
he actually said. When, with his son, the context changes so that he realizes that he 
will be understood strictly, according to what he actually says, then he must speak 
strictly to avoid communicating a falsehood.  
 According to Davis, our use of the word „knowledge‟ follows the same 
principle. Sometimes we may use the word knowledge just because it is close enough 
to real knowledge to count in the given context. We say “knowledge,” but we 
pragmatically implicate something less. The feature that varies according to context 
is how much divergence from the true semantic meaning of knowledge is 
acceptable.
198
 If the situation has low stakes, we do not object if the speaker uses the 
word very loosely; we understand that by saying “S knows,” he actually only means 
that S‟s belief is somewhat justified. If the situation has high stakes, we expect the 
speaker to use the word with precision; that is, he should only say “S knows” if he 
means that S has enough justification to really know, strictly speaking. 
iii. Pragmatic contextualism also loses authority and intelligibility 
Whether the contextualist sensitivity is pragmatic or semantic, it produces 
contextually varying effects in its hearers. That is, whether or not the semantic 
meaning of the word „knowledge‟ changes, what is actually communicated and 
understood does change. Therefore it is unclear how attributions could operate 
intersubjectively, remaining authoritative and intelligible in cases of 
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recommendation. If someone recommended an informant to me, or if I overheard an 
attribution, I would need a good deal of background information to be able to decode 
the meaning, whether that information changed the way I understood the semantics 
or the pragmatics of the speech act. Any semantic invariantists who argue that 
contextual variation is conveyed by pragmatic implications must explain how their 
account nonetheless retains intersubjective authority and intelligibility.  
 Davis‟ loose-use account therefore runs afoul of the disquotation objection. 
Rather than decoding the speaker‟s semantic meaning, an inquirer is left with the 
task of decoding the speaker‟s pragmatic implication, but there is no reason to expect 
that to be any easier of a task. We still cannot understand how people can report 
knowledge attributions, yet avoid a widespread rash of misunderstandings.  
 Davis does not realize that his account is vulnerable to the disquotation 
objection. In fact, he actually offers the disquotation objection against semantic 
contextualism, claiming that the following statement is valid in all contexts: “S 
speaks truly when saying I know p. Therefore, S knows p.”199 Such a statement can 
only be reliably valid if knowledge attributions are disquotable. Otherwise, S‟s true 
statement might be untrue relative to the speaker; compare “Janice speaks truly when 
saying Jack is nearby. Therefore, Jack is nearby.” In many contexts, namely all 
contexts in which the speaker is at a different location than Janice, that statement is 
invalid.  
 Davis assumes that pragmatic contextualism allows the statement to be valid in 
all contexts. Thus pragmatic contextualism scores a point over semantic 
contextualism, for it can account for the disquotability of knowledge attributions. In 
fact, pragmatic contextualism is unable to ensure that the statement will always be 
valid. Davis claims that people use the word knowledge while pragmatically 
communicating some less demanding state with great regularity.
200
 Therefore, it will 
be the case that a given knowledge attribution is very likely to be, strictly speaking, 
false. In any of these common situations, the speaker of the above statement may be 
pragmatically implying something less than „know‟ when she says, “S speaks truly 
when saying I know p.” Since knowledge is so rare, it would be an entirely 
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acceptable and rational conversational move to use that sentence to pragmatically 
imply, “S speaks close enough to the truth when saying I know p.”201  
Now we should ask, what’s to stop the speaker’s pragmatic context from 
changing mid-statement? Perhaps with the second sentence, she drops the pragmatic 
implications and speaks entirely literally. Therefore, she could acceptably say, “S 
speaks truly when saying I know p. However, S does not know p.” Thanks to the 
pragmatic implications that modify what is communicated by the first sentence, the 
whole statement is still valid. 
Davis attempts to block this consequence by stipulating that the pragmatic 
implications of a word cannot change within the same statement.
202
 However, he 
does not offer any support for this stipulation. Furthermore, there is no reason to 
assume that the exact same move would not be open to the semantic contextualist 
who could also simply stipulate that a context may not change within the same 
statement. I will suggest in section 6.a that the context of a sentence indeed may not 
change mid-sentence, at least not without a lot of guiding clues to alert the listener. 
However, this fact does not, in itself, offer any guidance as to whether contextualist 
sensitivity is pragmatic or semantic. 
As stressed in 4.b, I do not mean to argue that the contextualist variation of 
knowledge attributions must be semantic. By criticizing Davis‟ loose use account, I 
mean rather to show that one may not avoid the authority and intelligibility 
objections simply by shunting contextual variation into pragmatics. If any contextual 
sensitivity is possible, pragmatic or semantic, we must understand how we manage to 
avoid the loss of intersubjective authority and intelligibility. 
 
Verdict 
Contextualist sensitivity, whether semantic or pragmatic, allows knowledge 
attributions to function appropriately to their practical environment only by 
obscuring the possibility of intelligibility and authority. 
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e. Convention contextualism 
i. A middle way 
All the thinkers presented above seem to assume that we must choose between two 
extremes. Either we index the concept to one individual at one time, thereby allowing 
for constant and rapid fluctuation and the consequent loss of intelligibility and 
authority, or else we fix the concept to all of humanity for all times, thereby allowing 
for absolute rigidity and the consequent loss of sensitivity. However, we needn‟t 
restrict ourselves to these two poles. In what follows, I argue that, while the concept 
of knowledge is less stable than invariantism would have it, it is fixed to practical 
environments that are more stable than one individual‟s idiosyncratic preoccupations. 
The practical environments to which the concept of knowledge is sensitive must be 
the product of social conventions. By indexing the concept of knowledge to 
publically recognized contexts, we may retain sensitivity without subjecting the 
implied degree of epistemic authority to the fleeting whims of any individual subject. 
Furthermore, given the public nature of conventional contexts, listeners nearly 
always have enough background information to be able to understand the attribution, 
which accounts for the concept‟s general intersubjective intelligibility.  
 This promising approach has been suggested, or at least hinted at, in three recent 
essays. Greco, Willaschek and Beyer have all lent support to the notion that 
knowledge attributions are modified by social, rather than individual, practical 
environments. By taking the best part of each of their approaches, I present an 
approach that can synthesize all three of the desiderata. 
ii. Constraints on interest-dependence: Greco 
John Greco arrives at contextualism by means of his position that, to count as 
knowledge, a belief must be saliently caused by the believer‟s intellectual ability.203 
By way of accepting contextualism about salient causal relationships, he accepts 
contextualism about knowledge attributions. Just I as have done in the last chapter, 
he remarks that Craig‟s work suggests that the relevant context is determined by the 
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demands of practical reasoning and uses Hawthorne‟s notion of the practical 
environment to explore the consequences.
204
 
  In “What‟s Wrong with Contextualism” Greco acknowledges that contextualism 
might seem to threaten the objectivity of knowledge by making it interest-dependent. 
If the truth value of a knowledge attribution were interest-dependent, we might find 
that “odd or disturbing (or ugly, or we just wouldn‟t like it).”205 To mollify the 
distastefulness of interest-dependence, Greco introduces two constraints on the kinds 
of interests that may be allowed to affect the truth value of a knowledge 
attribution.
206
 First, the interests must be the interests of a group, rather than an 
individual. Second, the interests must be actual rather than perceived.
207
 
With Greco‟s constraints, knowledge attributions are sensitive to actual group 
interests as opposed to perceived individual interests. Such an approach obviously 
holds great promise for my project of synthesizing the conditions of sensitivity, 
authority and intelligibility. Under these constraints, the concept of knowledge 
remains sensitive to practical environments; the difference is that the practical 
environments must be publically acknowledged. If the concept of knowledge is 
sensitive only to public practical environments, then it seems possible that the 
intelligibility and authority conditions could be satisfied while retaining a high level 
of flexibility. A restriction to public practical environments might assure that the 
relevant practical environment would always be apparent, no matter who was making 
the attribution. This apparentness would demand detectable clues that transcended 
individual speakers. What would such clues look like?  
iii. Epistemic practice contextualism: Willaschek 
Greco‟s constraint is promising, but we need a more detailed picture of what 
constitutes a public practical environment. In “Contextualism about knowledge and 
justification by default,”208 Marcus Willaschek offers just that, outlining a new model 
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of contextualism which he calls epistemic practice contextualism. To set the stage for 
the new model, Willaschek draws on the work of Michael Williams. 
 Williams does not support contextualism by using semantic data of the use of the 
word „knowledge‟; indeed, his points should hold for cases where the knowledge-
claim is only implicit, and does not involve the actual word at all.
209
 He argues that 
skeptics fail to recognize that, at any given point in time, some beliefs must have 
default status; they need no argumentation, but may simply be accepted. He 
describes default status using two forms of justification, both of which are necessary 
for knowledge: personal and evidential. Personal justification is a question of 
whether the subject‟s belief is responsibly formed. Absent any challenges to the 
contrary, Willaschek argues that subjects‟ beliefs count as responsible by default, 
“Personal justification is ... like innocence in a court of law: presumptive but in need 
of defence in the face of contrary evidence.”210 Evidential justification, on the other 
hand, is an externalist consideration; a belief can be responsibly formed, and thus 
personally justified, but nonetheless evidentially unjustified thanks to circumstances 
beyond the subject‟s control. Here is an example: buying a genuine type-E vintage 
Jaguar is much cheaper than building a replica. Ivan knows this and thus, his claim 
that the type-E Jaguar before him is a genuine vintage car is responsibly formed. 
However, unbeknownst to Ivan, some wealthy enthusiast has been making replicas of 
type-E vintage Jaguars.
211
 This fact makes Ivan‟s claim evidentially unjustified, 
despite the fact that it was responsibly formed. How many cars must the enthusiast 
have made to destroy the evidential justification for Ivan‟s belief?  According to 
Williams, whether a belief counts as evidentially justified depends on the specifics of 
a given context. The actual demands are often hard to pin down, because “there is 
considerable indeterminacy about the objective adequacy of grounds, resulting from 
the fluidity of contextual boundaries.”212  
 As I have been stressing, this fluidity of contextual boundaries has spurred the 
concern that, on a contextualist account of justification, the authority and 
intelligibility of intersubjective knowledge claims is inexplicable. However, 
Williams does not address this problem. Neither does he investigate in greater detail 
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how various default statuses can differ from one another. He does outline five 
features that can influence a claim‟s epistemic status, but they do not bring us much 
farther than the three factors of practical environments sketched in 4.b.
213
  Given his 
concern with skepticism, Williams‟ goal is not to differentiate between different sorts 
of contexts, but rather to demonstrate how any default status may remain immune to 
skeptical doubts, which have no context at all. However, this leaves us without an 
entirely satisfying reply to the authority and intelligibility objections. Granted that 
knowledge claims change their character according a mesh of various factors, how 
can we act on and understand the claims? 
 Willaschek develops Williams‟ account by arguing that the default status of a 
belief is relative to the established social epistemic practice of which it is a part. 
Some epistemic practices are highly regimented; they offer explicit rules according 
to which practitioners must “acquire and attribute” knowledge.214 There are also less 
self-reflective practices, such as “crafts, commerce, and sports.” 215  While these 
practices mostly share the same “all-purpose set of epistemic standards that governs 
commonsense attributions of knowledge,” 216  they also employ some standards 
peculiar just to their own practitioners. Willaschek offers some examples: 
The epistemic standards employed in different practices overlap, but there are also 
important differences. In the empirical sciences, for instance, knowledge is tied to 
the possibility of empirical confirmation; in mathematics and related formal 
disciplines, knowledge requires proof; in the law, knowledge from testimony is 
restricted by certain formal procedures such as taking an oath; in various crafts, 
practitioners can tell things apart simply by looking or touching, while laypersons 
can do so only by indirect methods; etc. etc.
217
   
When analyzing a given institution to work out what sort of standard it places on 
knowledge, we should recall our basic hypothesis and the explication it produced in 
KAP. Imagine an inquirer, Ella, wondering whether Louis qualifies as having 
epistemic authority. How does the relevant epistemic practice affect what conditions 
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Louis must fill in order for Ella to trust him and accordingly use the proposition he 
asserts as a premise in rational practical reasoning? In the passage above, Willaschek 
makes helpful concrete suggestions. If Ella is working in the empirical sciences, 
Louis may count as knowing if his assertions are backed by empirical replicable data. 
If Ella is asking a mathematical question, Louis may count as knowing if his 
assertions are backed by deductive proof. If Ella is in a courtroom, Louis may count 
as knowing if his information is based on the testimony of a witness under oath. The 
list of examples could be extended and specified at length.
218
 We should notice that 
each context bears a detectable clue, such as the attributor‟s location (a courtroom) 
and the content of her question (mathematical). These detectable clues promise to 
solve the intelligibility objection. Knowledge claims are intelligible because they 
always hold more pertinent information than a bare statement, “S knows that p.”  By 
picking out a number of various aspects of and surrounding a knowledge claim, a 
listener gets an idea of the context to which it is sensitive.  
 Epistemic practice contextualism manages to satisfy the authority condition as 
well. For any given context, there is only one answer as to whether or not a subject 
knows. In the courtroom, there is no danger that some attributor will make a 
knowledge claim using tavern standards; if she did, she has simply made a mistake, a 
false attribution. Thus, true knowledge claims will always be authoritative for their 
context. Since public clues make the context always apparent, there is no danger that 
a claim made in one context will be repeated in another context. People can disquote 
knowledge attributions only when enough of the surrounding clues remain to ensure 
that the same standards are in place.  
 Thus, a knowledge claim can be both context-sensitive and absolute. As 
Willaschek explains, when a knowledge claim is authoritative for a given context, it 
has default status. Each epistemic practice sets its own criteria for the amount and 
kind of justification required for given beliefs to have default status: in a courtroom, 
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certain assertions may have default status if the speaker would swear to it on oath. In 
a laboratory, certain assertions may have default status if the speaker can point to 
reproducible data collected by empirical experiments. According to Willaschek, if a 
belief is true and has default status, then it is known. If beliefs do not have default 
status, then they must be explicitly argued for. The point at which a belief without 
default status may be considered established through explicit argumentation is also 
relative to the standards of the relevant epistemic practice. 
 As shown in Williams‟ example of the sports cars, the codified standards of one 
practice underdetermine the relevant criteria. Ivan‟s belief does not count as 
knowledge because of a very specific fact: one enthusiast has been making replicas. 
Willaschek contrasts such circumstances with the codified standards, calling the 
former the “facts of the matter.”219 The facts of the matter affect which relevant 
alternatives a subject would have to rule out for a speaker‟s knowledge attribution to 
be true.  The standards of the practice can determine in general what sorts of possible 
alternatives need to be ruled out in order for a knowledge attribution to be true, but 
the facts of the matter are needed in order to judge whether certain specific 
alternatives need to be ruled out. For example, Willaschek claims that ordinary 
epistemic practice has the following standard: “rule out any error-possibilities for 
which there‟s a reason to think that they may in fact obtain.”220 Whether or not there 
is such a reason is then a fact of the matter. Before there were any counterfeit Rolex 
watches getting hawked, reading the brand name on the watch face sufficed to grant 
a belief that the watch was a Rolex default status. After the possibility of counterfeit 
watches has become not just a logical possibility but a living threat, then the same 
evidence no longer suffices. In order to judge whether it is a relevant possibility that 
the watch is a counterfeit, we need to consider the fact of the matter: whether or not 
there are counterfeit Rolex watches in general distribution.
221
  
 According to Willaschek, certain paradigmatic kinds of belief may enjoy 
universal default status. If a subject can claim that his belief is based on memory, 
perception or testimony, then he need not offer any further evidence to convince his 
listeners to accept it as knowledge. That is, ordinary epistemic practice awards 
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default status to beliefs acquired by memory, perception and testimony.
222
 He points 
out that even these universally acceptable beliefs can lose their default status if a fact 
of the matter indicates that they are no longer reliable sources. That I remember 
doing something means that I know I did it, unless it so happens that I have 
dementia. 
 A default belief only loses its status if there is a reasonable challenge to its 
reliability. What counts as a reasonable challenge also varies according to the 
epistemic practice and the facts of the matter.
223
 Thus, it will be relative to the 
context at hand how many counterfeit watches must be in circulation before reading 
the brand name on its face no longer awards the belief „this watch is a Rolex‟ default 
status. 
In sum, four points can change according to context: 
(a) what kinds of beliefs enjoy default status; (b) what kinds of error-possibilities are 
relevant challenges; (c) what counts as answering a challenge (as ruling out an error-
possibility); and (d) what counts as establishing a claim that does not enjoy default 
status.
224
 
These four questions are answered in principle by the epistemic practice‟s standards, 
which in conjunction with the facts of the matter decide the status of specific beliefs. 
With Willaschek‟s epistemic practice contextualism, we now have a much clearer 
blueprint of how to develop Greco‟s proposal and index the meaning of knowledge 
to the actual interests of groups rather than the perceived interests of individuals in a 
way that allows for public authority and intelligibility. 
 However, Willaschek makes a further argument which would drastically impact 
the sensitivity of knowledge attributions. He argues that for any given claim, there is 
either an expert context or there is not. If there is a strict expert context, then the 
knowledge claim must be evaluated according to its standards; if not, „everyday‟ 
standards apply.
225
 On the strength of this dichotomy, Willaschek denies that a 
knowledge claim could ever be true in the mouth of one attributor, while false in the 
mouth of another. If Renata claims to know that it will rain by looking at the clouds, 
and Maria the meteorologist denies that Renata knows, than only Maria‟s claim can 
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be correct, for only Maria is using the expert standards of the relevant epistemic 
practice. Thus, epistemic practice contextualism does not allow for the kind of 
sensitivity that my synthesis demands. Since stakes, for example, cannot affect 
whether or not there is an expert practice, Willaschek implies that stakes cannot 
affect the truth of a knowledge attribution. Furthermore, with this clause Willaschek 
contradicts Williams as well, who holds that factors such as stakes are indeed 
relevant to whether a subject counts as knowing or not.  
iv. Conventions rather than practices: Beyer 
In order to synthesize the sensitivity, authority, and intelligibility conditions into one 
coherent concept, we need to think of public epistemic contexts, but we must also 
allow for these public contexts to change according to factors such as stakes. In 
“Contextualism and the background of (philosophical) justification,” 226  Christian 
Beyer presents a key concept which can enable this synthesis: epistemic conventions. 
Conventions are, of course, public, but unlike Willaschek‟s practices, they need not 
be rigidly defined. Conventions can be based on subtle social cues. Beyer introduces 
the apt phrase „convention contextualism‟ and defines it as follows: 
S knows that p at time t for a speaker belonging to a given linguistic community l, in 
a context of assessment c, iff (1) S believes at t that p, (2) it is true that p, and (3) S 
meets, at t, the criteria of justification that, according to the conventions valid in l, 
apply in c.
227
 
Beyer does not offer a clear explanation of what constitutes a convention. He claims 
that conventions are generally shared presumptions as to which alternatives are 
epistemically possible,
228
 but does not pursue the notion further, referring us instead 
to the work of two other philosophers: Husserl‟s phenomenological analysis of the 
Lebenswelt (life-world) and Wittgenstein‟s discussion in On Certainty of a subject‟s 
background or Weltbild (picture of the world.)  
 Despite the vagueness of what constitutes a convention, I expect that this notion 
will allow us to helpfully modify Willaschek‟s model of epistemic practice 
contextualism, using its insights to meet the authority and intelligibility objections, 
without overly narrowing the scope of acceptable contexts. The synthesized concept 
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can demonstrate sensitivity to subtler and vaguer, but nonetheless public 
conventions. We may then accept a change in stakes as affecting a change in the 
meaning of knowledge attributions, for people conventionally do adjust their 
epistemic standards to the stakes of their situation. Therefore the statement, “He 
knows that this mushroom isn‟t poisonous” might conventionally express a higher 
degree of reliability than, “He knows that this mushroom is one dollar cheaper than 
the other,” for the former implies a recognition of life or death stakes and we humans 
tend to care a lot more about staying alive than about saving a dollar. 
 Stakes are not the only factor unaddressed by epistemic practice contextualism 
that can nonetheless affect what will conventionally be understood by knowledge 
attributions. Take Bach‟s eavesdropping objection.229 If you overhear someone say, 
“Nixon knew that Liddy was planning the Watergate break-in,” do you understand 
him because you grasp which practice governs the standards of his attribution? 
While politics may be described as a practice, I do not believe that this is the best 
way to approach the intelligibility of the assertion. Rather, you gather that he is 
talking about a high rank political scandal. Given what people understand about high 
rank political scandals, the statement conventionally implies both very high stakes 
and a very low level of required justification. That is, we do not expect that the 
speaker means that Nixon was able to prove beyond any shadow of a doubt that 
Liddy was planning the Watergate break-in. Given the stakes and the nature of the 
situation, Nixon may be publically attributed with that knowledge as long as he had 
any substantial evidence at his disposal. On the other hand, a statement such as 
“President Obama knows that they harbor nuclear weapons,” while implying equally 
high stakes, would imply that Obama has a huge amount of substantial evidence, 
otherwise the public would not be willing to attribute him with knowledge of such a 
thing.  
I do not expect these examples to be immediately convincing. I only mean to 
demonstrate how one could begin to apply convention contextualism in order to 
describe these situations. As I will discuss at more length in the next chapter, these 
musings must be supplemented by linguistic and sociological research as well as 
normative arbitration. 
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v. Verdict for convention contextualism 
Convention contextualism provides us with the tools to synthesize all three 
conditions into one coherent concept. It limits the amount of sensitivity, but not 
enough to disable the concept from playing the hypothesized function in practical 
reasoning. While epistemic conventions do not respond to the practical environments 
of isolated individuals, they do adjust to publically recognized practical 
environments. Therefore, people may use the concept of knowledge in a way 
appropriate to their situation, as long as their situation fits some generally 
acknowledged mold.   
 According to convention contextualism, the meaning of a knowledge attribution 
cannot change according to entirely personal factors, such as whether or not the 
speaker happens to be thinking of a certain counterpossibility when he makes it. 
Rather, the meaning will be indexed to generally acknowledged standards. As 
indicated above in my discussion of Bach‟s eavesdropping example, the content of 
knowledge attributions will often indicate the conventional context according to 
which they ought to be understood. When a person makes her attribution according 
to conventional standards, listeners can thus understand it according to those same 
standards, even without any further background knowledge. Therefore, there is little 
danger that the listener will find herself using the „known‟ premise as a reason for 
action in a situation in which her raised standards make that no longer a rational 
choice. Within one fixed conventional context, there is one publically recognized 
standard for a belief to have default status. Beliefs that achieve that default status, or 
that are maverick but explicitly grounded, may be considered as absolutely 
authoritative within that context. Since anyone who hears the knowledge attribution 
should understand the conventional context it implies, it is possible for the attribution 
to imply a generally acknowledged status, honor, and normative demand as well. 
f. The final synthesis: KAP–CC 
The consideration of competing syntheses of knowledge have shown that, to 
accommodate the two objections and fully account for the social demands 
highlighted by my hypothesis, we should modify KAP by indexing the reliability 
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condition to S1 - Sn‟s conventional practical environment. The resulting formulation 
looks as follows: 
 
Knowledge characterized by its Authoritative role in Practical reasoning - 
sensitive to Conventional Contexts (KAP–CC) 
S1 knows relative to S1 - Sn iff p, S1 believes that p, and S1 has a property X which 
correlates with being right about p reliably enough to count as authoritative by the 
standards of S1 - Sn‟s conventional practical environment.   
 
KAP–CC is the final result of my conceptual synthesis. In the following chapter, I 
shall compare it to commonly held intuitions about knowledge and test for 
discrepancies.  
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6. Comparison: Is knowledge equivalent to KAP – CC? 
In the following chapter, I compare the result of my conceptual synthesis to 
intuitions about the concept of knowledge. I consider three possible discrepancies 
and argue against each of them. In so doing, I also manage to show why KAP–CC is 
superior to Hawthorne and Stanley‟s subject-sensitive invariant conception of 
knowledge. 
 In conclusion I discuss the vagueness about what constitutes a conventional 
practical environment. While we need not strive to eliminate all vagueness, I suggest 
that here there is room for empirical research and normative modifications as well as 
factual and conjectural genealogies. 
a. The disagreement objection 
i. The alleged contextualist interpretation of disagreement 
The disagreement objection points out that any contextualist conception of 
knowledge does a poor job of accounting for intuitions generated by disagreements 
over whether or not someone knows.
230
 Since it is usually leveled at those 
contextualist accounts motivated by skeptical arguments, the objection is usually 
based on examples of a skeptic arguing with a non-skeptic. So, for example, Mark 
Richard takes the example of Moore arguing with a skeptic about whether he knows 
that he has hands.
231
 Moore says he knows it; the skeptic says he does not. 
Contextualist accounts supposedly must interpret this situation as follows:  
The two speakers do not really contradict one another at all. The whole dispute is 
based on a misunderstanding! If the two speakers only clarified what each of them 
meant by the word know, they would realize that they are actually making two 
different claims. Knowing relative to the skeptic is simply a different property than 
knowing relative to Moore. Therefore, they are simply talking past one another, and 
both may very well be right, for Moore might know relative to himself and not know 
relative to the skeptic. 
Since KAP–CC is also a contextualist account of knowledge, it presumably would be 
forced to give just such a gloss on the disagreement. Yet, this interpretation does not 
sit well with our intuitive response to the disagreement. As Richard puts it, 
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One feels that something is awry. One wants to say that when the skeptic and Moore 
argue with each other, they disagree about whether Moore knows he has hands. One 
wants, for that matter, to say that when the skeptic utters „Moore doesn‟t know he 
has hands‟ he says that Moore doesn‟t know that he has hands; analagously, for 
Moore and „Moore knows that he has hands‟. But it‟s not clear we can say any of 
this, if we are contextualists.
232
 
The two parties believe that they are actually disagreeing and that only one of them 
can be right. As long as we have not already converted to contextualism, our 
intuitions concur. KAP–CC thus poses a discrepancy with widely held intuitions 
about the way the concept of knowledge is actually used. 
 According to DeRose, no advocate of contextualism would actually endorse 
such an interpretation of disagreement.
233
 There are various ways to offer a 
contextualist interpretation of disagreement without arguing that both speakers can 
be speaking truly. I will discuss here only that which convention contextualism 
offers. 
ii. Practical environments must be shared by both speakers 
My synthesis has not been driven by the desire to interpret skeptical arguments. 
What sort of practical environment could the skeptic have in mind? It is thus not 
immediately clear how the KAP–CC synthesis would guide us in describing Moore‟s 
and the skeptic‟s disagreement. Of course, its weakness in dealing with knowledge 
claims that do not relate to practical reasoning is itself another objection to KAP–CC 
which I return to in section d below. 
 To respond to the disagreement objection, I must consider disagreements that 
could arise out of two different practical environments. What sort of disagreement is 
possible in such cases? As demonstrated in the example from Chapter Four, “John 
was at work,” sometimes what looks like the same knowledge attribution may 
actually be understood as two different propositions with two different truth values. 
This apparent contradiction arises because the propositions are asserted in two 
different practical environments with two different standards for epistemic authority. 
If Thelma and the police were to disagree about whether or not Louise knows that 
John was at work, they would indeed merely be talking past one another.  However, 
notice that in the example Thelma and the police are not actually speaking to one 
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another. Their „disagreement‟ is only an artificial possibility. That is, if some neutral 
observer considers the two statements next to each other, it may seem as if the 
speakers would disagree, were they to start a conversation. But in fact, were the two 
speakers to confront one another and actually enter into a dispute, then they would 
not be able to avoid being in the same practical environment. If the police began to 
question Thelma as a potential witness to John‟s whereabouts the day of the crime, 
Thelma should adapt to the conventions that govern criminal investigations. If 
Thelma were to ask the police for their advice as to whether or not she should pay up 
to Louise, the police should adapt to the conventions that govern petty bets.  
This response to the disagreement objection relies on the following important 
condition on the public practical environment: it must be shared by both speakers. In 
a normal conversation about whether or not someone knows that p, both speakers 
adapt to common conventions as to what knowledge means. Since two people need 
to speak to one another in order to actually disagree, KAP–CC will never offer the 
alleged interpretation caricatured above. 
A natural way to phrase this condition is to say that conversations cannot bridge 
contexts. However, it would be false to claim that one cannot be in two conventional 
contexts at the same time. DeRose offers the example of Jane, the walking talker.
234
 
Talking to her friend, she claims to know that she will return to the college next year, 
despite the fact that she is that very moment walking to go sign up for a year of life 
insurance and thereby acting on the premise that she does not know any such thing, 
for she cannot rule out the possibility that she will die before the year is out. The 
woman uses the concept of knowledge in two different ways within one 
conversation. Relative to her conversation with her friend, she does know that she 
will return to the college next year. Relative to her decision to buy life insurance, she 
does not know that she will return to the college next year. 
Jason Stanley argues that such shifts within one conversation are not possible.
235
 
However, the linguistic data on which he bases his case uses only one proposition, 
with no extra details that imply any reason why the relevant context would shift. 
Conventions, though, rely on just such clues. When we look at a more thoroughly 
described example, such as DeRose‟s walking talker, we may recognize the 
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difference between the two contexts which have generated the two apparently 
conflicting uses. Chatting about plans obviously entails a different end of inquiry 
than buying life insurance. Only by being used in two recognizably different 
conventional contexts may one get away with bridging a context within one 
conversation. Thus, these situations should not engender disagreement at all. If the 
woman‟s friend objects that the woman does not really know whether she will return 
to the college, the friend is either mistaken, or attempting to switch contexts.  In such 
a case, we can encounter genuine disagreement.  
iii. Genuine disagreement  
There can be genuine disagreement within one context. That is, there are situations in 
which two subjects disagree despite being in the same practical environment, and 
thereby meaning the same thing by „knowledge.‟ If Molly and Rachel are in the same 
public practical environment, and if Molly believes that “Edgar knows that p” while 
Rachel believes that “Edgar doesn‟t know that p,” then only one of them can be right. 
Perhaps Rachel denies knowledge of Edgar because she overestimates the relevance 
of a certain alternative. Since her community would deem that alternative irrelevant, 
then her attribution is false. By leaving open the possibility for such mistakes, 
convention contextualism thus differs from other forms of contextualism. According 
to salience-sensitive contextualism, for example, if one individual subject deems an 
alternative relevant, then so it is; it would thus be impossible for Rachel to 
mistakenly award relevance to an irrelevant alternative. Thanks to Greco‟s constraint 
to actual rather than perceived interests,
236
 such errors are possible according to 
convention contextualism and so genuine disagreements may arise.  
 In genuine disagreements, one of the speakers must have made an error. Taking 
my cue from Willaschek‟s epistemic practice contextualism, 237  I suggest that 
according to convention contextualism, two kinds of errors are possible: an error as 
to which standards govern the environment at hand and an error as to the facts of the 
matter.  
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Suppose that, in fact, John was not at work. In such a case, both Thelma and 
Louise are wrong in the petty bet scenario, thanks to an unexpected fact of the 
matter.
238
 
Now, leaving it an open question for the moment whether or not John was, in 
fact, at work, suppose that Thelma does not accept Louise‟s epistemic authority and 
thereby refuses to give up the five dollars. The two begin to fight about whether or 
not Louise‟s evidence is sufficient to resolve the bet or not. “You‟re being ridiculous; 
he was obviously at work,” argues Louise. “If you didn‟t actually see him, you can‟t 
be sure,” argues Thelma. “Come on, we both know he was there!” says Louise. “No, 
maybe he just forgot his hat yesterday! Maybe Fred was confused, or you misheard 
him! You can‟t be sure he was there,” says Thelma. 
 The two of them are in fact operating different standards for epistemic authority. 
However, they are also genuinely disagreeing: they disagree over which standards 
should be taken as appropriate for the context at hand, i.e. over which conventions 
govern their petty bet. With this interpretation, one can be a contextualist and 
accommodate disagreement based intuitions. Simply point out that the disagreement 
is not over the truth of the assertion, but rather over the meaning of one of the verbs 
it contains.
239
 Thelma and Louise do not so much disagree about the answer to the 
question “Does Louise know or not?” as about the answer to the question “In our 
petty bet context, is circumstantial evidence enough to count as knowing or not?” 
 So much for the intuition that they are in disagreement. What about the intuition 
that only one of them can be right? Who is right, Thelma or Louise? In responding to 
this intuition, we must acknowledge the vagueness of the conventions pertinent to 
this example. Here, as in most other conventional practical environments, there is no 
well-defined code of standards to which any knowledge attribution must adhere. 
Rather, the conventions are flexible and vague. Therefore, it is true that in this 
example of disagreement, there is no clear answer as to which of them is right. While 
gambling institutions have established standards, a friendly personal bet is a 
„gentleman‟s agreement,‟ made on the implicit assumption that both parties 
recognize the same conventional standards of epistemic authority. If it turns out that 
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they both have different expectations, then intelligibility has failed. In such cases the 
disagreement is genuine, but not clearly resolvable. 
 Thus, irresolvable disagreements in which neither party is clearly right or wrong 
arise only in those cases in which knowledge attributions are neither intelligible nor 
authoritative. If such cases arose often, then both the functional strength and the 
intuition accommodation of convention contextualism would be threatened. 
However, such cases do not arise very often. When they do, I presume that two 
responses will be the most common, both of which contribute towards reducing the 
prevalence of such cases. First, the parties can try to convince each other as to what 
the standards should be. Second, the parties can explicitly state the standards in the 
future. When vague conventions lead to conflict, the natural and appropriate response 
is to clarify the conventions. 
b. The trans-contextual behavior evaluation objection 
i. The alleged contextualist interpretation of behavior evaluation 
Hawthorne argues that no contextualist account can accommodate the function of the 
concept of knowledge in behavior evaluation scenarios.
240
 His argument proceeds by 
showing that the following three claims cannot all be true:  
(1) Whether or not S1 may use p as a premise in rational practical reasoning does 
not depend on S2‟s practical environment. 
(2) If S1 may not use p as a premise in rational practical reasoning, then S1 does 
not know that p. 
(3) Whether or not it is true that „S1 does not know that p’ depends on S2‟s 
practical environment. 
One cannot simultaneously affirm all three claims. To understand why, imagine that 
the police are talking about Thelma. They recognize that, in her petty bet context, (1) 
Thelma was acting rationally to trust Louise and pay the five dollars. However, 
according to their criminal investigation context, they agree that (3) “Thelma does 
not know whether or not John was at work.” Thus, they must be able to say (not-2), 
“Thelma may act as if John was at work; nonetheless, she does not know that John 
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was at work.” In this case, the following two statements are true, with S1 as Thelma 
and S2 as the police: 
(1) According to S1‟s practical environment, S1 may use p as a premise in 
rational practical reasoning.  
(3) According to S2‟s practical environment, S1 does not know that p.  
Given the truth of (1) and (3), S2 must be able to make the following statement,  
 
(not-2) “S1 may use p as a premise in rational practical reasoning, but she does not 
       know that p.”  
 
In this situation, affirming claim (1) and (3) leads to the denial of claim (2). In the 
police‟s context, it is true that „Thelma does not know that p.‟ However, thanks to 
Thelma‟s context, it is false that „Thelma may not use p as a reason for action.‟  
Claim (2) is the basis of the role of the concept of knowledge in practical 
reasoning, according to both subject-sensitive invariantism and KAP–CC. Neither 
theory wants to deny it. Claim (3) is the contextualist thesis. Subject-sensitive 
invariantism saves claims (1) and (2) by denying claim (3). 
Hawthorne imagines that contextualists have to deny claim (1), leaving them 
with the burden of a more far-reaching contextualism than perhaps they bargained 
for.
241
 By supporting contextualism about “know” they are forced to support 
contextualism about practical rationality. That is, the contextualist would have to 
argue for something like:  
(4) Whether or not it is true that „S1 may use p as a premise in rational practical 
reasoning‟ depends on S2‟s practical environment. 
Claim (4) supports contextualism about rational practical reasoning. A contextualist 
could save claim (3) by replacing claim (1) with claim (4). However, claim (1) has a 
lot of intuitive support; whether or not S1 may perform a certain action should 
depend only on his own practical environment. My practical environment has no 
bearing on how you ought to act in your practical environment. The fact that Ida’s 
child is allergic to peanuts does not mean that Estelle should be more careful about 
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what cookies she eats. Furthermore, behavior evaluation does seem to rely on the 
truth of claim (1). That is, if John‟s mother can truthfully tell John “You ought to buy 
life insurance,” then it would be odd if John could just as truthfully reply, “That‟s 
true for you, but not for me! According to my standards, I ought to save my money!” 
Contextualism about rational practical reasoning does not seem compatible with 
behavior evaluation. So, if Hawthorne‟s criticism is correct, then any contextualist 
account of knowledge, including KAP–CC, would be unable to fully account for the 
force of behavior evaluation. In that case, the choice between the two theories would 
come down to choosing which of the two types of scenario is more important: 
behavior evaluation or testimony evaluation.  
ii. The conventions of trans-contextual behavior evaluation 
Hawthorne‟s criticism of contextualism is incorrect. There is a form of contextualism 
that can account for the function of the concept of knowledge in behavior evaluation, 
namely, convention contextualism. KAP–CC can describe behavior evaluation 
without succumbing to contextualism about rational practical reasoning. We must 
simply recognize that, according to the conventions of fair behavior evaluation, you 
may not evaluate another‟s behavior without adapting your standards to the context 
of the subject under evaluation. If S2 is evaluating S1‟s behavior, that fact affects S2‟s 
own context. Conventions of fairness hold that S2 may not evaluate S1‟s use of p as a 
reason for action by standards other than those pertaining to the environment in 
which S1 behaved.
242
  That is, conventions can demand that the attributor be sensitive 
to the subject. Accordingly, when evaluating S2‟s behavior, S1 cannot accurately 
evaluate S2‟s relevant knowledge by standards other than those pertaining to the 
environment in which S2 behaved. If the police are judging Thelma‟s behavior, they 
should adapt their standards to Thelma‟s environment. They should set their own 
high stakes concerns aside and look at things from Thelma‟s point of view. 
Otherwise, they cannot give a fair evaluation of her behavior. 
 Thus, S2 cannot truthfully say, “S1 may use p as a reason for action, but S1 does 
not know that p.”243 Convention contextualism can affirm (1), (2) and (3). It avoids 
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those situations in which such their simultaneous affirmation would entail a 
contradiction by putting a constraint on which practical environment S2 may be in 
when evaluating S1‟s behavior.  
iii. Subject-sensitive invariantism and testimony evaluation 
KAP–CC is in fact compatible with the function of the concept of knowledge in 
behavior evaluation. However, subject-sensitive invariantism is not compatible with 
the function of the concept of knowledge in testimony evaluation. That is, of the two 
accounts, only KAP–CC is flexible enough to describe the following situation:  
An inquirer‟s own epistemic position with respect to p is not very strong. Thus, she 
turns to an informant, who has an indicator property which correlates reliably 
enough with being right about p to give him the epistemic authority she needs. He 
asserts that p. She correctly judges that he knows that p and believes that p on his 
authority. Accordingly, she uses p as a premise in her practical reasoning. 
In this situation, the concept of knowledge functions when the inquirer decides that 
her informant has the epistemic authority she needs. Subject-sensitive invariantism 
on the other hand can locate a functional role for the knowledge attribution only in 
the final sentence, once the inquirer herself believes that p and uses it as a reason for 
action. It cannot account for the role that knowledge plays in her evaluation and trust 
of her informant.  
Subject-sensitive invariantism cannot account for the role of knowledge in cases 
of testimony evaluation. KAP–CC can account for the role of knowledge in behavior 
evaluation. Thus, according to the criterion of comparison presented in section 4.c.v, 
KAP–CC is superior to subject-sensitive invariantism. 
c. The belief objection 
i. Kelp’s objection 
Craig‟s work is motivated by situations in which an inquirer needs to decide whether 
or not to trust an informant. If the inquirer trusts the informant, then the informant‟s 
assertion that p causes the inquirer to believe that p. However, one can easily think 
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up examples in which a subject‟s assertion causes an informant‟s belief in some 
deviant way. Kelp presents the following example as trouble for Craig‟s thesis. 
Henry is in an environment with one real barn and otherwise only fakes. The one 
real barn is red while the fakes are all green. Henry will believe that a barn is present 
no matter whether he sees the real red barn or a green fake. However, he is sworn to 
secrecy about green barns. As a result, in the present circumstances, he will say that 
he is facing a barn only when he is facing a real barn.
244
 
Henry, it is generally agreed, does not know that he is facing a real barn. Yet, Kelp 
argues, he is an objectively good informant as to whether the barn is real.  
 Now it is easy to point out that this example is bizarre. The tricky part is to 
explain why it is different than the normal case. As explained above in section 1.d, 
bizarre counterexamples can be helpful insofar as they illuminate an important 
feature of the prototypical case that we might not have noticed until we considered a 
case in which it was absent. When an informant asserts and an inquirer believes, how 
must the informant‟s assertion cause the inquirer‟s belief in order for him to avoid 
being like Henry? 
ii. Craig’s distinction between informants and mere sources of information  
Craig deals with a similar example by denying that Henry is an informant at all.
245
 
He argues that anyone believing Henry on the basis of the information given in the 
example would be using him as a source of information rather than trusting him as an 
informant. The fact that the inquirer believes that p on the basis of the subject‟s 
sincere assertion that p is still not enough to render the subject an informant. There 
are many other examples of mere sources of information. Fred‟s dripping umbrella 
can give me the true belief that it is raining outside, without making Fred into an 
informant.
246
 Craig also considers how other controversies in epistemological 
literature may be based on the reluctance to attribute mere sources of information 
with knowledge.
247
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 This response would save Craig from Kelp‟s critique, but is it well justified? If 
the distinction is to be convincing, we need a functional reason why sources of 
information should be excluded from the extension of the concept of the good 
informant. 
 Craig suggests that an informant is worth distinguishing from a mere source of 
information, because the former is more convenient for an inquirer. He goes on to 
mention two features that render the informant more convenient. First, informants are 
more convenient for the inquirer, because the inquirer does not need any specialized 
background knowledge in order to interpret the subject‟s assertion. The difference 
between a source of information and an informant would be that an inquirer needs to 
be “specially equipped with background information and inferential techniques not 
generally available”248 in order to use a source of information. To understand the 
informant, on the other hand, the inquirer only needs to understand his language. 
Second, it is more convenient to have an informant, because he can cooperate with 
the inquirer, and thereby be more actively helpful.
249
 
 An inquirer talking to Henry in Kelp‟s counterexample would need background 
information about Henry‟s environment, Henry‟s awareness of his environment, and 
Henry‟s relationship to green barns. We might imagine that this background 
information is not generally available, and that therefore the inquirer would find 
Henry less convenient.  
iii. The problems with Craig’s distinction 
The inquirer‟s need for background information does not adequately capture the 
difference between informants and mere sources. There are too many situations in 
which a person does know that p, despite the fact that an inquirer would need 
specialized background information to be able to trust him as to whether p. Imagine 
the following example: 
The inquirer‟s tribe is at war with a band of marauders, who would all likely lie to 
her about whether or not a tiger was coming. Only the inquirer has realized that the 
marauders all have yellow tattoos on their ankles.  The inquirer then sees that Fred‟s 
ankles are tattoo-free, and accordingly trusts him about the tiger. Without that piece 
of background information, she should not have trusted Fred. 
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In this example, Fred knows that the tiger is coming, despite the inquirer‟s need for 
specialized background information in order to trust him. There is something else 
amiss in the Henry example that is not amiss in the Fred example. Furthermore, I 
suspect that this set of situations, in which a subject knows that p despite the fact that 
people would need specialized background information in order to trust his assertion 
that p, is significantly larger and less freakish than the set of Henry-like situations. 
Scientists, for example, have specific standards they expect an experiment to respect; 
they should not trust a colleague‟s report of an experiment‟s results without ensuring 
that her experiment meets those standards.
250
 Yet those standards may involve 
specialized background information. The inquirer‟s need for specialized background 
information in order to trust a subject‟s assertion that p does not imply that the 
subject does not know that p. Accepting such a distinction will take care of the 
discrepancy revealed by the Henry case, but only by producing a whole new batch of 
discrepancies. 
 There is a second problem with Craig‟s distinction: it does not accord with the 
demands of objectivization. Once we take social and diachronic circumstances into 
account, we realize that inquirers actually need objectively good informants, rather 
than subjectively good informants. The objectively good informant, like the subject 
with knowledge, need be neither accessible nor intelligible to the informant. Even the 
requirement that the inquirer can understand the informant‟s language falls away. 
The concept of the objectively good informant loses in individual convenience what 
it gains in public usefulness. Yet, as Craig has presented it, sources of information do 
not count as informants because they are not as convenient to individual inquirers. 
Why should the distinction between the source of information and the good 
informant not fall away with the other subjective conditions?  
 With the loss of the subjective condition (2), the indicator property need not be 
detectable in the actual world; a possible world in which the inquirer detects it can 
suffice.
251
 Some of those possible worlds will include ones in which the inquirer has 
just the background information she needs to understand the informant. Therefore, 
there is no reason why a demand on the inquirer to have background information 
should exclude an informant from the extension of knowledge. The concept of 
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knowledge, according to Craig‟s theory, is too objective to make such concessions to 
convenience. 
Furthermore, the subjective condition (4) reads, “Channels of communication 
between him and me should be open.”252 One of the obstructions which may block a 
channel of communication can be uncooperativeness. In fact, Craig offers the 
description of objectivization in part as a way to ensure that his synthesized concept 
of knowledge includes subjects such as mobsters who are uncooperative and will not 
say that p, but nonetheless know that p. The need for an objectively good informant 
does not imply the need for a cooperative informant. How then may we use a lack of 
cooperativeness to explain why we are not willing to say that the wet street knows 
that it rained?
253
 
iv. Using epistemic authority to make the distinction 
With the epistemic authority hypothesis, we exclude considerations like convenience 
from the beginning as too subjectively idiosyncratic to affect the synthesis. We 
should not attempt to respond to this or any other objection by reverting to such 
subjective considerations. In section 3.a I point out that the epistemic authority 
hypothesis demands the explication of three new conditions: a social status 
condition, an honor condition, and a normativity condition. Any successful synthesis 
must show how the concept can meet these three demands of a social system of 
epistemic evaluation. Convention contextualism has been explicated specifically to 
enable the synthesis of these features together with sensitivity to practical 
environments. I now suggest that these three conditions indicate the proper way to 
distinguish between informants and mere sources of information, and thereby 
respond to Kelp‟s belief objection. The epistemic position of mere sources of 
information makes them into useful tools for finding out whether p, but fails to 
provide them with authority as to whether p.
 
 
 In the context of a different discussion, Arnon Keren elaborates on the concept 
of epistemic authority, particularly its normative aspect.
254
 According to his 
interpretation of testimonial interactions, an authoritative informant‟s assertion is not 
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added to a bunch of reasons that the inquirer already has. Rather the informant‟s 
assertion preempts the other reasons the inquirer might otherwise have had to believe 
that p. 
To have the kind of epistemic authority that allows others to trust one on p, that 
allows others to take one‟s word for it, is to have a special kind of normative power, 
the power to issue a special kind of reason for belief: by expressing her belief that p, 
a person who has authority on p does not merely give us a reason to likewise believe 
that p. More than that, she gives us a second-order, preemptive reason for 
disregarding other relevant evidence which we may have concerning p.
255
 
Keren points out further that the informant‟s preemptive power is justified by his 
responsiveness to reasons. I trust that Fred is responsive to adequate reasons, and 
thereby came about his belief that p. As a result, I do not need any further reasons in 
order to simply believe that p on his authority. If Fred has epistemic authority, then I 
trust that his reasons are good enough to justify his assertion. I believe him and in so 
doing, make his reasons my own. A subject who is not properly responsive to reasons 
does not have epistemic authority, because the normative aspect of authority implies 
that an inquirer ought to take the authoritative informant‟s reasons as her own. 
 Keren further explains epistemic authority as a matter of which inferences the 
inquirer makes in order to believe the informant‟s assertion.  
It is possible, in other words, to trust a speaker on the basis of an inference. But if 
one trusts a speaker, then one does not accept her judgment on the basis of an 
inference from what she has said to the fact that what she has said is true.
256
 
An inquirer may need background information as to why a given subject is 
trustworthy, without altering his status as an informant. However, if she would need 
any further background information as to why his assertion that p implies that p, then 
his assertion could not be taken as a preemptive reason to believe that p and he 
should not be considered an epistemic authority on the question whether p. 
Using Keren‟s definition of epistemic authority, we may explain why tree-
climbing Fred is a good informant, while barn-gazing Henry is not. Once the inquirer 
hears Henry‟s assertion she must put it together with the other information she has 
about Henry‟s condition, and therefrom infer that Henry‟s assertion is true. She 
would not be able to simply take Henry‟s reasons for believing that p as her own 
reasons for believing that p, for she knows that he is not appropriately responsive to 
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reasons. Therefore, she may only take his assertion as one more piece of evidence, 
together with the rest of her information about his state. 
 On the other hand, once the inquirer has inferred that Fred is friendly, she trusts 
that he is appropriately responsive to reasons. Therefore, she may simply trust his 
assertion, assuming that all of his reasons for making the assertion are good enough 
to be her reasons as well. Even if Fred is entirely unaware of the yellow marauders, 
he is still in a good enough epistemic position to fully justify his assertion about the 
tiger, which is all the inquirer needs in order to trust him on that fact. 
 I do not pretend to have adequately supported Keren‟s proposal, nor am I even 
convinced that his account could overcome all objections. The work of finding the 
precise feature that really motivates this distinction requires more work and subtlety. 
However, I hope to have demonstrated the danger of falling into overly subjective 
considerations such as convenience when responding to fourth step discrepancies, 
and the ability of the epistemic authority hypothesis to do a better job. 
 Furthermore, we may go beyond Keren‟s work by using the honor condition to 
explain why Henry and other mere sources of information do not count as filling the 
relevant need. Ram Neta does just that, modifying Craig‟s hypothesis in response to 
the „source of information‟ objection so that it describes the need for creditable 
informants.
257
 Henry and his ilk do not deserve credit for their true assertions. They 
are being used by their inquirers, despite their major cognitive flaws. As Fricker 
recognizes, this is a degrading position to be in.
258
 Only subjects who are 
appropriately responsive to reasons deserve the honor involved in a knowledge 
attribution. Thus the subjects who can be counted on to assert the truth despite their 
twisted responses to the relevant reasons do not qualify as knowers.  
d. The scope objection 
i. KAP–CC neglects theoretical knowledge 
Throughout this thesis I have stubbornly ignored the question of skepticism. Given 
the motivation to explicate the concept of knowledge based on its actual social 
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function, this omission may be acceptable. However, a closely related question 
cannot be entirely avoided: How can KAP–CC account for the use of the concept of 
knowledge when practical concerns are irrelevant?  
 Using KAP–CC requires reference to a hypothetical situation: in a nearby 
possible world, would the informant meet the demands of an inquirer‟s practical 
environment? However, there are many situations in which conventions may provide 
no clue as to which hypothetical practical environment we ought to take into 
consideration. A historian, for example, may happen to know the average price of 
cinnamon in medieval Portugal. What conventional standards govern that attribution 
of knowledge? In other words, which hypothetical practical environment do we 
intuitively judge the attribution against?  
 The scope of my synthesis seems to be too narrow. The concept of knowledge is 
surely used to cover lots of useless beliefs. Thus, it seems that very many uses of the 
concept of knowledge do not in fact function to play the role described by KAP–CC. 
Of course, there would still be the chance that KAP–CC describes one pattern of use 
among others, along Kusch‟s Wittgensteinian model. 259  However, the more 
ambitious hypothesis on which this synthesis has been based, that nearly all 
knowledge attributions serve the hypothesized function, would be untenable. 
ii. Three possible responses 
There are three ways in which theoretical uses of the concept of knowledge might 
indeed turn out to serve the hypothesized function. First, we could simply broaden 
the focus from conventional practical environments to all conventional 
environments. Conventional epistemic standards do not arise exclusively in response 
to practical considerations. There is also no reason to assume that we need to decide 
whom to trust only while practically reasoning; we are equally eager to keep our 
theoretical reasoning rational as well, and that involves just as much testimony and 
trust. In fact, Willaschek‟s epistemic practice contextualism does not mention 
practical reasoning at all.
260
 He offers many examples of the kinds of standards that 
govern contexts such as natural science and the courtroom, which need not 
necessarily be connected to a hypothetical practical environment. Kappel also utilizes 
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this more general form of contextualism in his practical explication, which results in 
the following condition:  
K(S1, S1-Sn, p) iff p, and S1 is in a sufficiently good epistemic position such that S1-
Sn, given right circumstances of transmission, ought to take the truth of p for granted 
in their practical and theoretical deliberation.
261
 
Kappel is neutral as to whether the relevant context of deliberation is theoretical or 
practical. Imitating Willaschek and Kappel, we may thus imagine the sorts of 
conventions governing whether or not one may rationally use p as a premise in one‟s 
theoretical environment, and thereby broaden the scope of KAP–CC to encompass 
more knowledge attributions.   
 This response involves very little further argument. Indeed, the only reason that I 
do not take such a line from the beginning, is that Hawthorne‟s practical environment 
is the most fully developed model with which we can distinguish the types of 
contexts to which knowledge attributions are sensitive. Elaborating a model of the 
specific factors that affect theoretical environments would have taken a great deal 
more constructive work, and it was more appropriate to the scope of this thesis to use 
the tools already available.  
 Despite the sufficiency of this moderate adjustment to quiet the objection, I 
would also like to suggest two other possible responses to the objection, both of 
which would require a great deal more argumentation, but which I leave here in the 
interest of peaking curiosity. 
 One more radical approach would be to broaden the notion of practical 
environments and of practical reasoning altogether. Is any knowledge entirely 
useless? The standards to which a subject holds her theoretical knowledge affect her 
epistemic character and self-image. It may well have far reaching and subtle 
consequences throughout her life. One might therefore render theoretic reasoning as 
a form of practical reasoning, carried out towards the intention of, for example, being 
a responsible person. Thus, one may see a historian‟s integrity as indeed a practical 
choice. She may count as knowing the price of cinnamon in medieval Portugal if 
someone could believe it on her authority and accordingly use it as a premise in the 
conventional practical environment of acting as a responsible person would act. 
                                                 
261
 Kappel 2010, p. 79. 
  
137 
 
 The third available tactic would be to consider the alternative hypothesis that 
people need to explain the cognitive behavior of others. The concept of knowledge 
arguably functions to meet that need. One could then connect the need for labeling 
epistemic authority to the need to explain the cognitive behavior of others by means 
of a Williams-type imaginary genealogy. The genealogy would relate this non-
instrumental explanation to its instrumental benefits for the individuals who use the 
social system of epistemic evaluation. One perk of such an alternative explication 
would be to more easily account for how knowledge functions when we attribute it to 
non-human animals, as ethologists often do.
262
 
e. Suggestions for further research 
i. Empirical data and normative stipulation 
I pointed out that disagreements can arise as to which standards convention supports 
or ought to support. The question arises: What should count as a valid knowledge 
attribution, and what should count as a mistake? Such disagreement takes place 
within any society‟s actual epistemic practice and furthermore, were we to go on 
working with convention contextualism, it could just as well take place as we attempt 
to describe society‟s epistemic practice. I focus here on the tools that would be 
available to the latter group, the epistemologists working to clarify the conventional 
standards that govern the use of the concept of knowledge. I suggest that there are 
two avenues of clarification available. However, we should not assume that we will 
ever eliminate vagueness entirely. A good deal of epistemic practice does tolerate 
imprecision. There are no precise standards for petty bets among friends, and there 
arguably need not be.  
 Clarification can occur in two ways: empirical data and normative stipulation. 
Various attempts are being made to integrate epistemology with empirical studies. In 
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relation to this work, doubt has been thrown on armchair analytic attempts to define 
knowledge. As Michael Bishop and J.D. Trout write, 
In fact, we find the temptation to construct a theory to separate out the „justified‟ 
from the „unjustified‟ oddly Scholastic – designed for a kind of prim conceptual 
tidiness rather than for useful guidance.
263
  
The flexibility of KAP–CC provides a basic definition of knowledge which could be 
used and developed by empirical research. Furthermore, the synthesis could 
contribute to such research by suggesting fruitful directions. We must find empirical 
data to discern the allotment of epistemic authority in various fields of a given 
society and the ways these fields compare and interact. For example, a study of 
contrasting legal traditions can show various ways in which epistemic authority can 
be awarded to expert testimony.
264
 A psychological study has revealed a difference 
between the indicator property [being a statistics professor] and the indicator 
property [being a psychology professor]: the former was generally taken to correlate 
more reliably with being right about the professor‟s own subject matter, whereas the 
latter was generally taken to correlate more reliably with being right about general 
life issues.
265
 
 Epistemological work on clarifying the concept of knowledge has relied largely 
on empirical linguistic data. When this data is seen through the model of KAP–CC, 
we find one important guideline: the examples of the use of the word „knowledge‟ 
must not be underdetermined. The generated intuitions cannot be adequately 
interpreted if it is unclear which conventions affected the listener‟s understanding of 
the example. In addition to this guideline, the synthesis suggests several new 
questions that linguistic experiments should consider. Pairs of contrasting examples 
should be set up, so that we may better understand the difference in the standards 
implied by different conventional contexts. While the literature on contextualism has 
already begun this work, the choice of examples has been limited to a few stock 
favorites in which the subject does know in the first, but does not know in the 
second.
266
 It would also be illuminating to test for subtler contrasts, with a wider 
range of conventional contexts. Also, in order to allow for recommendations and 
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social statuses, the public nature of epistemic authority requires the conventional 
context to be transmittable through second and third-hand reports. Examples should 
be constructed to study how these reports affect listeners. Again, while some work 
for and against contextualism has offered examples of such reports, they have been 
radically underdetermined. Finally, the neutrality of KAP–CC as to whether the 
conventional shift is semantic or pragmatic should encourage attention to the non-
semantic features of case studies, such as the speaker‟s tone of voice. 
 Another way to deal with conventional standards is to normatively stipulate 
them. Indeed, when there is impassioned disagreement, this may well be the only 
way to achieve consensus. What should the standards of epistemic authority in 
education be? Should those standards change in a lesson on religion? How should the 
standards governing science be affected by those governing education, art, and 
religion? All these issues already inspire a great deal of work towards their 
resolution. From KAP–CC we may draw the lesson that the final answers need not be 
reductive. The goal is not to figure out the one appropriate set of standards of 
epistemic authority, for each field may and often must operate its own epistemic 
standards. 
ii. Factual and conjectural genealogies 
How does my use of the functional synthesis fit into the range of interpretations I 
describe in sections 2.b and c? As promised, I did not make use of any genealogy, 
but rather confined myself to the tools of Kappel‟s practical explication. However, 
by endorsing convention contextualism I also emphasize the incompleteness of the 
synthesized concept, KAP–CC, that has resulted. Kappel too ends up with a concept 
indexed to the needs of the user, but he does not pursue this sensitivity any farther. 
The omission is crippling, as such a conception of knowledge would fluctuate 
relative to individual rather than public contexts, and thereby lose authority and 
intelligibility. 
 The function of the concept of knowledge may only be fully comprehended 
when we understand the conventions actually at work in any given society. I have 
suggested that empirical sciences, particularly psychology, sociology and linguistics, 
may reveal the details of conventional contexts. Another way to broaden our 
empirical understanding of conventional contexts is to turn to history, i.e. to 
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construct a factual genealogy. A factual genealogy would illuminate the synthesis by 
showing how the use of the concept of knowledge has been modified by different 
conventions at different times and places. In addition, nothing bars the factual 
genealogy from including conjectural claims about the earliest uses of the concept of 
knowledge. 
 Furthermore, it is not necessarily an accident that I, and Craig, begin the 
synthesis with the most individualistic conditions and end with the conditions most 
involving society. It might be too difficult to begin by understanding the social 
aspects of the concept‟s function. In any case, it would be possible to rewrite the 
argumentation for convention contextualism as an imaginary genealogy. However, I 
have preferred to do without that expository device in order to maintain a maximum 
of clarity and simplicity. 
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7. Conclusion 
The method of conceptual synthesis begins with the plausible function of a concept 
and, on that basis, explicates its conditions. While Craig pioneers the use of this 
method in epistemology, his own results remain stubbornly suggestive. His synthesis 
includes a genealogy, meant to illuminate the marks of the concept‟s function, but it 
is unclear just what those marks could be or what kind of genealogy should 
illuminate them. This fogginess has inspired some confusion, as several 
contradictory approaches all claim to employ Craig‟s genealogical method. I outline 
this array of receptions, but do not support any one kind of genealogy, preferring to 
skirt the controversy altogether and apply the method without using a genealogy at 
all.  
 I thus begin by claiming that the concept of knowledge actually fills the need I 
hypothesize. That need, like Craig‟s, synthesizes a goal and a strategy. The goal 
remains the same: pick out the subjects with the true beliefs. The strategy however is 
modified to accommodate the social and diachronic conditions in which any 
epistemic practice must be embedded. Thus, I do not hypothesize that inquirers need 
to detect subjects that could meet their own personal momentary epistemic needs. 
Rather, I hypothesize that inquirers need to recognize subjects who could meet the 
enduring epistemic needs of their entire community. I characterize this social 
diachronic need as the need for epistemic authority. We may explicate three further 
conditions from this new hypothesis. The concept which meets the need for 
epistemic authority would have to confer a recognized social status, honor, and a 
normative obligation to others, for those with epistemic authority ought to be 
believed. 
 Despite these three new conditions, I refuse to remove the individual momentary 
needs from the original hypothesis as well. Thus, I argue that the concept of 
knowledge functions to serve individual inquirers as they evaluate whether a belief 
would be trustworthy enough to use in their own practical reasoning. Any condition 
that function demands must accordingly be included in my synthesis. I find that this 
function demands sensitivity to the attributor‟s practical environment. Despite 
disregarding skepticism and focusing on practical reasoning, a realm typically 
conducive to subject-sensitive invariantism, my synthesis therefore includes a 
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contextualist condition. No other condition would render the synthesis flexible 
enough to describe the function of the concept of knowledge in scenarios of 
testimony evaluation, in which an inquirer expresses whether a potential informant 
would be reliable enough for her practical environment by attributing or withholding 
knowledge to him. 
 The sensitivity condition clashes with the diachronic needs of epistemic 
communities with which my synthesis begins. Specifically, it is difficult to see how 
an attributor-sensitive concept could maintain the intersubjective authority and 
intelligibility required by the hypothesis. If the explicated conditions cannot be 
synthesized into one coherent concept, then the hypothesis must be false. I 
investigate several conceptions of knowledge to see if any of them offer the synthesis 
my hypothesis would require. After several failed attempts, I show that convention 
contextualism offers a plausible solution. If practical environments are publically 
fixed in common conventions, sensitivity need not threaten intersubjective authority 
and intelligibility. Each context has its own absolute standard of authority and the 
pertinent context is nearly always detectable, even in passed down reports or 
overheard tidbits, thanks to a plethora of conventional cues. A brief survey of our 
intuitions regarding real knowledge claims shows that conventions do in fact play an 
irreducible role in how we understand their implications. Thus, with the help of 
convention contextualism, I present the final synthesis of the concept of knowledge. 
The synthesis includes a true belief condition as well as an epistemic authority 
condition, the standards of which are relative to the conventional context in which 
the concept is used. 
 The final chapter compares the synthesis with some widely-shared intuitions 
generated by the concept of knowledge, to ensure that there is no unacceptable 
discrepancy. I consider four objections which claim to pose trouble for the synthesis 
and argue against each of them. Despite some reasons to suspect the contrary, the 
synthesis can generate the appropriate intuitions in cases of disagreement and 
behavior evaluation. Furthermore, basing the synthesis on epistemic authority 
suggests a better means of distinguishing between knowers and mere truth-asserters 
than that provided by Craig‟s good informant based synthesis. Finally, I point out 
that the restriction in scope affected by my attention to practical environments need 
pose no grave problem either. While some adjustment is required to describe the 
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function of the concept of knowledge with respect to useless information, there are 
several plausible ways to do so.  
 In conclusion I point out that the proposed synthesis is well-suited for use as a 
working definition of knowledge in empirical and normative pursuits. Its open-ended 
sensitivity and social orientation make the synthesis a flexible and suggestive 
resource.  
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Abstract 
 
Words and concepts are useful tools; they play a function vital to human survival. 
Conceptual analysis tends to ignore this fact, examining concepts in utter isolation from 
actual social life. As a result, conceptual analysts may unwittingly offer a definition that, 
were it correct, would leave the concept unfit to do the work it has to do. The method of 
conceptual synthesis, as developed by Edward Craig, corrects this mistake by explicitly 
constructing definitions so that they reflect the concepts‟ function. In the following thesis, I 
present Craig‟s conceptual synthesis of knowledge. I then elaborate on and amend his work 
with my own application of the method. 
 
Craig begins with the hypothesis that having a concept of knowledge meets the need to 
evaluate whether an informant is trustworthy. This hypothesis fails because it does not fully 
account for the demands that social and diachronic circumstances place on the concept. I put 
forth an alternative hypothesis: having a concept of knowledge meets the need to label 
epistemic authority. Labeling epistemic authority involves recognizing a fixed social status 
and bestowing honor; therefore my hypothesis does not suffer from a disregard for social 
circumstances. Labeling epistemic authority is also important to subjects who are engaged in 
practical reasoning; they must evaluate which beliefs are trustworthy enough to use as 
reasons for action. To meet this practical need, knowledge attributions must mean different 
things to different people; the concept of knowledge must be relative to the practical context 
of the speaker. This contextual sensitivity may seem to interfere with the social function of 
knowledge. However the intersubjective authority and intelligibility of the concept are 
unaffected because the relevant contexts are constrained by public conventions.  
 
People use the concept of knowledge in their practical reasoning as a label of epistemic 
authority and they interpret it as relative to conventional contexts. By constructing a 
definition that reflects this function, I offer a flexible, suggestive, and intuitively accurate 
conception of knowledge. 
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Abstract 
 
Worte und Begriffe sind nützliche Werkzeuge; sie erfüllen eine dem menschlichen 
Überleben grundlegende Funktion. Begriffliche Analyse übersieht meistens diese Tatsache 
und untersucht Begriffe in totaler Isolation. Demzufolge bieten begriffliche Analytiker eine 
Definition, die, wäre sie richtig, den Begriff diese Funktion nicht erfüllen lassen. Die von 
Edward Craig entwickelte Methode der begrifflichen Synthese korrigiert diesen Fehler, 
indem sie Definitionen explizit erstellt, sodass sie sich an die Funktionen der Begriffen 
anpassen. In der vorliegenden Arbeit stelle ich Craigs begriffliche Synthese des Wissens dar 
und fahre fort, seine Arbeit mit meiner eigenen Anwendung der Methode zu ergänzen und 
verfeinern. 
 
Craig beginnt mit der Hypothese, dass der Wissensbegriff das Bedürfnis erfüllt, andere 
anhand ihrer Vertrauenswürdigkeit einzuschätzen. Diese Hypothese scheitert, weil es die von 
sozialen und diachronischen Umständen geprägten Ansprüche an den Begriff nicht 
berücksichtigt. Ich stelle die Hypothese auf, dass der Wissensbegriff das Bedürfnis erfüllt, 
epistemische Autorität zu bezeichnen. Eine Bezeichnung der epistemischen Autorität 
schließt die Anerkennung einer gefestigten gesellschaftlichen Stellung und das Erweisen 
einer Ehre ein, weshalb meine Hypothese nicht an der Exklusion der sozialen Umstände 
leidet. Epistemische Autorität spielt auch für praktische Entscheidungen eine wichtige Rolle; 
Menschen müssen einschätzen, welche Überzeugungen vertrauenswürdig genug sind, um als 
Gründe für Handlungen verwendet zu werden. Um dieses praktische Bedürfnis zu erfüllen, 
müssen Wissenszuschreibungen verschiedene Bedeutungen in verschiedenen praktischen 
Kontexten haben. Die Kontextsensitivät scheint die soziale Funktion des Wissens zu 
beeinträchtigen, allerdings bleiben intersubjektive Autorität und Verständlichkeit des 
Begriffes unberührt, da die relevanten Kontexte durch öffentliche Konventionen fixiert sind. 
 
Menschen verwenden den Wissensbegriff in ihren praktischen Entscheidungen als eine 
Bezeichnung der epistemischen Autorität und deuten ihn einem konventionellen Kontext 
entsprechend. Indem ich eine Definition erstelle, die diese Funktion richtig erkennt, biete ich 
eine anpassungsfähige, beziehungsreiche und intuitiv zutreffende Konzeption des Wissens.  
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